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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the non-uniformity of Chinese wh-indefinites. The different
algebraic structures associated with the different wh-indefinites are shown to play a signif-
icant role in determining their possible readings. Specifically, those wh-indefinites that are
associated with an unordered algebraic structure can give rise to an epistemic reading in both
positive and negative sentences. Those wh-indefinites that are associated with a structure
of total ordering never have an epistemic reading. They have an existential reading in posi-
tive sentences and generate an insignificance reading under a clausemate negation. Shenme
‘what’ is a special in that it straddles both types of wh-indefinites. When it is interpreted
as kind-denoting, it is associated with an unordered structure and has an epistemic read-
ing; when it is degree-denoting, however, it is associated with a structure of total ordering,
leading to an insignificance reading under a clausemate negation.
The proposed analysis through the lens of algebraic structure not only accounts for the
non-uniformity of Chinese wh-indefinites, but also sheds light on the semantics of the particles
that interact with the wh-indefinites. The multi-functional particle dou is an example. Two
different groups of theories have been proposed to explain its different uses. The first group
analyzes dou as a distributor and the second takes it to be semantically equivalent to English
even. Bringing in the insights of the algebraic theory of Chinese wh-indefinites, I argue that
the second group of theories is on the wrong track.
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Chapter 1: Research questions
Research on Chinese wh-indefinites has been following the syntactic route of negative
polarity item (NPI) licensing initiated by Klima (1964), who argues that NPIs have to be
in the scope of affective operators. In light of the large overlap between the licensers of
English NPIs and those of Chinese wh-indefinites, C. T. Huang (1982) calls wh-indefinites in
Chinese affective items. Subsequent literature, minute differences aside, mainly follows this
line of thinking and analyzes Chinese wh-indefinites as polarity sensitive items (Y.-h. A. Li,
1992; Cheng, 1991, 1994, 1997; J.-W. Lin, 1996, 1998a, 2014; Xie, 2007; Liao, 2011; J. Lin,
Weerman, & Zeijlstra, 2014; J. Lin & Giannakidou, 2015; Chierchia & Liao, 2015). This
chapter argues for a departure from this predominant view, motivated by three unsolved
problems in the research of Chinese wh-indefinites. To avoid obscuring the main points, I
will not provide a complete review of the various syntactic and semantic accounts of Chinese
wh-indefinites. Instead, I will present the three unsolved problems one by one, accompanied
by a discussion of the previous literature when necessary in order to explicate what the
problem is and how it poses a challenge to the extant theories. After that, a set of research
questions informed by those problems is raised and I will give a heads-up as to how this
dissertation will set out to answer these questions.
1
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1 Three unsolved problems
1.1 The epistemic reading
The first problem is brought about by the epistemic reading exhibited by some Chinese
wh-indefinites. In (1), speaker a uses shenme to signal his ignorance as to which kind of books
Zhangsan purchased. This is why it is infelicitous for the hearer b to ask an identification
of what kind it is. In (2), the use of which student explicitly conveys that a does not
know specifically which student Zhangsan met. b’s question, however, refuses to register
a’s ignorance and is therefore infelicitous. In both cases, a Chinese wh-indefinite is used


















































Which student is it?
According to the polarity-sensitivity analysis, however, wh-indefinites are only grammat-
ical when there is an affective operator above it. Typical affective operators include negation,
yes-no question operator, modal verbs like believe or particles that involve a future or infer-
ential environment like sentence-final le. What these operators have in common, according
1All the examples on Chinese wh-indefinites in this dissertation have an additional interrogative interpre-
tation of the wh-words unless mentioned otherwise.
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to J.-W. Lin (1998a), is that they all create a context in which the existence of a referent sat-
isfying the description of the target wh-indefinite is not entailed. Based on this observation,
he proposes a Non-Entailment of Existence Condition (NEEC) on what he calls existential
polarity wh-indefinites (EPWs), given in (3). J.-W. Lin’s (1998a) proposal meshes well with
Xie’s (2007) non-veridicality theory and its successors (J. Lin & Giannakidou, 2015; J. Lin
et al., 2014), all of which claim that Chinese wh-indefinites are only grammatical in the
scope of an non-veridical operator, defined in (4). As we can see, the NEEC theory and the
non-veridicality theory are in the same spirit.
(3) Non-Entailment-of-Existence-Condition on EPWs (NEEC)
The use of an EPW is felicitous iff the proposition in which the EPW appears does
not entail existence of a referent satisfying the description of the EPW.
(J.-W. Lin, 1996, 1998a)
(4) Non-veridicality
A propositional operator F is veridical iff F(p)|=p; otherwise, F is non-veridical.
(Xie, 2007; J. Lin et al., 2014)
The NEEC theory and its kin, however, makes a wrong prediction on (1) and (2). (1) does
entail that there exists a kind such that Zhangsan bought three books of that kind. Likewise,
(2) entails the existence of a student who Zhangsan met today. In other words, despite the
speaker’s ignorance as to what the specific referent is, the existence of a referent satisfying
the description of the target wh-indefinite is not questionable. The NEEC theory predicts
the use of a wh-indefinites is ungrammatical in such cases, so do the non-veridicality theory
and its variants, but the facts speak to the contrary, as the grammaticality of (1) and (2)
shows.
One thing worth pointing out is that even the proponents of the polarity-sensitivity
analysis of Chinese wh-indefinites acknowledge the grammaticality of examples like (1) and
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(2). I found the following sentences from Xie (2007) and J. Lin and Giannakidou (2015). In
(5), shei is used in a past episodic sentence but is fully grammatical. In order to maintain the
non-veridicality theory while accounting for (5), Xie (2007) defines the temporal/aspectual
operator le as non-veridical by stipulation, a stipulation that is otherwise unmotivated. In
another example of his, (6), the progressive aspect does not make a non-veridical operator
either. Dowty (1977) discusses the modal meaning of progressives, but it only arises when
an accomplishment verb is in progressive.2 Here, we have an activity verb and the sentence
does entail that there was something that the relevant person drank. It is not clear to me
why Xie (2007) takes progressives as indiscriminately non-veridical. Last, in (7), J. Lin
and Giannakidou (2015) call progressives as uncertainty contexts. They understand the
uncertainty as something to the effect that the event denoted by the sentence does not
necessarily actually happen, but this is not the case with (7). In a scenario where the speaker













































A man with a low voice is singing a (=some or other/#any) song.
(J. Lin & Giannakidou, 2015)
More evidence against the NEEC theory and those along the same lines comes from
sentences with a wh-indefinite embedded under verbs carrying a factive presupposition. In
(8), the matrix verb regret presupposes the truth of its complement, i.e. Zhangsan bought
2Dowty’s (1977) main concern is that ‘John was crossing the street’ does not entail that John actually
crossed the street in the end. This is not true with an activity verb taking a mass noun as object. If John
was drinking something, it entails that John actually drank something.
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something. In the same vein, the matrix verb discover in (9) also presupposes that some
student cheated. In both cases, the existence of a referent of the wh-indefinite is presupposed.
Moreover, the complement of a factive verb constitutes a veridical, not a non-veridical envi-
ronment. Neither the NEEC theory nor the non-veridicality theory will predict them to be






































Zhangsan discovered that some student cheated, (I don’t know which student it is).
Cross-linguistically, many languages that admit the non-interrogative use of wh-words
are often found to also allow epistemic readings of wh-indefinites. The examples of the epis-
temic usage of Chinese wh-indefinites are in no way Chinese-specific. In Japanese, Sudo
(2010) provides a similar exchange as (1) and (2), shown in (10). He claims that the use
of dare ka in (10) signals the speaker’s ignorance as to which person John was meeting yes-
terday, a judgement shared by Kaneko (2011). The infelicity of the follow-up question is
thus not surprising. In Korean, a wh-word followed by inka explicitly conveys the speaker’s
ignorance regarding the referent of the wh-indefinite. This is why the speaker cannot use
guess who? to contradict this epistemic inference (Kang & Yoon, 2016), shown in (11). In
Russian, Kagan (2007) observes that which suffixed with -to has the same epistemic igno-
rance effect. (12a) means that there is a Swedish person that Masha wants to marry, but the
speaker does not know which Swede it is. Sentence (12b) is infelicitous because its intended
meaning is impossible. World knowledge tells us that it is impossible for a person to know
someone well who s/he even cannot identify.






















































#I know some Swede well. (Kagan, 2007)
The abundant examples illustrating the epistemic use of wh-indefinites in simple affir-
mative sentences and veridical environments, both in Chinese and cross-linguistically, cast
doubt on the hitherto predominant view that Chinese wh-indefinites are polarity sensitive
items and are only licensed in negative or non-veridical contexts. A more general theory
that can accommodate the previous data and the new data is called for.
1.2 Which NPs and negation
Research on Chinese wh-indefinites has been using shenme as a representative, but the
generalization drawn from the data on shenme is made out to apply to the entire group of
wh-indefinites. Some linguists have taken issue with this indiscriminate treatment (Cheng &
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Giannakidou, 2013), giving examples to show that not all Chinese wh-indefinites are equal.3
According to the NEEC theory and its kin, Chinese wh-indefinites take scope under negation
to give rise to a narrow scope existential reading similar to English any. However, Cheng and
Giannakidou (2013) point out that na sg-CL NPs do not behave in this way. (13) is a case
in point. An any reading of which book in this sentence is unavailable. While I agree with
Cheng and Giannakidou’s judgement that na sg-CL NPs are never interpreted as any NPs
under a clausemate negation, their claim that which book only has an interrogative reading






















There is a book that he didn’t buy, (I don’t know which book it is).
The survival of the epistemic reading deals another blow to the traditional analysis of
Chinese wh-indefinites as polarity-sensitive items. The fact that which NPs resist a narrow
scope under negation removes them from the NPI group. Furthermore, even the represen-
tative shenme turns out to sustain an epistemic reading under negation. An any reading is















Zhangsan didn’t buy three books of a certain kind, (I don’t know what kind it is).
In (15), shenme scopes above negation to generate an epistemic ignorance reading, contrary
to the prediction of the NEEC theory or the non-veridicality theory4. On its kind/quality
reading, shenme behaves in the same way as which NPs in that they don’t scope under
3This observation dates back to Cheng (1991, 1997), who draws attention to the fact that which NPs
cannot function as existential quantifiers in typical affective environments laid out in C. T. Huang (1982).
4I should add that Chinese linguists have not come to an agreement on the behavior of shenme under a
clausemate negation. See more discussion in §4 of Chapter 4.
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negation. Moreover, they generate an epistemic reading in declarative sentences.
shei ‘who’ in Chinese also has an epistemic reading that survives in negation, see (16)
and (17). A felicitous context for (16) is that the speaker gets back home to find a book
originally on the table moved to a different place but no one is at home. (17) means that the
speaker knows Zhangsan was criticized because he ignored someone, but he does not know


























Zhangsan didn’t respond to someone today and was criticized by the teacher. (I
don’t know who he ignored).
Starting from na cl NPs, we have seen that the epistemic reading shown in the last
section resists a narrow scope relative to a clausemate negation. Shei and the kind/quality
reading of shenme behave alike in this respect. It is not immediately clear how the previous
analyses can accommodate these data without jeopardizing their core argument that wh-
indefinites are polarity sensitive items. In the next section, we will see that even one and
same wh-indefinite can behave very differently depending on its varying readings in different
sentences. This finding further calls into question the umbrella term wh-indefinites, a name
based solely on the morphological make-up of the relevant words.
1.3 The insignificance reading of shenme
The most typical example to illustrate the NPI reading of Chinese wh-indefinites is (18),
a sentence from J.-W. Lin (1998a). This example, however, has to be taken with a grain of
salt. J.-W. Lin (1998a) himself claims that (18) has another reading—‘I didn’t buy anything
special or important’—but he has no explanation for it. A. Huang (2013) labels this reading
CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 9
as the insignificance reading of shenme. Furthermore, he classifies the insignificance reading































































Zhangsan did eat breakfast today, but he didn’t eat anything good. (quality)
According to the previous analyses, (19a) should be contradictory. Interpreting shenme as
any will result in a semantically anomalous reading ‘Zhangsan did eat breakfast today, but
he didn’t eat anything’. However, the possibility of the insignificance reading still gives the
sentence a chance of being grammatical. The previous analyses, therefore, oversimplifies the
picture of shenme.
The insignificant reading of shenme is not as widely discussed as its alleged polarity-
sensitive reading, though it is mentioned on occasion (J.-W. Lin, 1998a; Hole, 2004; Dong,
2009; Liao, 2011). The only theoretical treatment of it that I know of is given by A. Huang
(2013), who proposes a pragmatic account of it. Before I proceed to the problems of
A. Huang’s theory, I would like to make a comment on his claim about the data in (19).
A. Huang (2013) agrees with J.-W. Lin (1998a) that shenme has an insignificance reading of
quality. However, I find that this reading is not an independent reading and is only possible
when it is parasitic on the insignificance reading of quantity. In the context given in (20)
where Zhangsan had a large amount of poor quality food but nothing good, it is infelic-
itous to use (19b) to describe the scenario. The insignificance reading of quality is only
possible when Zhangsan ate very little and what he ate was bad quality. In other words,
the insignificance reading of quality is only a special case of the insignificance reading of
CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 10
quantity.5
(20) Context: Suppose porridge is considered as a very bad choice for breakfast. Zhangsan
had a lot of porridge this morning, but nothing good other than that.
In addition, I disagree with A. Huang (2013) that shenme by itself can generate an insignif-
icance reading of quality. As a matter of fact, we need to insert an adjective to the effect
of ‘good’ after shenme and before the common noun. (21) is a case in point. The adjective













Zhangsan didn’t eat anything good.
Considering the parasitic nature of the insignificance reading of quality and the need of an
adjective for it to arise, I conclude that shenme by itself can only generate an insignificance
reading of quantity.
Jon Nissenbaum (p.c.) points out that sentence (22) is acceptable in English with an
insignificance reading of the NPI any. For example, if John ate only a blueberry for breakfast,
then we can use (22) to describe the scenario. The so-called insignificance reading, to him,
might just be an exaggeration use of the NPI. In this way, the insignificance reading of
shenme may not be a challenge to the previous polarity-sensitivity analyses.
(22) John ate breakfast today, but he didn’t eat anything!
I argue that the insignificance reading is a real reading instead of a by-product of the NPI-
like use based on the following supporting evidence. Adding an adverb ‘literally’ removes the
exaggeration flavor of any but not the insignificance reading of shenme. Inserting ‘literally’
turns the originally consistent sentence in (22) into a contradictory one, shown in (23),
but it has no effect on the consistency of the counterpart Chinese sentence, see (24).6 The
5I thank Paul Portner for discussing this point with me at MACSIM 6 held at University of Delaware. I
also thank Richard Larson for raising the same point to me.
6I thank Sam Alxatib for this argument.
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insignificance reading of shenme, therefore, is a different beast than the insignificance reading
of any resulting from exaggeration. The former does not live on exaggeration at all.



























Zhangsan did eat breakfast today, but he literally didn’t eat much.
With these clarifications in place, I now turn to the problems of A. Huang’s (2013) prag-
matic theory. According to A. Huang (2013), two important assumptions on the pragmatics
of interlocution work in tandem to generate the insignificance reading. First, the listener
trusts that the speaker is telling the truth, similar to Grice’s Quality Principle. Second,
shenme is always anaphoric to the contextually significant kinds of things. Take Huang’s























Mr. Dog ate a lot of food, but Mr. Pig hardly ate any food.
In a scenario where Mr. Pig did eat food, the listener will first rule out the not any reading,
as s/he trusts that the speaker is telling the truth. Then, the listener seeks an alternative
that can rationalize the use of this sentence. With the second assumption that shenme is
anaphorically linked to the significant kinds of entities in the discourse context where all
things are partitioned into significant vs. insignificant kinds, negation over shenme then
yields the insignificance reading.
The pragmatic theory provides one possible solution to the insignificance reading, but
it suffers at least two problems. First of all, it fails to explain why which NPs never convey
insignificance readings no matter how strong the contextual support is. Which NPs only give
rise to epistemic readings when negation is above them. Why can’t a felicitous context where
which NPs are made anaphorically linked to the contextually significant kinds of things give
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rise to an insignificance reading, in the same way that it does with shenme? What is the
special part of shenme that makes the insignificance reading possible? Second, A. Huang
only discusses the insignificance reading of shenme, but a little expansion in the range of wh-
words to consider immediately reveals the fact that the insignificance reading is not specific
to shenme, but is shared by all amount-denoting wh-indefinites. This is true regardless of
whether the Chinese wh-indefinite is one that goes with countable nouns, as in (26), or
uncountable nouns, as in (27), or common nouns that refer to a scale, as in (28)7. As long
as we have a negation over an amount-denoting wh-indefinite, the so-called insignificance
reading is always the only reading of the sentence. This systematic correlation between the
amount interpretation of wh-indefinites and the insignificance reading they generate under
negation is strongly suggestive of a semantic source operating underlyingly, rather than























































John is not tall.
Since the previous theories do not do justice to the insignificance reading, and A. Huang’s
7The use of ‘ji’ followed directly by a common noun denoting dense scales is lost in Mandarin Chinese,
but is still very active in Cantonese. My own dialect, which belongs to the Lower Yangtze Mandarin, also
maintains this use.
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pragmatic theory suffers two problems itself, a more satisfactory theory is called for.
1.4 Interim conclusion
We have seen that the predominant theory of analyzing Chinese wh-indefinites as po-
larity sensitive items leave three problems unsolved. First, shenme ‘what’ and na sg-CL
NPs ‘which NP’ are grammatical in simple affirmative sentences and veridical environments
to give rise to an epistemic ignorance reading. Neither the NEEC theory nor the non-
veridicality theory allows them in these linguistic contexts, thus making wrong predictions
in this regard. Second, na sg-CL NPs are found to take obligatory wide scope relative to a
clausemate negation, exhibiting a scope behavior opposite to that of an NPI, which presents
further challenges to the previous analyses along the polarity sensitivity lines. Third, inter-
preting shenme as any misses a difference between the two expressions: shenme appears to
permit an amount-reading, and when it does, it contributes an insignificance inference; any
does not behave in this way. Without an account of the insignificance reading, the previous
theories are bound to be insufficient.
2 Research questions
The problems presented above lead to the following research questions:
• In what ways are Chinese wh-indefinites non-uniform?
• Specifically, why can some wh-indefinites like shenme/shei/na ge xuesheng ‘what/who/which
student’ give rise to an epistemic reading, but others like ji ben shu ‘how many books’
cannot? Moreover, why do those that can generate an epistemic reading maintain the
epistemic reading under a clausemate negation, but those that cannot instead generate
an insignificance reading under negation?
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• Why is shenme able to give rise to both an epistemic reading and an insignificance
reading?
• What are the ramifications of the non-uniformity of Chinese wh-indefinites?
This dissertation is set out to answer these questions. I draw upon the research re-
sults from different areas. From the research on wh-words, I follow Szabolcsi and Zwarts
(1993, 1997) in assuming that different readings of wh-words are associated with different
algebraic structures. It is the semantic properties of their associated algebraic structure
that determines whether they can generate an epistemic reading (Chapter 2). From the
degree semantics on gradable adjectives, I capitalize on the idea that gradable expressions
are undergoing a process called ‘negative strengthening’ under negation. It is this process
that produces the insignificance reading for the degree-denoting wh-indefinites in Mandarin
Chinese (Chapter 3). The fact that shenme has both an epistemic reading and an insignif-
icance reading under negation reveals its semantic ambiguity (Chapter 4). The findings on
the different algebraic structures associated with different wh-phrases also shed light on the




In this chapter, I propose an analysis of the epistemic reading of Chinese individual-denoting
indefinites. A generalization that characterizes the correlation between a potential epistemic
reading and the algebraic structure of the set associated with the wh-indefinite will be made.
Specifically, I show that not all individual-denoting wh-indefinites in Chinese are capable
of giving rise to an epistemic reading. Only those with an unordered structure can have
an epistemic reading when the speaker believes that there is a unique true answer to the
corresponding wh-question.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. §1 focuses on the data on the epistemic
indefinites in Chinese. The bare wh-phrases shei ‘who’/shenme ‘what’, singular-marked
which-phrases na ge xuesheng ‘which student’, and numeral-modified which-phrases na liang
ge xuesheng ‘which two students’ can give rise to an epistemic reading, but the plural which-
phrases without a numeral modifier na xie xuesheng ‘which students’ cannot. §2 gives a
generalization regarding the sufficient conditions of the epistemic reading and §3 gives a
formal account based on the generalization. Problems with adopting the two existing the-
ories of epistemic reading will be discussed in §4. These two theories, one couched in the
exhaustification theory and the other in the choice function theory of indefinites, make in-
correct predictions with respect to the behavior of the plural which-phrases with no numeral
15
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modifiers in Chinese. The formal account proposed in §3 will be shown to be advantageous
over the two theories in that it has wider empirical coverage.
1 Which wh-phrases give rise to an epistemic reading?
In Chapter one, we have seen that individual-denoting wh-indefinites in Chinese can give
rise to an epistemic reading. Some examples are given in §1.1. It is sloppy, however, to say
that individual-denoting wh-indefinites have an epistemic reading, since not all individual-





















Zhangsan met someone yesterday and chatted with her for a while. He got back

















































Zhangsan met a neighbor yesterday and chatted with her for a while. He got back





























Zhangsan asked two students in their class to pick up the speaker. The students were
lost. (I don’t know which two students it was).





























In their class, two students did a prank. They carried the bureau and put it on the























Intended: *Zhangsan met with some students yesterday and chatted with them. (I
don’t know which students it was).





















Intended: *Zhangsan gathered some students for a game. (I don’t know which stu-
dents it was).
Only reading: Which students did Zhangsan gather for a game?
From these examples, we see that who/what, the singular which-phrases ‘which neighbor’
(henceforth sg-marked which-phrases) and the plural which-phrases modified by a numeral
‘which two students’ (henceforth num-modified which-phrases) allow an epistemic interpre-
tation, but the plural which-phrase without a numeral modifier ‘which students’ (henceforth
non-num-modified which-phrases) do not. Table 1 summarizes.
Epistemic No epistemic




(e.g. which two students)
Table 1: The wh-phrases that have/do not have an epistemic reading
Intuitively, an epistemic reading is generated when the speaker believes that there is a
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unique true answer to the question raised by the relevant wh-phrase, but she does not know
which among the possible answers is the true answer. Moreover, the speaker is not requesting
the addressee to identify the answer for her. I write this intuition as in (36).
(36) An epistemic reading of a wh-question is generated when
(i) the speaker believes there is a unique true answer to the wh-question.
(ii) the speaker does not know which among the possible answers is the unique true
answer.
(iii) the speaker is not requesting the addressee to identify the unique true answer.
2 The uniqueness inference alone is not a sufficient con-
dition
Given the intuitive characterization of the epistemic reading, we see that an epistemic reading
is allowed when the corresponding wh-question has a uniqueness inference that there is
one and only one true answer to the speaker. The uniqueness inference, therefore, can be
regarded as a necessary condition for the epistemic reading. Is it a sufficient condition? In
this section, I will argue that the uniqueness inference by itself is not a sufficient condition for
the epistemic reading. To achieve this goal, I will go over each type of the wh-phrases in Table
1 by presenting relevant empirical data. Ultimately, we will see that the ordering structure
of the relevant wh-phrases also plays an important role in determining the availability of the
epistemic reading.
2.1 The bare wh-phrase who
Before we delve into the question of whether the uniqueness inference of a who-question is the
sufficient condition for its epistemic reading, we need to clarify a difference between Chinese
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shei ‘who’ and English who8. In English, who is assumed to be number-neutral, including
both atomic and non-atomic individuals in the extension of its NP-complement. In a model
where there are three people, a, b and c, the denotation of who forms a semi join-lattice, as
in Figure 1.
a⊕ b⊕ c
a⊕ b a⊕ c b⊕ c
a b c
Figure 1: Who is number-neutral in English
Chinese shei ‘who’, however, is strictly singular. There are several pieces of evidence
supporting the singularity of Chinese who.
First, unlike who in English, Chinese does not allow shei ‘who’ to take a collective predi-
cate. A true collective predicate ‘surround the castle’ combined with a subject who will result
in an ungrammatical question, as in (37a). However, the same combination is grammatical













Who surrounded the castle?











Who formed a team?
b. Who formed a team?
Chinese shei ‘who’ is not only incompatible with true collective predicates, but also in-
compatible with collective predicates that have distributive sub-entailments (Dowty, 1987;
8The discussion on the bare wh-phrase shenme ‘what’ will be postponed to Chapter 4.
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J.-W. Lin, 1998b; Champollion, 2010). In (39a), for example, the collective predicate ‘gather’
has distributive sub-entailments. If John, Mary, and Sue gathered, it follows that Mary and
Sue gathered. As is shown in this example, Chinese does not allow shei to form a question
with ‘gather’. In (40a), we use a collective predicate that requires exactly two participants,
‘form a pair’, the incompatibility persists. In contrast, English who with the same predicate
produces grammatical questions, see (39b) and (40b).
(39) a. *shei juzai le yiqi
who gather Asp together
Who gathered?
b. Who gathered?
(40) a. *shei jucheng le yi dui’er
who form Asp one pair
Who formed a pair?
b. Who formed a pair?
(37) - (40) show that in Chinese, shei ‘who’ is not compatible with any kind of collective
predicates. This is a categorical difference between Chinese shei and English who, suggesting
that the assumption on the algebraic structure associated with English who cannot be directly
carried over to Chinese shei.
Another piece of evidence for the singularity of shei ‘who’ in Chinese is that two whos
connected with and form a plurality that has two atomic parts. While we have seen that
a single who is ungrammatical with the collective predicate ‘form a pair’ (40a), the plural
expression shei gen shei ‘who and who’ is grammatical with the same collective predicate,















Who and who formed a pair?
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Compare (41) and (40b), a natural question to ask is — why is the same question asked
in different ways in Chinese and English respectively? The answer lies in the different
algebraic structures associated with Chinese who and English who, as already suggested by
their incompatibility/compatibility with collective predicates. In Chinese, the entities in the
denotation of who are all singular. A plurality can only be derived from these singularities
using a sum operator ‘and’. In English, however, who not only has singular entities but also
plural entities in its denotation. Therefore, there is no need for a sum operator to access a
plurality. In a model where there are three individuals, the algebraic structure associated
with Chinese shei ‘who’ is an unordered set, shown in Figure 2, while in English, the algebraic
structure associated with who is a partially ordered set that forms a join semi-lattice, as we
have seen in Figure 1, replicated here in Figure 3.
{a, b, c}
Figure 2: Chinese who
a⊕ b⊕ c
a⊕ b a⊕ c b⊕ c
a b c
Figure 3: English who
Although Chinese who is strictly singular, it permits conjunctive answers when combined
with a non-collective predicate. (42) is an example. Since the extension of Chinese who does
not include the plurality of individuals, the propositional set denoted by the who-question
in (42a is as in (43), following the standard treatment of wh-questions as the set of their
possible answers (Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977). The conjunctive answer is not a member
of this set and can only be derived by picking out the two true answers from the set and
connecting them with a conjunction. In other words, the who-question in (42a) in the given
context does not presuppose a unique true answer and therefore does not have a uniqueness
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inference.


















John and Mary smiled.
(43) Jshei xiao leK = {j smiled,m smiled, s smiled}
Since a Chinese who-question does not formally presuppose a unique true answer, we can
only force it in the speaker’s epistemic state by giving a special context. When we do so, we
find that a context where the speaker presupposes a unique true answer allows an epistemic
reading of a who-question, but a context that lacks such a presupposition does not allow an
epistemic reading. (44) - (45) illustrate.



























Someone went to the party yesterday and brought back a gift. (I don’t know who it
is.)




























Intended: #Someone or some people went to the party yesterday and brought back
a gift. (I don’t know who it is or who they are.)
So far, the data on Chinese who-question is compatible with the hypothesis that the
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uniqueness inference of a wh-question is a sufficient condition for an epistemic reading of the
same question.
2.2 The sg-marked which-phrases
A sg-marked which-phrase like na ge xuesheng ‘which student’ in Chinese behaves the same
as its counterpart in English in terms of its obligatory uniqueness inference.












(47) Wh-question with a sg-marked which-phrase
a. JstudentK = {x : student@(x)}
b. Jwhich student smiledK = {̂ x smiled : student@(x)}
= {̂ j smiled,ˆm smiled, ŝ smiled}
In (46), the singular noun ‘student’ denotes a set of atomic students, as in (47a)9. The
wh-question denotes a set of propositions, each corresponding to an atomic student, as in
(47b). This question presupposes a unique true answer and is ruled out in contexts where
more than one propositions in the denotational set are true. This is why it is infelicitous
in the given context. For such questions, the only way to form a conjunctive answer is
to pick out the true answers and connect them with a conjunction. However, conjunctive
answers directly contradict the uniqueness presupposition of a wh-question with a sg-marked
which-phrase and therefore are never possible for them.
9I’m only concerned with the de re reading of the NP restriction of the which-phrase. The de re/de dicto
complication is orthogonal to the current problem and will not be discussed further. I refer the interested
readers to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984).
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The sg-marked which-phrases are similar to the bare wh-phrase who. They also denote
a set of unordered singular individuals. Due to the singularity, they are incompatible with
collective predicates. Moreover, the propositional set resulted from their combination with
a non-collective predicate is an unordered set as well, with all the propositions therein inde-
pendent of each other. The only difference between the two types of wh-phrases is that while
who-questions do not necessarily require a unique true answer and need a specific context
to force it, as we have seen in (44), the sg-marked which-phrases obligatorily give rise to a
uniqueness inference, as shown in (46).
Interpreted relative to the speaker’s epistemic state, the wh-questions containing sg-
marked which-phrases will always force a unique true answer due to their obligatory unique-
ness inference. Their capability of generating an epistemic reading, as shown in (31), is
compatible with the hypothesis that uniqueness inference is a sufficient condition for the
epistemic reading.
2.3 num-modified plural which-phrases
The num-modified plural which-phrases in Chinese behave very similarly to the sg-marked
which-phrases. They have an obligatory uniqueness inference and are infelicitous in any con-
text where the uniqueness inference is unsatisfied. Given their plurality, the num-modified
plural which-phrases can combine with a distributive or a collective predicate. In either case,
the obligatory uniqueness inference persists.














Which two students smiled?
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(49) Context: Among the four students, John and Mary formed a pair. Bill and Sue

















Which two students formed a pair?
(50) a. JxueshengK = {x : students@(x)}
=

j ⊕m⊕ b⊕ s,
j ⊕m⊕ b, j ⊕m⊕ s, j ⊕ b⊕ s,m⊕ b⊕ s,
j ⊕m, j ⊕ b, j ⊕ s,m⊕ b,m⊕ s, b⊕ s,
j,m, b, s

b. Jliang ge xueshengK = {x : |x| = 2 ∧ students@(x)}
= {j ⊕m, j ⊕ b, j ⊕ s,m⊕ b,m⊕ s, b⊕ s}
In (48) - (49), the bare noun xuesheng is number-neutral and denotes a set that contains
not only singular students but also pluralities of students, semantically the same as the bare
plural ‘students’ in English10. The numeral two then confines the set members only to those
that satisfy the cardinality ‘two’, as in (50b).
In the context of (48) where which two students combines with a distributive predicate,
the wh-question, whose denotation is the propositional set in (51), does not have a unique
true answer. For example, both ‘John and Mary smiled’ and ‘John and Sue smiled’ are
true. This violates the requirement of the uniqueness inference. Hence the infelicity of
10We are following Schwarzschild (1996), Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro (2005) and references
therein in the assumption that English bare plurals are number-neutral. This is supported by the ‘none’
reading they generate when embedded under negation. Chinese bare nouns also have a ‘none reading’ under









Zhangsan didn’t see any student.
ii Zhangsan didn’t see students = Zhangsan didn’t see any student.
CHAPTER 2: INDIVIDUAL-DENOTING WH-INDEFINITES 26
the wh-question. In (49), which two students combines with a collective predicate and the
resulting propositional set also has more than one true answer. Both ‘John and Mary formed
a pair’ and ‘Bill and Sue formed a pair’ are true. Again, the dissatisfaction of the uniqueness
inference makes the wh-question infelicitous in the given context.
(51) a. Jna liang ge xuesheng xiao leK
= {̂ x smiled : |x| = 2 ∧ student@(x)}
=

ĵ ⊕m smiled, ĵ ⊕ b smiled,
ĵ ⊕ s smiled,ˆm⊕ b smiled,




ĵ smiled ∧m smiled, ĵ smiled ∧ b smiled,
ĵ smiled ∧ s smiled,ˆm smiled ∧ s smiled,
ˆm smiled ∧ s smiled, b̂ smiled ∧ s smiled

b. Jna liang ge xuesheng zucheng le yi dui′erK
= {̂ x formed a pair : |x| = 2 ∧ student@(x)}
=

ĵ ⊕m fap, ĵ ⊕ b fap,
ĵ ⊕ s fap,ˆm⊕ b fap,
ˆm⊕ s fap, b̂⊕ s fap

We know from examples (32) and (33) in §1 that which two NP allows an epistemic
reading, regardless of whether the predicate is distributive or collective. Since their unique-
ness inference is obligatory no matter the predicate is distributive or collective, the data
conforms to the hypothesis that the uniqueness inference is a sufficient condition for the
epistemic reading.
The discussion on the bare wh-phrase who, the sg-marked which-phrases, and num-
modified which-phrases in Chinese has not pose any challenge to the hypothesis that the
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uniqueness inference is a sufficient condition for the epistemic reading. In the next section,
we will see that this consistent picture will be broken by the non-num-modified which-
phrases in Chinese.
2.4 non-num-modified plural which-phrases
In English, the number-neutral which-phrases take a bare plural as their NP-complement.
The bare plurals, as mentioned in footnote 10, contain both atomic and plural individuals
in their extension. Their plural reading is considered as an implicature and can be canceled
in downward-entailing environment(Sauerland et al., 2005; Spector, 2007, a.o.). Chinese
non-num-modified plural which-phrases na xie NP, however, only have plural individuals in
their denotational set. Their plural reading is lexically encoded by the plural classifier xie
and cannot be canceled in downward-entailing environment.
The following examples from Wu (2019) illustrate the difference between English and
Chinese. In (52), we see that both the Chinese yi xie shu ‘some books’ and the English bare
plural ‘books’ can serve as the antecedent of a plural anaphor in positive sentences. In a DE
context, English bare plurals may include singulars in their denotation but Chinese does not






























Yesterday I bought some books. I brought *it/them home.























If he doesn’t have some children he at least has one.
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Everyone who has some children, please raise your hand.
(Include only people who have 2 or more children)
b. Everyone who has children, please raise your hand.
(Include people who have at least 1 children)
Given the semantic plurality of Chinese number-neutral which-phrases, they are compat-
ible with both non-collective and collective predicates. In either case, they do not require
an obligatory uniqueness inference.

























John, Mary and Sue smiled.













































John and Mary formed a pair. Bill and Sue formed a pair.
(57) Jxie xueshengK = {x : |x| > 1 ∧ students@(x)}
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=

j ⊕m⊕ b⊕ s,
j ⊕m⊕ b, j ⊕m⊕ s, j ⊕ b⊕ s,m⊕ b⊕ s,
j ⊕m, j ⊕ b, j ⊕ s,m⊕ b,m⊕ s, b⊕ s

In (55) and (56), the bare noun xuesheng ‘student’ denotes a set that contains both atomic
students and pluralities of students, as in (50a). The plural classifier xie then confines the
set members to the plural ones only, (57).
In (55), na xie xuesheng combines with a distributive predicate and produces the propo-
sitional set in (58). In the given context, this wh-question does not have a unique true
answer. For example, both ‘John and Mary smiled’ and ‘John and Sue smiled’ are true.
Different from the num-modified plural which-phrases in Chinese, however, the question is
still felicitous in this context, indicating that the non-num-modified which-phrases do not
require an obligatory uniqueness inference.
(58) Jna xie xuesheng xiao leK
=

j ⊕m⊕ b⊕ s smiled
j ⊕m⊕ b smiled, j ⊕m⊕ s smiled,
j ⊕ b⊕ s smiled,m⊕ b⊕ s smiled,
j ⊕m smiled, j ⊕ b smiled, j ⊕ s smiled,




j smiled ∧m smiled ∧ b smiled ∧ s smiled
j smiled ∧m smiled ∧ b smiled, j smiled ∧m smiled ∧ s smiled,
j smiled ∧ b smiled ∧ s smiled,m smiled ∧ b smiled ∧ s smiled,
j smiled ∧m smiled, j smiled ∧ b smiled, j smiled ∧ s smiled,
m smiled ∧ b smiled,m smiled ∧ s smiled, b smiled ∧ s smiled

In (56), na xie xuesheng combines with a collective predicate.The propositional set de-
noted by the question is as in (59). This time, the wh-question does not have a unique true
answer in the given context either. Both ‘John and Mary formed a pair’ and ‘Bill and Sue
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formed a pair’ are true11. The felicity of the wh-question further corroborates the conclusion
that the non-num-modified which-phrases do not require an obligatory uniqueness inference.
(59) Jna xie xuesheng zucheng le yi dui′erK
=

j ⊕m⊕ b⊕ s fap
j ⊕m⊕ b fap, j ⊕m⊕ s fap, j ⊕ b⊕ s fap,m⊕ b⊕ s fap,
j ⊕m fap, j ⊕ b fap, j ⊕ s fap,
m⊕ b fap,m⊕ s fap, b⊕ s fap

Since no necessary uniqueness inference is required for the non-num-modified which-
phrases, we can only force a unique true answer for such questions by putting them in a
special context. First, when a non-num-modified which-phrase combines with a distributive
predicate, the propositions in the wh-question are closed under conjunction, as has been
shown in (58). Therefore, the only way to force a unique true answer is to make one of the
answers having only two conjuncts true and all the other answers false. (60) provides such a
context. Since the total number of students that smiled is two, only one of the propositions
that involve two of the students can be true. Given that the propositional set is closed
under conjunction, all the other answers except the unique true answer have to be false. The
readers can verify this using the propositional set in (58).























Bill and Sue smiled.
11Some answers in the set are crossed out because they are always false and can’t be true. The predicate
‘form a pair’ requires a plurality containing two and no more atomic individuals as its subject. Any plurality
that has more atomic parts can never form a pair.
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If uniqueness inference is a sufficient condition for the epistemic reading, a context that forces
a uniqueness inference and facilitates an epistemic reading should bring out this reading
naturally. The context in (61), for example, is such a context. It dictates that the answer to
the question has to be selected from the propositions that involve only two of the students.
Lisi knows that only two students smiled, so only one of the propositions that involve two
students can be selected. Lisi’s uncertainty about which specific two students smiled also
makes an epistemic reading natural in this case. Despite all the contextual support, however,
the epistemic reading is just impossible.
(61) Context: When John was telling a joke, Bill and Sue smiled. Lisi knows two students





















Intended: #When John was telling a joke, some students smiled, (I don’t know
who smiled though.)
Second, when a non-num-modified which-phrase combines with a collective predicate,
we can only force a uniqueness inference by giving a special context as well. For example,
in (62), the wh-question has a unique true answer because team A can only be formed by a
certain plurality of students.
(62) Context: The students in John’s class formed three different teams for a game, team
































Mary, Bill and Sue formed team A.
The same question, however, does not allow an epistemic reading, even if we put it in a
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context that forces a uniqueness inference and is amenable to an epistemic use. In (63a), the
wh-question necessarily has a unique true answer, for the simple reason that team A cannot
be formed by two different pluralities of people. Moreover, the given context makes the
epistemic reading of the wh-question the most natural one. Despite the contextual amenity,
however, the epistemic reading is impossible.
(63) Context: Some students from John’s class formed team A and won the School Cup
for basketball. Zhangsan knows team A won but he does not know which students

































Some students from John’s class formed team A and won the championship of the
school basketball game. (I don’t know which students formed team A though.)
We have found that different from the sg-marked or num-modified which-phrases, the
non-num-modified which-phrases do not require a uniqueness inference. To test whether the
uniqueness inference is a sufficient condition for the epistemic reading, we come up with very
special contexts to force the a uniqueness inference and facilitate an epistemic use. However,
even if the non-num-modified which-phrases are placed in the most amenable context, they
still cannot give rise to an epistemic reading. This indicates that the uniqueness inference is
not a sufficient condition for an epistemic reading.
2.5 Interim conclusion
In the previous four sections, I have shown that the sg-marked and num-modified which-
phrases obligatorily require a uniqueness inference that there is one and only one true answer.
Since they allow epistemic readings, the data on them are consistent with the hypothesis
that the uniqueness inference is a sufficient condition for the epistemic reading. As for
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the bare wh-phrase who in Chinese, it does not have an obligatory uniqueness inference in
questions. However, it allows an epistemic reading only in those contexts where the speaker
knows there is a unique true answer. Therefore, the data on who-questions in Chinese are
also supportive of the uniqueness inference as a sufficient condition for an epistemic reading.
The picture changes, however, when the non-num-modified which-phrases in Chinese are
considered. They do not have an obligatory uniqueness inference in questions and they
rule out the epistemic reading altogether even in contexts that force a uniqueness inference
and facilitate an epistemic reading. The data on the non-num-modified which-phrases in
Chinese, therefore, challenges the hypothesis that the uniqueness inference is a sufficient
condition for the epistemic reading head-on. Table 2 presents a summary of all the data.
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ represents the possibility and impossibility of an epistemic reading respectively.
The frowning faces indicate where the hypothesis makes a wrong prediction.
Type of wh-phrase E.g. non-collective collectiveuniqueness no uniqueness uniqueness no uniqueness
Bare wh-phrase who Yes No N.A.
sg-marked which student Yes N.A. N.A.
num-modified which two students Yes N.A. Yes N.A.
non-num-modified which students No § No No § No
Table 2: Uniqueness inference as a predictor for the epistemic reading
Now that we have proved that the uniqueness inference is not a sufficient condition for
the epistemic reading, a natural follow-up question to ask is: what is the sufficient condition
for the epistemic reading then?
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3 A theory of the epistemic reading
3.1 The sufficient condition for the epistemic reading
In the previous section, we have studied four different types of wh-phrases. Using the unique-
ness inference as a predictor of an epistemic reading, we find that it makes correct pre-
dictions for the bare wh-phrase who, sg-marked which-phrases and num-modified plural
which-phrases, but makes wrong predictions for the non-num-modified which-phrases. If a
uniqueness inference arises, the first three types of wh-phrases all allow an epistemic reading.
The last type, however, never permits an epistemic reading even if we put it in the most
felicitous context. From the data, I conclude that the uniqueness inference calculated at the
propositional level by itself is not a predictor of epistemic readings we find with Chinese
wh-phrases.
Our task, then, is to find a property that distinguishes the first three types of wh-phrases
from the last type of wh-phrase, keeping in mind that the uniqueness inference is still neces-
sary. The different algebraic structures associated with the four different types of wh-phrases
exactly discriminate between the former three and last one. While the former three all have
an unordered structure, the last one has a partial-ordering structure, shown here in (64)12.
(64) Context: There are three relevant individuals, John, Mary and Sue, all of whom are
students.
a. Bare wh-phrase shei ‘who’
JsheiK = {j,m, s}
b. sg-marked which-phrase na ge xuesheng ‘which student’
Jna ge xueshengK = {j,m, s}
12For a simple exposition the different algebraic structures associated with the different wh-phrases, I write
their denotation as a set of the entities in the domain of their NP-complement. The actual denotation of a
wh-phrase we will use in the formal theory of the epistemic reading is one based on the structured meaning
approach. See §3.2 of this chapter.
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c. num-modified which-phrase na liang ge xuesheng ‘which two students’
Jna liang ge xueshengK = {j ⊕m, j ⊕ s,m⊕ s}
d. non-num-modified which-phrase na xie xuesheng ‘which students’
Jna xie xueshengK = {j ⊕m, j ⊕ s,m⊕ s, j ⊕m⊕ s}
Based on the relevance of the ordering structure of the wh-phrases and the uniqueness
inference of the corresponding wh-questions in the account of the epistemic reading, I argue
that the sufficient condition of an epistemic reading consists of two parts. One is imposed
locally to the wh-phrase, and one is imposed at the propositional level on the entire wh-
question.
(65) Sufficient condition for the epistemic reading of a wh-clause
a. The wh-phrase assumes an unordered structure.
b. The corresponding propositional set has a unique true answer to the speaker.
I have reiterated once and again that the second sub-condition of the two-part sufficient
condition, the uniqueness inference alone cannot be a sufficient condition for the epistemic
reading, using examples of the non-num-modified which-phrases in Chinese as supporting
evidence. The same reiteration should apply to the first sub-condition as well. Recall that
in (45), repeated in (66), we have a Chinese who-question where who has an unordered
structure, but the entire question does not have a uniqueness true answer. As a result, an
epistemic reading is impossible. The two-part sufficient condition for an epistemic reading in
(65), therefore, has to have its two sub-conditions work together to make correct predictions.
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Intended: #Someone or some people went to the party yesterday and brought back
a gift. (I don’t know who it is or who they are.)
3.2 A formal theory of the epistemic reading
The prior discussion leads to a natural conclusion when it comes to the formal account of
the epistemic reading: we need a formal theory which can track the information contributed
by the local wh-phrase and that contributed by the propositional set denoted by the entire
wh-question at the same time.
In the following, I will propose a formal account of the epistemic reading built on the
structured meaning approach13 to the semantics of questions (Hausser & Zaefferer, 1979; von
Stechow & Zimmermann, 1984; Von Stechow, 1990; Krifka, 2002, a.o.). The basic idea of
this approach is that a question Q denotes a function that yields a proposition when applied
to its answer. In this approach, a wh-phrase takes a predicate and restricts its domain by
the NP-complement, (67). (69) is a simple example showing that the question denotation
returns a proposition when taking a short answer as its input.
(67) JwhoK= λPλxλw : person(x).P (x)(w)
(68) Jwho cameK= λxλw.came(x)(w)
(69) a. Who came?
b. John.
c. Jwho cameK(JJohnK)= λw.came(j)(w)
The denotational set of a wh-phrase in the traditional propositional set approach to
questions is now the domain of the function denoted by a wh-question. For simplicity, I will
continue to use the term ‘the denotational set of the wh-phrase’ when I refer to the domain
of the wh-question. The propositional set denoted by a wh-question before is now the range
13The structured meaning approach is also called the ‘categorial’ approach or the ‘functional’ approach.
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of the function denoted by the question. Therefore, in the structured approach, we can
easily access the denotational set of the wh-phrase and the familiar propositional set of the
possible answers to the corresponding question. This makes it possible to write an operator
that imposes a constraint on the local wh-phrase as well as the propositional set.
(70) Suppose the partial function denoted by a wh-question is f
a. The denotational set of the wh-phrase: Dom(f)
b. The propositional set of its possible answers: Range(f)
I posit an epistemic check operator, ep, in the logical form of an epistemic statement,
whose semantics is presented in (71). ep is subscripted with a variable indicating whose
epistemic state it operates on. For simplicity, we only discuss cases where the epistemic
reading is interpreted relative to the epistemic state of the speaker and therefore here in the
entry the subscript is s. ep takes a world w and a question f as its input, and presupposes
that the domain of the partial function denoted by f is an unordered set and that the set of
possible answers induces a partition on the doxastic worlds of the speaker in w. When the
two presuppositions are satisfied, ep returns true if and only if there is an answer from the
answer set that true in w.
(71) JEpsK = λwλf : Dom(f) is unordered ∧ Partition(Range(f), Doxws ).
∃p ∈ Range(f)[p(w) = 1]
a. Partition(Q, I) is true
iff {λw.Maxinf (Q,w) = p : p ∈ Q} partitions I
iff ∀r ∈ {λw.Maxinf (Q,w) = p : p ∈ Q}[∃w′ ∈ I[r(w′) = 1]]
&∀w′ ∈ I[∃r ∈ {λw.Maxinf (Q,w) = p : p ∈ Q}[r(w′) = 1]]
b. Maxinf (Q,w) = p iff p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈ Q[q(w) = 1→ p ⊆ q]
c. Doxws is a set of doxastic worlds accessible to the speaker in w
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Let’s take (72) as an example for illustration. Suppose we are in a context where there are
only two people that were potentially seen by John — Bill, Mary. These are the only people
in the extension of the NP complement of shei ‘who’, and we restrict the domain of shei with









John saw someone, (I don’t know who he saw though).
For an epistemic reading to arise, ep comes in. The partial function denoted by the wh-
clause is as in (76b). ep first checks whether the domain of this function is unordered. Since in
the given context, the domain of the function is the set of the two singular individuals {b,m},
the first presupposition is satisfied. In the evaluation world w@, the second presupposition
of ep requires that the range of the function denoted by the wh-clause induce a partition on
the doxastic worlds accessible to the speaker in w@, as shown in (77). For this to be true,
in each doxastic world of the speaker, there is one and only one person that John saw, and
for each person in the domain, there is a doxastic world of the speaker in which John saw
him/her. In the given context, this means that the speaker believes that John saw only one
of Bill and Mary. Moreover, to the speaker, it could be Bill and it could be Mary. Figure 4
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(74) JEpsK = λwλf : Dom(f) is unordered ∧ Partition(Range(f), Doxws ).
∃p ∈ Range(f)[p(w) = 1]
(75) JsheiDK= λPλxλw : person(x) ∧ x ∈ D.P (x)(w)
(76) J 2 K= λx : person(x) ∧ x ∈ {b,m}.λw.saw(x)(j)(w)
a. Dom(J 2 K) = {b,m}
b. Range(J 2 K) = {λw.saw(x)(j)(w) : x ∈ {b,m}}
= {λw.saw(b)(j)(w), λw.saw(m)(j)(w)}
(77) Partition(Range(J 2 K), Doxw@s )=1
iff {λw.Maxinf (Range(J 2 K), w) = p : p ∈ Range(J 2 K)} partitions Doxw@s
a. {λw.Maxinf (Range(J 2 K), w) = p : p ∈ Range(J 2 K)}
= {λw.saw(b)(j)(w) ∧ ¬saw(m)(j)(w), λw.saw(m)(j)(w) ∧ ¬saw(b)(j)(w)}
b. Partition(Range(J 2 K), Doxw@s )=1
iff (77a) partitions Doxw@s



















Figure 4: Two scenarios for (72)
When both presuppositions imposed by ep are satisfied, (72) makes an assertion that
John saw someone in w@.
How does the current account capture those two conditions? First of all, the require-
ment that the local wh-phrase has to be associated with an unordered set of entities in
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the extension of its NP-complement is built into the entry of ep as its first presupposition.
Second, the uniqueness condition that the speaker believes there is only one true answer to
the corresponding wh-question is captured by the second presupposition of ep, a partition
presupposition.
What about the epistemic reading in a negative sentence? (78) has a negation in it and
the epistemic reading of shei ‘who’ survives. If shei moves across the negation, the epistemic
reading is naturally captured, as shown in (79). Suppose again that we are in a context
where there are only two relevant people, Bill and Mary, that were potentially seen or not
seen by John. (78) is predicted to be defined only in a context where the speaker believes
that there is a only one of Bill and Mary that John didn’t see14. If defined, (78) asserts that


















a. J 1 K = {b,m} is unordered &
∀w′ ∈ Doxw@s [∃p ∈ {λw.saw(b)(j)(w) ∧ ¬saw(m)(j)(w), λw.saw(m)(j)(w) ∧
¬saw(b)(j)(w)}[p(w′) = 1]]
∧∀p ∈ {λw.saw(b)(j)(w)∧¬saw(m)(j)(w), λw.saw(m)(j)(w)∧¬saw(b)(j)(w)}[∃w′ ∈
14The other presupposition that the set {b,m} is unordered is automatically satisfied due to the fact that
shei ‘who’ in Chinese is singular.




An important question we have to answer is why a wh-phrase used epistemically takes
scope over the clausemate negation. Imagine that sentence (78) in the same context is
interpreted with the negation scoping over the wh-phrase. Accordingly, the LF is as in (80).
With the common assumption that negation is a presupposition hole, we will end up with










a. J 1 K = {b,m} is unordered &
∀w′ ∈ Doxw@s [∃p ∈ {λw.saw(b)(j)(w) ∧ ¬saw(m)(j)(w), λw.saw(m)(j)(w) ∧
¬saw(b)(j)(w)}[p(w′) = 1]]




The truth condition says sentence (80) is defined only in a context where the speaker
believes John saw only one of Bill and Mary. If defined, (80) asserts that John did not see
anyone. Following the assumption that the epistemic accessibility relation is reflexive, so
that the evaluation world belongs to the set of speaker’s doxastic worlds, the truth condition
is destined to be contradictory. This is why we never find an epistemic indefinite scoping
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under a clausemate negation.
4 Advantage of the present account
In this section, I will elaborate two advantages of the current theory over the other theories of
epistemic indefinites on the market. Specifically, I will briefly review two existing theories,
one couched in the exhaustification theory (Fox, 2007; Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2012)
and one framed within the general choice functional theory of indefinites (Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito, 2010, 2011), and then point out their incorrect predictions when applied
to the Mandarin Chinese data. Our theory will be shown to have wider empirical coverage,
making correct predictions for Mandarin Chinese as well as English and Spanish.
4.1 Epistemic reading in the exhaustification theory
For a simple disjunctive sentence (81), we get three kinds of inferences. The basic inference
follows from the basic semantic reading of the sentence. The ignorance inferences15 are tra-
ditionally derived using the general pragmatic principles governing conversational exchanges
(Grice, 1975). Specifically, they are derived from the Maxim of Quantity which requires
interlocutors to contribute as much information as possible.16
15The epistemic ignorance reading in the exhaustification theory is referred to as ‘ignorance inferences’.
For terminological consistency, I will continue using the name ‘epistemic reading’.
16Here is how the ignorance inferences are derived. With the assumption that both disjuncts are relevant
to sentence (81), we will have to conclude that the speaker does not know that John saw Mary and she
does not know that John saw Sue, as the two alternative sentences containing only one of the two disjuncts
are both logically stronger than (81). Based on Maxim of Quantity, the speaker would have uttered the
alternatives if she knows they are true. Since she uttered the disjunctive (81) rather than either alternative,
it must be that for either alternative, she does not know that it is true. Strictly speaking, that the speaker
does not know that John saw Mary is not an ignorance inference, because it is compatible with a scenario
where the speaker knows that John did not see Mary and also compatible with a scenario where the speaker
is not opinionated about whether John saw Mary. The former scenario is not a speaker-ignorance scenario.
We need some more reasoning to obtain the ignorance inferences for the two disjunct alternatives. Suppose
that the speaker knows that John did not see Mary, together with the assumption that interlocutors only
utter what they believe to be true (Maxim of Quality from (Grice, 1975), we conclude that the speaker
knows that John saw Sue. However, this inference contradicts the ignorance inference that the speaker does
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(81) John saw Mary or Sue.
a. Basic inference:
John saw Mary or Sue or both.
b. Scalar implicature (henceforth SI):
John didn’t see both Mary and Sue.
c. Ignorance inferences:
The speaker does not know that John saw Mary.17
The speaker does not know that John saw Sue.
(82) Maxim of Quantity:
If S1 and S2 are both relevant to the topic of conversation and S1 is informative than
S2, if the speaker believes that both are true, the speaker should utter S1 rather than
S2.
One main view of the exhausitification theory is that the scalar implicatures and the ig-
norance inferences are computed in different modules pertaining to language. While the
SIs are computed in the formal grammar, the ignorance inferences are computed post-
compositionally in the pragmatics(Fox, 2007, 2014)18. The argument is quite involved and
will not be reviewed in detail here. Instead, I will show that the computation of igno-
rance inferences as argued in the exhaustification theory will make incorrect predictions for
Mandarin Chinese data. Before we get there, however, let’s first see how the exhaustification
theory explains the three kinds of inferences observed for (81). The basic inference, of course,
follows from the basic semantic meaning of the sentence. What about the other two?
not know that John saw Sue. We therefore have to retract our initial supposition and conclude that the
speaker does not know that John did not see Mary. That the speaker does not know that John saw Mary
and also does not know that John did not see Mary is an ignorance inference. The same reasoning applies
to the other disjunct alternative and the same kind of ignorance inference will be derived.
17The readers should set aside the factivity associated with the verb ‘know’ in the ignorance inferences.
18Recently, there is some argument in the exhaustification theory that the ignorance inferences should also
be computed in the grammar. For more details, see Meyer (2013).
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First of all, the SI is derived by a covert sentential operator Exh appended to the utter-
ance whose semantics is akin to only. Basically, Exh affirms the prejacent and negates all
the innocently-excludable (I-E) alternatives to the prejacent.
(83) JExhK=λCλpλw.p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q[q ∈ I-E(p, C)→ q(w) = 0]
a. I-E(p, C) = ∩{C ′ ⊆ C : C ′ is a maximal set in C s.t. C ′¬ ∪ {p} is consistent}
b. C¬ = {¬p : p ∈ C}
The application of Exh is couched in the focus theory developed in Rooth (1985, 1992),
where a linguistic expression is argued to have two semantic values, an ordinary value and
a focus value. The focus value is defined as in (84), giving a non-trivial set of F(ocus)-
alternatives when the expression is focus-marked. The F-alternatives grow point-wise based
on the Point-wise Functional Application Rule (PWFA), (85). A simple compositional ex-
ample illustrating PWFA is given in (86). When a focus-sensitive operator takes a prejacent
containing a focus-marked expression as its input, the focus value of the prejacent plays an
important role in constraining the format of the alternatives in the quantificational domain
of the operator. The way this is achieved is via a ∼ operator which takes a variable C and
imposes a presupposition that C is a subset of the focus value of the prejacent using a focus
interpretation principle. The focus-sensitive operator will then access its quantificational
domain via a free variable C whose value is pragmatically fixed to be identical to the afore-




Dτ if α is F-marked
{JατK} if α is not F-marked




= {f(x) : f ∈JβKf ∧ x ∈JγKf}
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(86) JJohn saw MaryF K





{x : x ∈ De}
(87) a. Jonly C John saw MaryF ∼ CK





b. Focus interpretation principle:
J∼ C αK is defined iff JCK⊆JαKf
There is a small difference between the original focus interpretation theory and the actual
implementation in the framework of exhaustification theory. While a focus-sensitive operator
accesses its quantificational domain with the help of the ∼ operator and a variable C in the
original theory, the exhaustification theory allows the focus operator to directly acquire its
quantificational domain through a free variable, as we have seen in (83). For simplicity, I
will follow the convention in the exhaustification theory and omit the definedness condition
that constrains the format of the alternatives in C. However, the readers should understand
that the quantificational domain of the focus-sensitive operator is always presupposed to be
a subset of the focus value of its prejacent.
Back to the derivation of the epistemic reading. A disjunctive/existential expression
marked with a F-feature is assumed to activate both its subdomain alternatives and scalar-
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alternatives, defined respectively in (88a) and (88b), to be exhaustified by Exh. According
to the definitions, the focus alternative set to the prejacent of Exh in (81), replicated here
in (90), is as in (90d). Exhaustifying this set affirms the prejacent and negates the I-E
alternatives, which, in this case, is the conjunctive alternative19. Therefore, we derive the SI
that John did not see both Mary and Sue.
(88) a. The sub-domain alternatives of an existential expression α over the domain D
D-alt(α) = {λP.∃x ∈ D′[P (x)] : D′ ⊆ D}
b. The scalar-alternatives of an existential expression α over the domain D
σ-alt(α) = {λP.∀x ∈ D′[P (x)] : D′ ⊆ D}
(89) The focus value of an existential expression α over the domain D
JαKf=D-alt(α)∪σ-alt(α)
(90) John saw Mary or Sue.
a. LF: JExh C [Mary or Sue]F 1 John saw t1K
b. JMary or SueK= λP.∃x ∈ {m, s}[P (x)]
c. JMary or SueKf
= {λP.∃x ∈ {m, s}[P (x)], λP.∃x ∈ {m}[P (x)], λP.∃x ∈ {s}[P (x)], λP.∀x ∈
{m, s}[P (x)]}
d. J[Mary or Sue]F 1 John saw t1Kf
= {λw.saww(m)(j), λw.saww(s)(j), λw.saww(m)(j)∨saww(s)(j), λw.saww(m)(j)∧
saww(s)(j)}
e. JExh C [Mary or Sue]F 1 John saw t1K
= λw.[saww(m)(j) ∨ saww(m)] = 1 ∧ [saww(m)(j) ∧ saww(s)(j)] = 0
After the SI is derived, the Maxim of Quantity comes in. The two alternatives with the
19For simple exposition, I take the quantificational domain of Exh, C, to be the same as the focus
alternative set of its prejacent here.
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disjunctive expression replaced by either disjunct, (91) - (92), are relevant in this context.
The quantification domain C of the covert focus operator Exh is assumed to stay the same.
Importantly, both disjunct alternatives are semantically stronger than the original assertion.
Therefore, the fact that the speaker did not utter them implicates that for either alternative,
the speaker does not know it is true. Together with the fact that the speaker believes the
original assertion is true, we will conclude that for the two disjunct alternatives, the speaker
is not opinionated about them.
(91) JExh C MaryF 1 John saw t1K
=λw.saww(m)(j) = 1 ∧ saww(s)(j) = 0
(92) JExh C SueF 1 John saw t1K
=λw.saww(s)(j) = 1 ∧ saww(m)(j) = 0
(93) Maxim of Quantity yields the following implicature:
Bels([f(m)∨ f(s)]∧¬[f(m)∧ f(s)])∧¬Bels(f(m)∧¬f(s))∧¬Bels(f(s)∧¬f(m))
where f stands for the predicate λxλw.saww(x)(j)
The exhaustification theory yields desirable implicatures for example (90) with a dis-
junctive expression analyzed as an existential quantifier. If we assume that wh-phrases in
Mandarin Chinese are existential quantifiers, like many others do (Liao, 2011; Chierchia
& Liao, 2015, a.o.), we will derive the correct implicatures for shei ‘who’, the sg-marked
which-phrases like ‘which student’, and the num-modified wh-phrases like ‘which two stu-
dents’. However, when it comes to the non-num-modified wh-phrases, the exhaustification
theory predicts that they also give rise to ignorance inferences, which, as we already know,
is not empirically attested in Chinese.
Suppose we have a context where the topic of conversation is which people Bill invited.
The only potential invitees considered in this context are John, Mary and Sue. Recall that
the non-num-modified plural which-phrases are strictly plural in Chinese. Accordingly,
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na xie ren ‘which people’ in this context is an existential quantifier whose quantificational
domain is the set containing the pluralities of people formed by the three potential invitees,
illustrated in (95). Applying the Exh to the utterance in (94) will first derive a SI that Bill
did not invite all three of John, Mary and Sue, i.e. Bill invited exactly two people. This
is not a SI that we intuitively get for (94). Next, the Maxim of Quantity will come in and
yield the ignorance inferences in (98). Together with the strengthened assertion by Exh, we
conclude that the speaker knows Bill invited exactly two people, but he does not know which
two of John, Mary and Sue it was. Since neither the SI nor the ignorance inferences are
empirically attested for this example, the exhaustification theory makes incorrect predictions
in this case.













Intended: *Bill invited some people, but I don’t know specifically which people he
invited.
(95) Jna xie renK= λP.∃x ∈ {j ⊕m, j ⊕ s,m⊕ s, j ⊕m⊕ s}[P (x)]




f(j ⊕m), f(j ⊕ s), f(m⊕ s), f(j ⊕m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s), f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s)

b. σ-alt(94)={f(j ⊕m⊕ s)}
(f stands for λxλw.invitedw(x)(b))
(97) Predicted SI for (94)
JExh C which people 1 Bill invited t1K
= [f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s)] ∧ ¬f(j ⊕m⊕ s)
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(98) Predicted ignorance inferences:
Bels(f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m ⊕ s)] ∧ ¬f(j ⊕m ⊕ s)) ∧ ¬Bels(f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕
s)) ∧ ¬Bels(f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s)) ∧ ¬Bels(f(m⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m))
= ♦s(f(j ⊕m)) ∧ ♦s(f(j ⊕ s)) ∧ ♦s(f(m⊕ s))
∧♦s¬(f(j ⊕m)) ∧ ♦s¬(f(j ⊕ s)) ∧ ♦s¬(f(m⊕ s))
(94) is an example with a distributive predicate relative to the wh-phrase. How about
(99), where we have a collective predicate relative to the wh-phrase? In this case, the disjunct
alternatives are logically independent from each other. For example, if John, Mary and Sue
together lifted that table, it does not follow that John and Mary together lifted up that
table. After the application of Exh, we obtain a SI that either exactly two of the three
people together lifted up the table or all three of them together lifted up the table, (101).
After the SI is derived, the Maxim of Quantity further yields the ignorance inferences given
in (102). Coupled with the original assertion strengthened by the SI, we conclude that the
speaker knows that either exactly two of the three people together lifted up the table or all
three of them together did it. To the speaker, it might be John and Mary together did it, or
Mary and Sue together did it, or John and Sue together did it, or John, Mary and Sue all
together did it. Again, neither the SI nor the ignorance inferences are empirically attested
in Chinese for (99).



















Intended: *Some people lifted up that table together, (I don’t know specifically which
people they were though).
(100) Focus-alternatives of (99)
a. D-alt(99)
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=

f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s), f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s), f(m⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s), f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(m⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s),





f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕ s), f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s), f(m⊕ s) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(m⊕ s), f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(m⊕ s) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s), f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(m⊕ s) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s),
f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(m⊕ s) ∧ f(j ⊕m⊕ s)

(f stands for λxλw.lifted-up-the-table(x))
(101) Predicted SI for (99):
JExh C which people 1 t1 together lifted that tableK
= [f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s)]
∧¬[f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕ s)] ∧ ¬[f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(m⊕ s)] ∧ ¬[f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(m⊕ s)]
∧¬[f(j⊕m)∧ f(j⊕m⊕ s)]∧¬[f(j⊕ s)∧ f(j⊕m⊕ s)]∧¬[f(m⊕ s)∧ f(j⊕m⊕ s)]
(102) Predicted ignorance inferences for (99):
Bels([f(j ⊕m) ∨ f(j ⊕ s) ∨ f(m⊕ s) ∨ f(j ⊕m⊕ s)]
∧¬[f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(j ⊕ s)] ∧ ¬[f(j ⊕m) ∧ f(m⊕ s)] ∧ ¬[f(j ⊕ s) ∧ f(m⊕ s)]
∧¬[f(j⊕m)∧f(j⊕m⊕s)]∧¬[f(j⊕s)∧f(j⊕m⊕s)]∧¬[f(m⊕s)∧f(j⊕m⊕s))∧
¬Bels(f(j⊕m)∨ f(j⊕ s)∨ f(m⊕ s))∧¬Bels(f(j⊕m)∨ f(j⊕ s)∨ f(j⊕m⊕ s))∧
¬Bels(f(j⊕m)∨f(m⊕s)∨f(j⊕m⊕s))∧¬Bels(f(j⊕s)∨f(m⊕s)∨f(j⊕m⊕s))
= ♦s(f(j ⊕m))∧♦s(f(j ⊕ s))∧♦s(f(m⊕ s))∧♦s(f(j ⊕m⊕ s))∧♦s¬(f(j ⊕m))∧
♦s¬(f(j ⊕ s)) ∧ ♦s¬(f(m⊕ s)) ∧ ♦s¬(f(j ⊕m⊕ s))
Based on the prior discussion, I conclude that the exhaustification theory makes incorrect
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predictions for the Chinese wh-phrases. Specifically, it predicts that the non-num-modified
which-phrases should behave like the other three types of Chinese wh-phrases and also have
epistemic readings, a prediction that contradicts the empirical fact in Chinese.
4.2 Epistemic reading in the choice function theory
In Spanish, a singular indefinite headed by the article algún/alguna is called an epistemic
indefinite, because it generates an epistemic ignorance effect that an ordinary indefinite does
not (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito, 2003, 2010). The epistemic effect is illustrated in























María married some doctor or other, namely Dr. Smith.
(104) a. María se casó con algún médico
María married with algún doctor




(Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito, 2011)
In (103), the second half of the sentence is infelicitous because by identifying the referent
of the indefinite algún médico, it contradicts the ignorance effect that the indefinite gives
rise to. Uttering the first half, the speaker clearly indicates her ignorance of the identity
of the doctor by using algún over an ordinary article. Therefore, to go on and identify the
referent will make the speaker self-contradictory. In (104), the first speaker already explicitly
expresses her ignorance of the identity of the doctor using algún. This is why a follow-up
question that asks the speaker to identify the reference is infelicitous.
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Surprisingly, however, Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2011) observes that the plu-
ral version of algún, algunos, never triggers an epistemic effect. A namely continuation that
identifies the referent of algunos NP is perfectly acceptable and a follow-up question that








































Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2011) propose a theory that explains the empirical
pattern they found. Specifically, algún introduces a free variable f that is a subset selection
function with an anti-singleton presupposition whose semantic role is very similar to a choice
function. While a choice function takes a set as input and returns a member from it(Reinhart,
1997), a subset selection function takes a set as input and returns a subset from it . An
anti-singleton subset selection function f presupposes that its output is a non-singleton set.
(107) Anti-singleton subset selection function:
f is an anti-singleton subset selection function iff for any set P, f(P ) is not a singleton.
In (108), for example, the sentence asserts (109a) and presupposes (109b).
(108) Context: The rooms in the house are the bedroom, the living room and the bathroom,

















Juan is in a room of the house.
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(109) a. w[∃x[x ∈ f({the bedroom, the living room, the bathroom}) ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
b. |f({the bedroom, the living room, the bathroom})| > 1
Given that there are three contextually salient rooms in total, the anti-singleton presup-
position imposed by the free variable f results in four different possible values for f . It either
returns a set containing all the three rooms, or any set that contains two of the three rooms.
In other words, sentence (108) may express any of the four propositions in (110).
(110) a. w[∃x[x ∈ {the bedroom, the living room, the bathroom} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
b. w[∃x[x ∈ {the bedroom, the living room} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
c. w[∃x[x ∈ {the bedroom, the bathroom} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
d. w[∃x[x ∈ {the living room, the bathroom} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
Moreover, the use of algún, an anti-singleton indefinite, triggers a competition between
the original sentence and the alternative assertions resulted from applying a subset selection
function that returns singleton sets only. In the given context, there are three competitors,
as in (111).
(111) a. w[∃x[x ∈ {the bedroom} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
b. w[∃x[x ∈ {the living room} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
c. w[∃x[x ∈ {the bathroom} ∧ inw(x)(j)]]
Following Kratzer and Shimoyama’s (2002) reasoning of the free choice effect of German
irgendein, Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito argue that the existence of the alternatives
will make the hearer wonder why the speaker did not utter any of the alternative assertions.
One plausible reason is that the speaker wants to avoid false claims. Therefore, the hearer
will ultimately conclude that none of the competing alternatives is true. The readers can see
that any of the four possible assertions the original sentence strengthened by the negation
of all the three competing alternatives will yield a modal variation. There have to be at
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least two of the three rooms that the speaker holds as possible locations of Juan without her
knowing which room Juan is actually in.
The plural algunos, different from algún, further places a constraint of plurality on its
output set. In (105), repeated here in (112), for example, the bare plural students is number-
neutral and contains both atomic and plural sums of students in its denotation. Algunos,
like its singular version, introduces an anti-singleton subset selection function variable f and
if defined, it functions as an existential quantifier, one that requires the subset f returns has
at least one member that has a cardinality bigger than one.



























Juan⊕ Pedro, Juan⊕ Sara, Pedro⊕ Sara,
Juan, Pedro, Sara

(114) JalgunosK= λf : anti-singleton(f).λPλQ.∃x[|x| > 1 ∧ (f(P ))(x) ∧Q(x)]
Let’s think about what are the possible assertions the original sentence in (112) may
express. There are three types of possible assertions by (112). First are those that are
destined to be false. (115) is an example. If the anti-singleton function f returns a non-
singleton set that only contains singular students, the cardinality constraint imposed by
algunos in the truth condition cannot possibly be satisfied.
(115) w[∃x[|x| > 1 ∧ x ∈ {Juan, Pedro} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
The second type of assertions are those that restrict the domain of quantification to a
non-singleton set containing one singular student and one sum of students. Note that such
assertions, due to the plurality constraint of algunos, is semantically the same as one where
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the domain of quantification is restricted to a singleton set containing just the sum of the
students. (116) illustrate. The semantic equivalence illustrated in (116), as will be discussed
later, is significant in explaining why algunos does not have an epistemic reading.
(116) a. w[∃x[|x| > 1 ∧ x ∈ {Juan, Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
b. w[∃x[|x| > 1 ∧ x ∈ {Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
The third type of assertions are those that have at least two sums of students in the
domain of quantification, as in (117). Excluding the first type of assertions that cannot be
possibly true, there are in total eight different assertions sentence (112) may express20.
(117) w[∃x[|x| > 1 ∧ x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro, Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
Again, the assertions an anti-singleton f generate compete with the singleton ones. The
four competitors, shown in (118)21, each has a single sum of students in its quantificational
domain.
(118) a. w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
b. w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
c. w[∃x[x ∈ {Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
d. w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
20The eight propositions are given here.
i w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
ii w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
iii w[∃x[x ∈ {Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
iv w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
v w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro, Juan⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
vi w[∃x[x ∈ {Pedro⊕Sara, Juan⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
vii w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro, Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
viii w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro, Juan⊕Sara, Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
21Note that the competitors which are destined to be false are not considered here.
CHAPTER 2: INDIVIDUAL-DENOTING WH-INDEFINITES 56
By the same reasoning that Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito employ for the singular
algún, the use of algunos will lead to an implicature that all the competitors are false.
However, this implicature cannot be calculated this time because each of the four competitors
is semantically equivalent to one of the eight possible assertions the original sentence may
express. For example, (119a) is semantically the same as (119b).
(119) a. w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
b. w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan, Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
Since the hearer does not know which one among the eight possible assertions the speaker
wants to express, she will not be able to rule out any of the competitors. The modal variation
effect we have seen with algún that relies on the negation of the competitors, then, cannot
be achieved by algunos. This explains why algunos does not trigger an epistemic effect.
When algunos NPs are combined with a collective predicate, the same process of calcula-
tion applies. The anti-singleton presupposition of algunos could be satisfied by a quantifica-
tional domain containing an atom and a sum, for the bare plural nouns are number-neutral.
This makes the singleton competitors equivalent to one of the possible assertions of the orig-
inal sentence. (120), for example, has one of its possible assertions as in (120a). (120b) is a











Some students formed a circle.
a. w[∃x[student(x) ∧ x ∈ {Juan, Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ form-a-circlew(x)]]
b. w[∃x[student(x) ∧ x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ form-a-circlew(x)]]
Since the singleton competitors are each semantically equivalent to one of the possible as-
sertions of (120), the listener will not be able to rule out any of them. The modal variation
effect cannot be derived. This is a welcome result, as the plural algunos does not have an
epistemic effect when the predicate is collective, as shown in (121).





















Some students formed a circle: Juan, Pedro, Sara and Jorge.
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s (2011) theory of algunos is crucially contingent on
two assumptions. First, the bare plurals in Spanish are number-neutral, having both atoms
and sums in their denotation. Second, the assertion of the original sentence with a non-
singleton quantificational domain competes with the alternative assertions with singleton
quantificational domains. The first assumption rules in the assertions whose quantificational
domain contains one atom and one sum as possible assertions of the original sentence, as we
see in (116), which are semantically equivalent to those assertions with the atom excluded
from their quantificational domain. The second assumption makes those assertions with
just the sum in their quantificational domains competitors to the original assertion. As
all the competitors are the possible assertions the original sentence wants to express, the
hearer cannot negate any one of them, and therefore cannot derive a modal variation effect
dependent on such negation, regardless of whether the predicate is distributive or collective.
Suppose, however, a language is different from Spanish in its grammatical system of
plurality. This language expresses a plural reading semantically, which cannot be cancelled
in downward-entailing environment, but it also has a special existential quantificational
determiner with an anti-singleton presupposition like algunos. In such a language, Alonso-
Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s (2011) theory predicts that an epistemic reading is absent
when the predicate is distributive but possible when the predicate is collective. Why is
it the case? Imagine a counterpart sentence of (105) in this language where the predicate
is distributive, the semantic denotation of the plural noun students will only contain sums
of students, as in (122). To satisfy the anti-singleton presupposition of f , the possible
assertions made by the counterpart sentence will have to contain at least two sums in their
quantificational domain. Due to the distributive predicate, the propositions with the biggest
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sum will entail all the other propositions. For example, if María lives with Juan, Pedro and
Sara, it follows that María lives with Juan and Pedro. An existential quantification over a
domain containing the biggest sum and any other sum, then, is equivalent to an existential
quantification over a domain containing just the smaller sum, shown in (123). Therefore,
the possible assertions expressed by the counterpart sentence of (105) in this language are
the same as (105) in Spanish. In other words, the singleton competitors are still part of the
possible assertions of the original sentence. The epistemic effect is predicted to be absent by
the same reasoning Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito give to (105).
(122) JstudentsK= {Juan⊕Pedro, Juan⊕Sara, Pedro⊕Sara, Juan⊕Pedro⊕Sara}
(123) w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro, Juan⊕Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
=w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ lives-withw(x)(m)]]
Now, suppose we have a collective algunos sentence ‘algunos students together María’ in
this language. The plural noun students still denotes the set in (122). Due to the collectivity
of the predicate, there is no entailment relationship between the alternatives. For example,
if Juan, Pedro and Sara together lifted up María, it does not follow that Juan and Pedro
together lifted up María. Again, to satisfy the anti-singleton presupposition of f , a possible
assertion of the sentence has to contain at least two sums in its quantificational domain. This
time, however, an assertion with two sums in its quantificational domain will not be able to
be reduced to one that contains only one of the sum in its quantificational domain, illustrated
in (124), contrary to what we see is the case with the distributive (123). The competitors,
whose quantificational domain has only one sum, will not be semantically equivalent to any
of the possible assertions of the original collective sentence. Therefore, it is safe to negate
all of them and a modal variation effect is predicted.
(124) w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro, Juan⊕Pedro⊕Sara} ∧ lift-upw(x)(m)]]
6= w[∃x[x ∈ {Juan⊕Pedro} ∧ lift-upw(x)(m)]]
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According to our summary of the Chinese data in §2, Mandarin Chinese is such a lan-
guage. The non-num-modified which-phrases like na xie xuesheng in Chinese only have
sums of students in their quantificational domain due to the plural classifier xie. If we carry
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s (2011) analysis over to Chinese and treat which as an
existential quantifier with an anti-singleton subsection selection function f built in it as in
(125), we will predict that the non-num-modified which-phrases will not have an epistemic
effect when combined with a distributive predicate, but will give rise to an epistemic effect
when combined with a collective predicate.
(125) JwhichK= λf : anti-singleton(f).λPλQ.∃x[(f(P ))(x) ∧Q(x)]
This prediction, however, is incorrect. The non-num-modified which-phrases in Chinese
never give rise to an epistemic reading, regardless of whether the predicate is distributive
or collective, as the data summary in Table 2 shows. The theory proposed in Alonso-Ovalle
and Menéndez-Benito (2011), therefore, makes wrong predictions in Mandarin Chinese. Ac-
tually, for any language that has a grammatical system of plurality where the plural reading
is encoded semantically rather than pragmatically, Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s
(2011) theory will make the same wrong prediction.
4.3 The advantage of the current theory
We have reviewed two theories of the epistemic reading on the market. One is couched in
the exhaustification theory and another is based on the choice function theory of indefinites.
Both predict that the non-num-modified which-phrases ‘na xie NPs’ could give rise to an
epistemic reading in Mandarin Chinese, contrary to fact. The theory we put forward in §3,
however, is not plagued by this problem. Recall that the epistemic operator ep proposed in
our theory has two presuppositions. The first one is that the wh-phrase has to be associated
with an unordered set of entities in the extension of its NP-complement. This presupposition
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preempts the possibility of acquiring an epistemic reading for the non-num-modified which-
phrases in Chinese in the first place. Whether the non-num-modified which-phrases combine
with a distributive or a collective predicate, they will fail the presupposition. As a result,
they will never be able to give rise to an epistemic reading.
Interestingly, the current theory also makes correct predictions for English and Spanish.
In English, some has an epistemic reading only when it takes a singular noun. When a
bare plural noun comes in, the epistemic effect disappears. In Spanish, the same pattern is
observed.
(126) English
a. Some plant is growing through the wall of my room.  The speaker does not
know what kind of plant it is.
(Weir, 2012)
b. John lives with some girls, Mary Sue and Jane.


















Juan is in a room of the house.












































Some students formed a circle: Juan, Pedro, Sara and Jorge.
(Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito, 2011)
The singular nouns denote a set of singular entities, which is unordered. The bare plurals
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nouns, however, have both atoms and sums in their denotational set, which is partially
ordered. If we impose a presupposition that an epistemic reading only arises when the set
contributed by the NP-complement is unordered, like what we did in Mandarin Chinese, we
can immediately rule out the possibility of an epistemic reading for some+bare plural and
algunos+bare plural in English and Spanish, respectively.
Chapter 3: Amount-denoting
wh-indefinites
In this chapter, we focus on the amount-reading wh-phrases in Mandarin Chinese. The main
questions we have asked in chapter 1 about this group of wh-phrases are (i) why epistemic
reading is absent for them? (ii) Why do they give rise to an insignificance reading when
embedded under a clausemate negation?
1 Empirical facts on amount-denoting wh-phrases
In Chapter 1, we have presented some empirical facts on the amount-denoting wh-phrases
in Mandarin Chinese, but mainly focused on the insignificance reading they generate under
negation. Here, we will take a more board view of this group of expression and summarize
their behavior accordingly.
First, different from the individual-denoting wh-phrases (excluding the non-num-modified
wh-phrases), they never have an epistemic ignorance reading in declarative sentences. In
(128a)22, ji cl NPs ‘some NPs’ does not implicate that the speaker does not know the
amount of books that Zhangsan bought. A follow-up question like that in (128b), therefore,
is perfectly fine. Recall that the individual-denoting wh-phrases with an unordered structure
22As noted in Chapter 1, all the examples with wh-phrases have an additional interrogative reading unless
noted otherwise.
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behaves differently. They give rise to an epistemic reading in declarative sentences, and a
follow-up question that requests the identification of the referent is impossible. Example










































Which student is it?
Second, for the individual-denoting wh-phrases with an unordered structure, their epistemic
reading survives sentential negation, in which case they take semantic scope over negation.
The amount-denoting wh-phrases, however, can never take scope over negation. They have
neither an epistemic reading, nor an interrogative reading. The only available reading is an



















Zhangsan didn’t respond to someone today and was criticized by the teacher. (I













XZhangsan saw few people.
#There is a certain amount of people that Zhangsan didn’t see, (I don’t know
specifically what amount it is).
#How many people didn’t John see?
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In the following, I will given a semantic account whereby these empirical behaviors of amount-
denoting wh-phrases are traced back to the algebraic structure associated with them, in
keeping with what we have concluded in Chapter 2.
2 Absence of epistemic reading
As concluded from Chapter 2, the possibility of an epistemic reading for a wh-phrase is
contingent on two conditions. First, the algebraic structure of the set associated with the
wh-phrase has to be unordered. Second, the corresponding wh-question has a unique true
answer in the speaker’s epistemic state. The amount-denoting wh-phrases, unfortunately,
fail the first condition. As a result, the epistemic reading is forestalled for them.
In a sentence like (128a), repeated here in (131), the domain of the function denoted by
the wh-clause is a set of degrees in a total ordering relation. Therefore, the insertion of the
























CHAPTER 3: AMOUNT-DENOTING WH-INDEFINITES 65
a. JZhangsanK= zs
b. Jmai-leK = λxλyλw.bought(x)(y)(w)
c. JgeK= λdλx.ben(x)(d)23
d. J 2 K= λw.∃x[ben(x)(d) ∧ books(x) ∧ bought(x)(zs)(w)]
e. JjiK= λD〈d,st〉λd : deg(d).λw.P (d)(w)24
f. J 1 K= λd : deg(d).λw.∃x[ben(x)(d) ∧ books(x) ∧ bought(x)(zs)(w)]
g. Dom(J 1 K) = {d : deg(d)} = {...1, ...2, ...3, ...}
h. JepsK = λwλf : Dom(f) is unordered ∧ Partition(Range(f), Doxws ).
∃p ∈ Range(f)[p(w) = 1]
i. Jeps w@ 1 K (presupposition failure!)
The requirement that the epistemic operator ep imposes on the algebraic structure asso-
ciated with the relevant wh-phrases makes it impossible for the amount-denoting wh-phrases
in Chinese to generate an epistemic reading. Therefore, in (131), we do not observe an
epistemic reading over the amount of books that Zhangsan bought.
When a clausemate negation comes in, the epistemic reading is prohibited as well, for













Intended: *There is a certain amount of books that Zhangsan didn’t buy, (I don’t
know specifically what amount it is).
23ben(x, d) is read as ‘x has d units in it when measured using the classifier ben’.
24deg(d) is read as ‘d is a degree’.













b. J 2 K= λw.∃x[ge(x)(d) ∧ people(x) ∧ saw(x)(zs)(w)]
c. J 1 K= λd : deg(d).λw.∃x[ge(x)(d) ∧ people(x) ∧ ¬saw(x)(zs)(w)]
d. Dom(J 1 K) = {d : deg(d)} = {...1, ...2, ...3, ...}
e. JepsK = λwλf : Dom(f) is unordered ∧ Partition(Range(f), Doxws ).
∃p ∈ Range(f)[p(w) = 1]
f. Jeps w@ 1 K (Presupposition failure!)
3 The insignificance reading
We have seen that the wide scope epistemic reading over a clausemate negation for amount-
denoting wh-phrases in Mandarin Chinese is prohibited due to a presupposition failure. The
wide scope interrogative reading over a clausemate negation for them as noted in §1, is also
impossible. The only reading they could generate is a narrow-scope insignificance reading.
Why is this so? The following sections will address this question.
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3.1 Maximal informativity and negative island
In chapter 2, we have concluded that the sufficient condition for the epistemic reading of a wh-
phrase in Mandarin Chinese consists of two parts. First, the wh-phrase is associated with an
unordered structure. Second, the corresponding wh-question has a unique true answer in the
speaker’s epistemic state. Neither condition by itself can make a correct prediction as to the
(un)availability of an epistemic reading. Recall that the uniqueness requirement is formalized
using a partition presupposition underlined in (135). This presupposition basically says that
each proposition in the propositional set of the corresponding wh-question is a maximally
informative answer to the question in at least one of the speaker’s epistemic world. And each
of the speaker’s epistemic world of the speaker has one of the propositions as the maximally
informative answer to the question in it.
(135) JEpsK = λwλf : Dom(f) is unordered ∧ Partition(Range(f), Doxws ).
∃p ∈ Range(f)[p(w) = 1]
a. Partition(Q, I) is true
iff {λw.Maxinf (Q,w) = p : p ∈ Q} partitions I
iff ∀r ∈ {λw.Maxinf (Q,w) = p : p ∈ Q}[∃w′ ∈ I[r(w′) = 1]]
&∀w′ ∈ I[∃r ∈ {λw.Maxinf (Q,w) = p : p ∈ Q}[r(w′) = 1]]
b. Maxinf (Q,w) = p iff p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈ Q[q(w) = 1→ p ⊆ q]
c. Doxws is a set of doxastic worlds accessible to the speaker in w
The maximality requirement plays an important role in accounting for the sensitivity to
negative islands of degree questions (Fox & Hackl, 2006). It has long been observed that a
degree question becomes ungrammatical when a sentential negation is inserted, as can be
seen in the contrast between (136) and (137).
(136) How much does John weigh?
(137) *How much doesn’t John weigh?
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Fox and Hackl’s (2006) theory of the negative island effect has two assumptions. First,
the degree scale is always dense no matter what we measure25. Second, a degree question of
the form how many /much d [φ(d)] should be answered by the most informative degree d
that satisfies the degree predicate φ.
(138) d is the most informative degree that satisfies a degree predicate φ if and only if
Maxinf (φ)(w) = d
where Maxinf (φ)(w) = ιd[φ(d)(w) ∧ ∀d′[φ(d′)(w)→ (φ(d)→ φ(d′))]]
Suppose John’s weight is 120 pounds. For any degree d′ in the interval (0, 120], John weighs
at least d′-pounds. In other words, the predicate λd.John weighs d pounds holds of any
degree in this interval. According to the definition of the most informative degree, the
question in (136) can be answered with the most informative degree — John’s weight, and
therefore is well-formed. When a sentential negation is inserted, the degree predicate turns
to λd.John doesn′t weigh d pounds and holds of any degree in the open interval (120,+∞).
This time, however, there does not exist a most informative degree. To see why, let’s choose
a degree 120+ ε bigger than John’s weight from this interval. The negative degree predicate
holds of 120+ ε since John’s weight falls short of it. Due to the assumption that the scale is
always dense, we can always find a degree d′′ within (120, 120 + ε), say 120 + ε/2, such that
d′′ is more informative than 120 + ε: if John’s weight falls short of 120 + ε/2, it follows that
his weight falls short of 120 + ε. More generally, for any degree 120 + ε that exceeds John’s
weight, we can always find a degree d′′ smaller than 120 + ε but still bigger than 120 such
that d′′ is more informative. Therefore, it is impossible to find a most informative answer
to a degree question like (137). With the assumption that a degree question is required
to be answered with the most informative degree, (137) is predicted to be ill-formed. This
25In cases where the context seems to require a discrete scale like the following example, we still use a
dense scale.
i How many books did John read?
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prediction applies to all degree questions with a sentential negation, giving a nice explanation
of the sensitivity of degree questions to negative islands.
While the examples (136)- (137) concern human weight that is intuitively related to a
dense scale, Fox and Hackl (2006) argue that all gradable expressions are measured using
a dense scale, including those intuitively associated with a discrete scale. For example,
countable objects like ‘book’ are only counted using whole numbers, with the infinite many
degree points in between two whole numbers ignored. This conforms to our world knowledge
as we don’t ever say ‘two point three books’. Fox and Hackl (2006), however, use the
incompatibility between only and modified numerals as the motivation for universal density of
scales. They first observe that only can take a bare numeral as its focus associate but cannot
take modified numerals, (139). Given that only has a semantics stating that its prejacent
is the most informative among the true alternatives26, a natural hypothesis would be that
whether ‘only’ can take an item as its focus associate depends on whether the maximality
requirement of only can be satisfied by the corresponding prejacent. Particularly, Fox and
Hackl (2006) identifies the universal density of scales as the deciding factor that makes (139a)
live up to the maximality requirement and (139) fail it.
(139) a. John only has 3 children.
b. *John only read more than 3 children.
(140) JonlyK= λpλw.p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈alt(p)[q(w) = 1 ∧ p ⊆ q]
In (139a), only asserts that its prejacent is true and all other true alternatives are entailed
by the prejacent. If John has 3 children is true, for any degree d in the interval (0, 3], that
John has d children is also true. For any degree d′ in (3,+∞) that is bigger than 3, that John
has 3 children does not entail that John has d′ children and therefore have to be false by the
definition of only. In other words, the maximal degree that satisfies the degree predicate is
26Strictly speaking, only presupposes the truth of its prejacent. Since nothing in the logic reasoning of the
examples hinges on this, I make the presupposition truth-conditional for simplicity.
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3 and the maximality requirement of only is realized. The resulting truth condition is ‘John
has 3 and no more children’. On the other hand in (139b), the prejacent of only—John has
more than 3 children—is asserted to be true. Moreover, if we replace 3 with a degree 3 + ε
that is bigger than 3, the resulting alternative proposition has to be false, according to the
semantics of only, for the prejacent does not entail that John has 3 + ε children. In other
words, for any degree d in (3,+∞), it is false that John has more than d children. This
negation of all stronger alternatives will contradict the prejacent if the measurement scale is
dense. To see why, let’s suppose John actually has 3+ ε children. In this case, the prejacent
is true. Moreover, for any degree d in (3,+∞), it is false that John has more than d children.
However, since John has 3 + ε children, with the assumption that the scale is always dense,
we can always find a degree d′′ in (3, 3 + ε), say 3 + ε/2, such that it is true that John has
more than d′′ children. The prejacent and the negation of all the stronger of alternatives
turns out to be contradictory. This contradiction, according to Fox and Hackl (2006) is the
underlying cause for the ungrammaticality of (139b). Note that the crucial factor in deriving
the contradiction is the assumption of a dense scale even if intuitively we don’t use a dense
scale when measuring the number of children someone has27.
With the universal density of scales in place, we can explain the infelicity of the following
question in exactly the same way as we did for sentence (137). This question fails because
it does not have a maximally informative true answer.
(141) *How many books doesn’t John have?
Fox and Hackl’s theory is also relevant in the context of the non-uniformity of wh-
27Other motivation of the universal density of scales in Fox and Hackl (2006) includes the salvaging effect
of a universal modal above a modified numeral in a only-sentence and the absence of such salvaging effect of
an existential modal, (i)-(ii), as well as the negative island effect definites and wh-questions are susceptible
to. For space constraint, I will not review the details here. The interested readers are referred to the original
paper for their arguments.
1. You are only required to read more than 30 books.
2. *You are only allowed to read more than 30 books.
CHAPTER 3: AMOUNT-DENOTING WH-INDEFINITES 71
indefinites in Mandarin Chinese in that it also explains why the amount-denoting wh-
phrases lack a wide scope epistemic reading when a sentential negation is present, unlike
the individual-denoting ones (excluding the non-num-modified wh-phrases). This difference



















Zhangsan didn’t respond to someone today and was criticized by the teacher. (I













XZhangsan saw few people.
#There is a certain amount of books that Zhangsan didn’t buy, (I don’t know
specifically what amount it is).
#How many books didn’t John buy?
Recall that an epistemic reading requires that the wh-phrase have an unordered struc-
ture and the corresponding wh-question have a maximally informative answer in all of the
speaker’s epistemic worlds. In §2, we have seen that the fact that amount-denoting wh-
phrases are associated with a set of degrees standing in a total ordering relation, which
already rules out the possibility of an epistemic reading for them. What’s worse, when a
clausemate negation is present, the corresponding wh-question cannot possibly have a max-
imally informative answer. In this case, the second presupposition imposed by ep is not
satisfied either. As a result, the epistemic reading in a negative sentence is forestalled.
With the wide scope forbidden for amount-denoting wh-phrases, their scope is confined
to a narrow scope under the sentential negation. In consequence, we observe an intriguing
insignificance reading. In the next section, I will explain how the insignificance reading is
obtained.
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3.2 The insignificance reading
We have seen in Chapter 1 that all amount-denoting wh-phrases generate an insignificance
reading when embedded under a sentential negation, be they combine with countable nouns,
























































John is not tall. (He is rather short).
How does the insignificance reading arise? I argue that it is derived in two steps. First, a
positive sentence with a degree expression like the amount-denoting wh-phrase is evaluative
(Neeleman, Van de Koot, & Doetjes, 2004; Rett, 2015), making reference to a degree which
exceeds a contextually valued standard (Kennedy, 1999). Second, a process of ‘negative
strengthening’ (Horn, 1989; Levinson, 2000; Blutner, 2004) comes about, strengthening the
negation of the stronger evaluative scalar alternative to an interpretation that negates the
weaker alternative. Both steps are empirical motivated. There is no need to posit any
assumption or stipulation particular to Mandarin Chinese.
28As mentioned in footnote 8 in Chapter 1, the use of ‘ji’ followed directly by a common noun denoting
dense scales is lost in Mandarin Chinese, but is still very active in Cantonese. My own dialect, which belongs
to the Lower Yangtze Mandarin, also maintains this use.
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To start, for a positive construction containing a gradable adjective like (146) to be true,
it is not sufficient for John to have some degree of tallness. Intuitively, John’s tallness needs
to exceed a contextually sensitive standard of what counts as being tall. This is what is
called an ‘evaluative’ reading. Traditionally, gradable adjectives are analyzed as a function
denoting relations between individuals and degrees (Cresswell, 1976). We follow Kennedy
and McNally (2005) and define tall as in (147). tall(x, d) is read as ‘x is tall to at least degree
d’. The evaluative reading is attributed by a covert pos morpheme, which introduces the
contextual standard and existentially closes the degree argument at the same time (Kennedy,
1999), as in (148).
(146) John is tall.
(147) JtallK= λdλx.tall(x, d)
(148) JposK = λP〈d,t〉.∃d[P (d) ∧ d > s], where s is some contextually determined standard
(149) ∃d[tall(j, d) ∧ d > s]
pos





As pointed out by Rett (2015) based on the observation by Bartsch and Vennemann (1972),
evaluativity contributed by pos seems to be an obligatory component of positive construc-
tions. The negation of a positive construction is a negation of evaluativity. The following
sentence does not mean that there does not exist a degree such that Adam is tall to that
degree, i.e. Adam does not have a height, but means that Adam’s height does not exceed
CHAPTER 3: AMOUNT-DENOTING WH-INDEFINITES 74
a contextually relevant standard of tallness29. In other words, the positive construction is
enriched with an evaluative reading before the negation comes in.
(150) Adam isn’t/is not tall.
I assume that the amount-denoting wh-phrases in Mandarin Chinese have the same se-
mantic contribution as a gradable adjective. The negation over a degree predicate resulted
from an amount-denoting wh-phrase amounts to a negation of an evaluative reading of the































(153) a. J 4 K= λx.ge(x, d)
b. J 3 K= λPλw.∃x[ge(x, d) ∧ people(x) ∧ P (x)(w)]
29This reading does not take into account the phenomenon of negative strengthening yet. We will come
back to it later.
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c. JposK = λP〈d,st〉λw.∃d[P (d)(w) ∧ d > s]30
d. J 2 K= λw.∃d∃x[ge(x, d) ∧ people(x) ∧ saw(x)(zs)(w) ∧ d > s]
e. J 1 K= λw.¬∃d∃x[ge(x, d) ∧ people(x) ∧ saw(x)(zs)(w) ∧ d > s]
In an example of the insignificance reading as in (151), the wh-word ji moves, leaving
a degree trace behind, which then combines with the classifier and the common noun. A
covert existential determiner comes in, makes an existential quantifier over individuals and
undergoes quantifier raising, leaving an individual trace. The details of the composition are
given in (152). We get a proposition that takes a world and returns true if and only if there
does not exist a degree d exceeding a contextually relevant standard such that John saw
d-many people in the world. In other words, if John saw anyone, then the number of people
he saw cannot be counted as ‘many’ in the given context.
The derived truth condition, however, is still far from the desired insignificance reading.
First of all, if John didn’t see anyone, the truth condition is automatically satisfied. In-
tuitively, however, the sentence is infelicitous in such cases. Second, if John did see some
people, and the number is not so small as to be counted as ‘few’, but also does not reach
the threshold of ‘many’, the truth condition is still satisfied. Yet such a reading is too weak
compared to an insignificance reading. As (151) shows, the insignificance reading requires
that the number of people that Zhangsan saw to fall short of the neutral zone that covers
the degrees between the span of ‘few’ and that of ‘many’.
The first problem has a solution if we follow Kennedy (1999) and many others in assuming
that gradable adjectives have a positive extension presupposition. This presupposition says
that if a gradable adjective is predicated of an individual, the individual has to instantiate
the adjective to some degree. The positive extension presupposition is first used to explain
the selectional restrictions of gradable adjectives exemplified in (154).
30The entry for pos is intensional here.
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(154) a. #This sauce is curvy.
b. #This sauce is not curvy.
With our treatment of the Mandarin amount-denoting wh-phrases as well as the widely
adopted assumption that presuppositions survive negation, we have a natural solution to the
first problem. In (151), the positive extension presupposition requires that Zhangsan saw at
least one person and predicts the sentence to be infelicitous in a context where John did not
see anyone. What about the second problem though? If the positive extension presupposition
is satisfied but the number of people that John saw falls in the neutral zone, the sentence is
still predicted to be true without attaining the insignificance reading. However, when hearing
a statement that Zhangsan did not see many people, we understand it in a strengthened way
that Zhangsan only saw few people. Likewise, when hearing the statement that John is not
tall, we take it to mean that John is short. This phenomenon is called negative strengthening
in the literature. How does negative strengthening arise?
In the literature, there are two main theories of the negative strengthening of an evaluative
statement, analyzing it either as an R-implicature (Horn, 1989, 2007), or an I-implicature
(Levinson, 2000). According to Horn (2007), the R-principle extends to the speaker a dictate
‘Don’t say too much’. Since speakers across languages tend to weaken the force of their
negative judgment, making the contrary into the contradictory, the hearers will fill in with
the intended stronger negative evaluation. Levinson’s (2000) I-implicature is in the same
spirit as Horn’s Q-implicature. An implicature generated by the R/I principle is basically an
enrichment of the literal meaning into stereotypical cases. Applying these two theories to our
example (151), the truth condition stays in its weak form where ‘not many’ is contradictory
to ‘many’. However, the hearer, will strengthen it to a stronger statement that Zhangsan
saw few people, making the negative expression ‘not many’ contrary, not contradictory to
its positive counterpart.
There is still a third theory of negative strengthening that can account for the insignifi-







cance reading — the blocking theory 31. Using the gradable adjective ‘happy’ as an example,
Krifka (2007) assumes that ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ are actually contradictories, so are their
negations. In other words, the two antonyms exhaust the whole range of their scale, Figure 5.
This is very different from the conventional assumption that they are contraries (Horn, 1989;
Blutner, 2004, a.o.). Following Williamson (1994), Krifka considers the two as vague pred-
icates and takes them to have sharp borders despite the impression that they don’t. Since
the interlocutors, in most cases, do not have an authority to reply on for the determination
of the sharp borders between the two antonyms, what they do is to entertain many different
possibilities of where the border lies on the scale, illustrated in Figure (6). Moreover, when
the speaker and the hearer cannot guarantee that they set the border in the same way, they
both know that the use of a gradable adjective may cause misunderstanding between them.
The safe choice, therefore, is to restrict the range of scale that a gradable adjective covers
to an area where both interlocutors agree on. This is how ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ end up
referring to the two ends of the scale respectively, as in Figure 7.
With an additional assumption that of two expressions of similar meanings, the simpler
one is reserved for stereotypical, or here, safer meaning and the marked one for marked
meaning (M principle in Levinson (2000)), Krifka concludes that ‘happy’ is used to cover
the range of the scale in the safe zone, and ‘not unhappy’ ends up covering the part of
31I only introduce Krifka’s (2007) blocking theory here because Blutner’s (2004) blocking theory makes
‘unhappy’ and ‘not happy’ end up with the same distribution. As Krifka (2007) points out, this is not the
case.
i I’m not happy at all, in fact I’m quite unhappy.
ii *I’m quite unhappy, in fact I’m not happy at all.













not happy not unhappy
Figure 8
mild happiness. Moreover, since ‘not happy’ is arguably more complex than ‘unhappy’, the
latter is used to express a more severe state of unhappiness and the former a mild state of
unhappiness. The result after the calculation of M-principle is shown in Figure 8.
Recall that in our analysis the amount-denoting wh-phrases how many/much make very
similar semantic contributions as the gradable adjectives. The ‘negative strengthening’ effect
we find with those wh-phrases is thus compatible with Krifka’s (2007) theory. In (151), for
example, ‘many’ and ‘few’ originate as contradictory antonyms. Due to their vagueness
nature, the interlocutors will confine their coverage of the range of the scale to either end.
Since ‘not many’ is morphologically more complex than ‘few’, it triggers further calculation
by the M-principle. ‘Not many’ will ultimately fall on the few side but express a less severe
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few many
not many not few
Figure 9
state of scarceness. The strengthening effect is illustrated in Figure 9.
To conclude the discussion, the insignificance reading we observe with amount-reading
wh-phrases in Mandarin Chinese is a combination of their semantics and the general prag-
matic principles that govern human communication. It is generated in two steps. First, the
amount-denoting wh-phrases give rise to an evaluative reading under a clausemate negation.
The positive extension presupposition rules out the possibility of not satisfying the degree
predicate at all. Second, based on the R/I principle that instructs the speakers not to say
too much, the listener will conclude that the negation of the evaluative positive statement is
meant to express a stronger negation, thus deriving an insignificance reading. I also give a
third theory of negative strengthening which differs from the previous two in that the nega-
tion of a positive gradable expression will end up expressing a milder insignificance reading.
Here, I don’t choose between the two types of theories, since the data from Mandarin Chinese
we are interested in are compatible with both.
Chapter 4: The special wh-phrase
shenme
Chapter 4 is devoted to the special wh-phrase shenme ‘what’ in Mandarin Chinese. It is
special because the empirical data on shenme, as we will soon see, shows that it seems to
straddle both types of wh-phrases we discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. When shenme
is kind-denoting, it behaves similarly to the individual-denoting wh-phrases in that it has
an epistemic reading in both positive and negative sentences. However, when it is amount-
denoting, the epistemic reading disappears and the only non-interrogative use has to be one
that generates an insignificance reading under a clausemate negation. My claim that shenme
is ambiguous in this way receives support from findings about its historical development, as
I will show below (S. Zhang, 1989). Moreover, the ambiguity is not specific to shenme.
The wh-phrase zenme ‘how’ is also ambiguous, and its two meanings behave in parallel to
those of shenme. When it is intended to stand for a manner adverb involving the location
or tool of action, i.e. a non-degree-based one, zenme is amenable to an epistemic ignorance
interpretation in both positive and negative sentences. However, when it is intended to stand
for an adverb that semantically requires a degree scale, for instance a frequency adverb, the
epistemic reading is no longer available and an insignificance reading is made possible by a
clausemate negation.
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1 Shenme revisited
As I said in Chapter 1, since C. T. Huang (1982), the most influential analysis of Mandarin
Chinese wh-indefinites is to treat them as negative polarity sensitive items (Y.-h. A. Li, 1992;
Cheng, 1991, 1994, 1997; J.-W. Lin, 1996, 1998a, 2014; Xie, 2007; Liao, 2011; J. Lin et al.,
2014; J. Lin & Giannakidou, 2015; Chierchia & Liao, 2015). The main motivation for this
line of thinking is the claimed contrast between a positive and a negative sentence containing
a wh-indefinite, as shown in (155). While a positive sentence with shenme ‘what’ is said to


















I didn’t buy anything. (J.-W. Lin, 1996)
As we saw in Chapter 1, shenme does in fact appear in positive contexts. (156) - (157),

































A man with a low voice is singing a (=some or other/#any) song.
(J. Lin & Giannakidou, 2015)
32‘Ill-formed’ here means an absence of a non-interrogative reading. As emphasized in footnote 3 in
Chapter 1, all the examples on Chinese wh-indefinites in this dissertation have an additional interrogative
interpretation of the wh-words unless mentioned otherwise.
33I have searched for the examples of declarative sentences containing Chinese wh-indefinites in certain
corpora of Chinese language as well as on Google. As the readers will see, Chinese unordered individual/kind-
denoting wh-indefinites have an epistemic reading in simple positive sentences and also in negative sentences
under a clausemate negation.
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The question that I will address in this chapter, given these data, is when shenme behaves
as if it were an NPI, and why.
First, if shenme is kind-denoting, it behaves like an epistemic individual-denoting wh-
indefinite we have seen in Chapter 2. It has an epistemic reading in both positive and
negative sentences. (158) and (159) are two examples repeated from Chapter 1. In a context
where the speaker knows that Zhangsan bought three books of a certain kind, but does
not know what specific kind it is, a statement like (158a) is felicitous to describe the event.
By using shenme, the speaker explicitly expresses her ignorance of what kind of books that
Zhangsan bought. This is why a follow-up question like that in (158b) is disallowed. And just
like the other epistemic individual-denoting wh-indefinites, the epistemic reading of shenme
survives the clausemate negation. If the speaker knows that Zhangsan did not buy three
books of a certain kind, but she does not know what kind it is, she is entitled to use (159)









































Zhangsan didn’t buy three books of a certain kind, (I don’t know what kind it is).
Apart from the kind-reading, however, shenme also has an amount reading, or more
generally, a degree-based reading. If a context makes it clear that shenme is associated with
a degree scale, we see that it behaves like the amount-denoting wh-expressions discussed
in Chapter 3: it can never take scope above a clausemate negation and it only has an
insignificance reading when scoping under a clausemate negation. When shenme is degree-
based, it can take a count noun or a non-count noun. In (160), shenme takes a count noun
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ren ‘people’ and has an amount reading34. Same as what we saw with the amount-denoting
wh-phrase, shenme gives rise to an insignificance reading under the clausemate negation.




































Zhangsan does not have much money on him. (He has very little money on him).
More generally, all the abstract mass nouns that are supposed to be measured using
a degree scale, when combined with shenme under a clausemate negation, easily make an









Zhangsan didn’t have much confidence. (Zhangsan was very diffident).
34I have noticed that shenme with certain countable nouns seems to require more contextual support for
an insignificance reading. This may be due to the potential confound brought by the epistemic kind-reading.
For example, in the following sentence, both a wide scope epistemic reading and a narrow scope insignificance
reading are available for shenme. What reading we get depends on the particular context. Here, I add two











































The coach asked him to increase the amount of exercise.
35Of course, the kind-reading is still available as long as a facilitating context is given. For example, in
a context where confidence is further broken down into several types including social confidence, confidence
in learning, confidence in self-appearance, etc., (162) can well mean that Zhangsan does not have a certain
type of confidence, but the speaker does not know which type it is.









































Zhangsan does not have much talent. (Zhangsan has very little talent).
In light of the correlation between the different readings and the scope behavior of shenme,
it is inaccurate to label it as an NPI, as this label does not capture the full range of its use.
The data show that when shenme conveys an epistemic reading, it does not behave like an
NPI and escapes a sentential negation freely. However, when it has a degree reading, it can
only scope below the sentential negation, just like an NPI. But even here it is misleading to
describe shenme, on the amount reading, as an NPI, because its interaction with negation
follows the same pattern observed for other amount wh-expressions. The reason why those
take scope below negation, as I claimed in Ch. 3, is not that they are NPIs, but that the
wide scope reading will result in a violation of the maximality requirement imposed on the
corresponding wh-question (Fox & Hackl, 2006).
In the following two sections, I will give some evidence for the ambiguity view of shenme
that I have just presented.
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2 An ambiguity view of shenme
2.1 Evidence from a historical linguistics study
In last section, I argued that shenme has a kind-reading as well as a degree reading. Whether
it takes scope under a clausemate negation depends on which reading it has in the given
context. In the following, I will give some evidence from study on shenme in historical
linguistics in order to support the ambiguity view.
S. Zhang’s (1989) traces the historical development of the word shenme. The initial
question he asks is why shenme has two different spellings, 什么 and 甚么 respectively.
The main difference between the two seems to be that the former is more colloquial and the
latter more formal. 什么 was first found to be used at the end of Tang Dynasty (around 940
AD) and functions as the interrogative pronoun ‘what’. 甚, according to Zhang, originally
means ‘very, extremely’. 甚么 picks up the interrogative meaning of ‘what’ in Song Dynasty
(around 1056 AD), and since then 什么 and 甚么 are used interchangeably as ‘what’.
Although 什么 and 甚么 collapse into one in their meaning, Zhang emphasizes that 什
and 甚, when used alone unaccompanied by 么, have very different meanings. While 甚
has the degree-related meaning of ‘quite, rather’, 什 either means the ordinal ‘tenth’ or is
used as an adjective ‘miscellaneous’.
The connection that I am trying to imply here may look too far-fetched. How does the
interrogative pronoun ‘what’ come to have a degree-reading? The degree modifier use of 甚
seems to be relevant to some extent, but to make a full story out of it, more needs to be said.
The proposal I put forward in Chapter 3 crucially analogize the degree-based amount-reading
wh-phrases and the gradable adjectives, where both denote a relation between degrees and
an individuals. Does ‘what’ ever have a similar use in Mandarin Chinese? The answer is no.
It never has an interrogative reading over degrees. Compare (167) and (168), for example.
(167) with shenme cannot be used to ask for degree questions. We have to use the designated
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How many books did Zhangsan buy?
There is some evidence for the possibility of what ranging over degrees in English, however.
For example, when the predicate facilitates a degree reading, what can be used to ask a
degree question, (169a). Moreover, it can also refer to amounts in headless relatives, (169b),
or exlamatives, (169c).
(169) a. What does a plumber make in a year?
b. He weighs what you weigh. (Kayne, 2007)
c. What does it cost!
However, just like the degree-based use of shenme ‘what’ in Chinese is so restricted as
to existing only in the insignificance reading, what has very limited degree use in English,
too. The most common verbs that trigger the degree-reading of what concern the amount
of money or the degree of weight. The tight connection between the verbs and the degree
reading of what makes this use of what almost idiomatic. In (170), even if the context is
most welcoming to a degree reading of what, the intended degree question still fails. The
designated wh-phrase how much has to be used instead.
(170) Context: Lisi is a nurse and she makes a record of how much each of her patient eats
for dinner. The doctor asks Lisi about his record every day. Today, the doctor asks
this conventional question to him.
What did Zhangsan eat for dinner today?
a. Intended reading: How much did Zhangsan eat for dinner today?
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b. Only reading: What kind of food did Zhangsan eat for dinner today?
The same kind of questions we asked before about Mandarin Chinese can be asked here
for English as well. Why is the degree use of what in English only restricted to some particular
verb-what combinations? I have no answer to this question. I don’t know why the degree-
based use of shenme ‘what’ in Mandarin Chinese seems to exist only in the insignificance
reading; I don’t know why the degree reading of what in English seems to be almost idiomatic.
However, I hope at least I have shown that it is not inconceivable that shenme ‘what’ has
a degree reading. First, one of its morphological realization, 甚么, has a degree-related
character 甚 in it. Second, its counterpart what in English retains the degree-based use,
despite being rather limited. If we accept the ambiguity view of shenme and analyze its degree
denotation in the same way as we analyze the amount-denoting wh-phrases in Chinese, we
will have a story for the insignificance reading of shenme. It results from the phenomenon
of negative strengthening observed in negative sentences with a sentential negation scoping
over a gradable degree expression.
In the next section, I will give another empirical support for my ambiguity view of
shenme. The adverb-denoting wh-phrase zenme ‘how’, as we will soon see, also exhibits mixed
properties in terms of scope-taking and presence/absence of epistemic reading. Once we
adopt the ambiguity view, we can explain the correlation between its different readings and
scope properties in the same way as we did for shenme. The ambiguity view is not designed
particularly for shenme and its insignificance reading. It corresponds to the systematic
ambiguity displayed by both shenme and zenme.
2.2 Evidence from the adverb-denoting wh-indefinite zenme
Zenme ‘how’ normally functions as an interrogative adverb. A typical question using zenme
is given in (171). When zenme is used to substitute an adverb identifying the manner of
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an action, it can convey an epistemic reading. The epistemic reading, as we have seen with





































































Zhangsan didn’t turn the knob in a certain way as the teacher instructed, so he didn’t
fix it.
However, the epistemic reading and the attendant scope freedom above the clausemate
negation disappears if the intended reading of zenme ‘how’ is degree-based. For example, in
(174), an epistemic reading indicating the speaker’s ignorance of how often Zhangsan goes
to the gym is unavailable. The same sentence adding a clausemate negation as in (175) does
not have an epistemic reading either. The only way to access the degree use of zenme seems











Intended: #Zhangsan goes to the gym at a certain frequency recently. (I don’t know
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Intended: #Zhangsan did not go to the gym at a certain frequency. (I don’t know













Zhangsan did not go to the gym frequently recently. (He rarely went recently).
What’s intriguing is that zenme ‘how’, just like shenme, does not have an interrogative
degree use. For example, if Lisi asks someone how strongly Zhangsan supports the proposal
after a department meeting, he can use (178) but not (177). Again, the degree use reappears











































Zhangsan does not support this proposal strongly. (He barely supported it).
At this point, it should be clear to the readers that we seem to face a pattern exactly
the same we have witnessed for shenme ‘what’. If zenme ‘how’ stands for a manner, whose
domain is arguably unordered, then an epistemic reading is available and it is not susceptible
to the negative island effect. However, if zenme stands for a frequency adverb or a gradable
adverb like ‘strongly’, an epistemic reading becomes unavailable, and under a clausemate
negation, it gives rise to an insignificance reading. The ambiguity we observed with shenme
‘what’ repeats itself on zenme ‘how’. The puzzle posed by shenme also persists with zenme.
Shenme does not have an interrogative degree use, nor does zenme. The only way to access
the degree use of shenme is through its insignificance reading, so is the case with zenme. I
summarize the analogous behavior of shenme and zenme in Table 3.
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shenme ‘what’ zenme ‘how’
kind-denoting degree-denoting manner-denoting degree-denoting
epistemic reading yes no yes no
insignificance reading no yes no yes
interrogative reading yes no yes no
Table 3: Shenme and zenme
Why both of shenme and zenme only have their degree-based use in their insignificance
reading is an important question to answer. However, at least we have seen that this kind
of limitation is not particular to Mandarin Chinese. Recall that in (169), we have seen that
English what has a degree reading only in combination with certain verbs. Although our
observations do not provide a definite answer to the question as to why the three wh-phrases
only have such limited degree use in their respective languages, the parallel drawn from the
observations seems to point to something more general rather than an idiosyncrasy specific
to these wh-phrases.
3 The original so-called NPI use of shenme
In previous sections, I presented and discussed the complex behavior of shenme in Chinese.
Specifically, I proposed that shenme is ambiguous, allowing a kind-denoting reading and
an amount-denoting reading, and argued that it is incorrect to treat the expression as an
NPI. When it is used as an epistemic indefinite, shenme takes scope above the clausemate
negation for the intended epistemic ignorance reading in a negative sentence. The only case
that looks like an NPI use of shenme is in the insignificance reading where shenme ranges
over degrees and requires a c-commanding negation for grammaticality. However, there are
many claims in the literature that shenme has an any-like use. (180) - (188) are examples36.
36Although some linguists have touched upon the non-uniformity of Chinese wh-indefinites using which-
phrases (Giannakidou & Cheng, 2006; Cheng & Giannakidou, 2013), they all agree that shenme behaves like
any under negation.































































































‘Zhangsan didn’t eat anything.’ or ‘Zhangsan didn’t anything special.’
(Chierchia & Liao, 2015)
In what follows I will explain my disagreement with these claims, but I want to say at the
start that others have questioned these judgements also. Dong (2009), for example, mentions
that the so-called NPI use of shenme is mostly used as a denial answer to a preceding question.
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Out of blue, ‘¬...wh...’ is odd37. (189) is an example from him. If Zhangsan went to the
store but didn’t buy anything, the narrative with ‘¬...wh...’ in (189) sounds odd. However, if







































He didn’t buy anything.
The same kind of denial also applies to simple affirmative sentences. In (191), speaker





































B: He didn’t treat anyone to a meal.
It is worth mentioning that when mei...shenme ‘¬...what’ is used as a denial, a prosodic
accent is put on the negation. Without such special prosody, the only reading is an epistemic












I didn’t buy anything.
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ignorance reading as we have discussed in Chapter 2, where shenme defies the negative island
and scopes above the clausemate negation. For the readers, a facilitating context for a denial
interpretation could help triggering a prosodic accent on the negation in their mind. The
necessity of such contextual help is what makes Dong’s (2009) example in (189) sound odd. In
that sentence, no preceding linguistic context has been established for a denial reading, and
therefore shenme resists scoping under negation by default. The intended ‘not...any’ reading
imposes too much of a burden on the listener to make up for the missing information, making
the sentence sound odd. The impact of an accented negation on the sentence meaning is























Zhangsan didn’t bring some book to class and was criticized by the teacher. (I don’t
know what book it was that he didn’t bring to class).






























Zhangsan didn’t bring any book to class.
(Accent on neg, neg>shenme)
This special prosody as required by the speech act of denial is not particular to Mandarin
Chinese. Moreover, the fact that shenme can only scope under a clausemate negation in a
denial context is familiar from English. Positive polarity items (PPIs) like ‘someone’ cannot
scope under a clausemate negation unless it is used in a denial context (Szabolcsi, 2004;
Nicolae, 2012a, 2012b). (194) gives an example (caps indicate prosodic accent).
(194) A: I heard John talked to someone at the party yesterday.
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B: No actually. John didn’t talk to someone. (Nicolae, 2012a)
I believe the readers can see where I am going with these observations. The view that
shenme is an NPI is, I believe, a misconception. All the examples that are used to support
this conclusion, some of which are given in (180) - (188), are actually sentences of denial.
They can only attain the intended ‘not...any’ reading when a prosodic accent is put on the
negation. With no prosodic accent on the negation, we have only two possible readings of the
‘¬...what’ sentences: the epistemic reading and the insignificance reading. Dong (2009) did
not discuss the epistemic reading of shenme and only mentioned the insignificance reading as
well as the ‘not any’ reading of a ‘¬...what’ sentence. Of the two, he thinks the most salient
reading is the insignificance reading. In (195), Dong claims the first half of the sentence has
an uncancelable implicature that the speaker bought something, although what she bought
was not much/important. This implicature contradicts with the second half that states the





















??I didn’t buy anything, and in fact I bought nothing. (Dong, 2009, p. 142)
Contrary to Dong (2009), I argue that a ‘¬...what’ sentence has three possible readings.





















Accented negation × × X
Unaccented negation X X ×
Table 4: negation...what
If my take on the negative sentences with shenme is correct, shenme turns out to be
a schizophrenic wh-phrase. When it is kind-denoting, it behaves like a PPI. The surface
scope reading is absent when shenme is embedded under a clausemate negation and the
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only reading is an epistemic reading where shenme scopes above the negation. The only
way to achieve a wide scope of the negation relative to the PPI shenme is to place the
sentence in a denial context. In that case, a prosodic accent on the negation is obligatory.
On the other hand, when shenme is degree-denoting, it is trapped under the clausemate
negation and the only possible reading is an insignificance reading. It is in this case that
shenme conforms to the definition of an NPI. Intriguing enough that the two diametrically
opposed properties converge to one and the same wh-phrase shenme, but it is not surprising.
Adopting the ambiguity view I have argued in the previous sections, the PPI and NPI
properties are associated with the two different possible algebraic structures associated with
shenme respectively. When it is associated with an unordered structure, it behaves like the
other unordered individual-denoting wh-phrases in Chinese. When it is associated with an
ordered structure, it behaves like the other ordered amount-denoting wh-phrases in Chinese.
If my dissection of shenme holds water, we predict that all the individual-denoting wh-
phrases that have an unordered structure will behave like PPIs. This prediction is borne out.
Recall the observation from Chapter 1 and 2 that singular-marked wh-phrases in Chinese
cannot scope under a clausemate negation. This was first observed by Giannakidou and
Cheng (2006) and later discussed in Cheng and Giannakidou (2013). According to the
authors, the singular-marked which-phrases in a negative sentence only has a wide scope












*He didn’t buy any book. (*NPI reading)
Which book didn’t he buy? (XInterrogative reading)
There is a book that he didn’t buy. (I don’t know which book it is).
38In the appendix at the end of this chapter, there are real world examples of singular-marked which-
phrases used as a wide scope epistemic indefinite in negative sentences as well.
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(XEpistemic reading)
The same is true for who, which, as I have argued in Chapter 2, is strictly singular and



















*Zhangsan didn’t respond to anyone today and was criticized by the teacher.
(*NPI reading)
Who didn’t Zhangsan respond to so that he was criticized by the teacher?
(XInterrogative reading)
Zhangsan didn’t respond to someone today and was criticized by the teacher. (I
don’t know who he ignored).
(XEpistemic reading)
Moreover, just like shenme, for all these unordered individual-denoting wh-phrases to
take a narrow scope relative to a clausemate negation, a denial context is necessary. The
reflex in prosody is an accent put on the negation. The absent ‘not any’ reading when the


































































B: Zhangsan didn’t invite anyone. (with accented negation)
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Although PPIs cannot take scope under a clausemate negation, they are felicitous if the
negation is extra-clausal. (200) gives an example from English. In Mandarin Chinese, the
unordered individual-denoting and kind-denoting wh-phrases behave alike, scoping under an
extra-clausal negation felicitously, as shown in (201).





























































I don’t think Zhangsan bought something for Lisi
In light of the parallel behavior of shenme and PPIs like ‘someone’ in English, I have
turned the traditional NPI analysis of shenme on its head. Shenme is not an NPI but a PPI.
Not only shenme, but also other unordered individual-denoting wh-phrases are all PPIs. In
the face of a clausemate negation, they obligatorily take wide scope. To make them scope
under a negation, we either accent the negation to make a denial context or we move the
negation to an extra-clausal position.
4 Where Chinese epistemic indefinites fit in the cross-
linguistic picture
In the past three decades, we have seen surging interest in epistemic indefinites. Indefinites
from different languages that are identified as belonging to this class have been studied
separately: Spanish algún (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito, 2003, 2010; Giannakidou &
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Quer, 2013), French quelque (Jayez & Tovena, 2006, 2011), Italian un qualche (Zamparelli,
2007), Romanian vreun (Fălăuş, 2010, 2014), German irgendein (Kratzer & Shimoyama,
2002; Lauer, 2012), Greek kapjos (Giannakidou & Quer, 2013), Russian wh-nibud’ series
(Pereltsvaig, 2008; Onea & Geist, 2011), Japanese wh-ka series (Sudo, 2010; Alonso-Ovalle
& Shimoyama, 2014) as well as English some (Weir, 2012). Chinese epistemic wh-indefinites
have only received attention very recently (Chen, 2017, 2018), partly due to the deep-seated
assumption that they are polarity sensitive items and cannot appear grammatically in simple
affirmative sentences. In order to gain a cross-linguistic view, some linguists have done an
inter-language comparison between these indefinites and try to identify the parameters along
which they exhibit variations (Aloni & Port, 2010, 2015; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito,
2013, 2015). Chinese epistemic indefinites come to the fore relatively late and therefore have
not been included into any of the cross-linguistic studies. Therefore, a natural question to
ask about the Chinese epistemic indefinites is: where do they fit in this picture?
This is a huge question which does not have an easy answer. Aloni and Port (2010,
2015) have investigated the interaction between the epistemic indefinites from Romance and
Germanic languages and different operators, including epistemic modals, deontic modals
and negative operators. They argue that epistemic indefinites signal a shift in the concep-
tual cover (naming, ostension, description) used to identify the referent of the indefinite.
Given the discrepancy between the Romance and Germanic languages in terms of the con-
ceptual cover shifting they each allows, Aloni and Port (2010) propose a different hierarchy
of the conceptual cover for the two families of languages respectively39. Alonso-Ovalle and
Menéndez-Benito (2013) conduct a review of the two main approaches to the epistemic indef-
inites. The first derives the epistemic variation of the indefinite as a quantity conversational
implicature. The second, represented by Aloni and Port (2010, 2015), argues for a conceptual
cover shifting view where the epistemic effect is a conventional implicature. Alonso-Ovalle
39For more detailed discussion, I refer the readers to Aloni and Port (2010, 2015).
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and Menéndez-Benito (2013) concludes from the empirical facts that neither approach could
account for all the data.
Since the current dissertation mainly focuses on the interaction between Chinese wh-
indefinites and the sentential negation, I will start from the negative operator and see where
Chinese wh-indefinites fit compared to the other epistemic indefinites. Where to put them in
the cross-linguistic picture from the perspective of how they interact with the other operators
will have to be left to another occasion.
In the last section, we have seen that Chinese unordered individual-denoting/kind-denoting
wh-indefinites in declarative sentences convey an epistemic effect, and when they do in a neg-
ative sentence, they obligatorily take scope above the clausemate negation. A narrow scope
reading relative to the negation is only possible in a denial context where the negation is
prosodically accented. Another way to make the negation outscope an Chinese epistemic
indefinite is to put it in an extra-clausal position. All these behaviors are similar to that
of PPIs. Is the PPI-like behavior an indispensable property of epistemic indefinites? If we
raise our eyes from Chinese epistemic indefinites to take a broad cross-linguistic view, we
find that the empirical facts are quite heterogeneous.
Gianollo (2019) conducts a diachronic study of the Classical Latin epistemic indefinite
aliquis and its subsequent development in Romance languages. According to Gianollo (2019),
aliquis can be broken down into two parts morphologically. The first morpheme originates
from the same stem of Latin alius ‘other’, meaning ‘some or other’. The second is an
interrogative morpheme with the stem qu- marking the sortal restriction40. The following
gives the ali- series in Latin.
(Gianollo, 2019, p.13)
Gianollo (2019) observes that Classical Latin aliquis can be used as an epistemic indef-
40The interrogative morpheme is a very common component of indefinites cross-linguistically. Out of
Haspelmath’s (1997) 100 language samples, 63 exhibit a relation between its interrogative and indefinite
morphemes. Chinese, of course, is one of them.







inite. This epistemic reading persists in negative sentences, where aliquis obligatorily takes
a wide scope relative to the clausemate negation. The necessary wide scope, as Gianollo
(2019) put it, is ‘a very robust generalization, for which no exceptions are observed during
the Classical Latin stage, independent of register and text type’. In (202), aliquid resists a
narrow scope under the negation, yielding a wide scope existential reading ‘...there is some-
thing you don’t have...’. In (203), the speaker is making an analogy between the loss of noun
endings and the statues that do not have the head or ‘some other part’. Aliquam aliam has































‘You use the verb carere [to lack] in the situation in which there is something that






















































‘For as some statues lack the head or some other part without destroying the regu-
larities in their other limbs, so in words certain losses of cases can take place, with
as little result.’ (Varro ling. 9.46.147) (Gianollo, 2019, p.76)
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Gianollo (2019) further points out that if aliquis a metalinguistic negation can successfully
trap the epistemic indefinite aliquid in its scope, as shown in (204). The resistance to
a narrow scope under a clausemate negation and the savaging effect of a metalinguistic


























PH. ‘for Hercules, I do not want “something”: I prefer “certain” to “something” ’
PH. (Plaut. Curc. 319-20) (Gianollo, 2019, p.76)
Still another property of aliquis that resembles PPIs is that it is licensed by double DE
operators. Nicolae (2012a, 2012b) observes the same property for English PPI ‘someone’.
Given all the similarities between aliquis and the PPIs, no wonder Gianollo (2019) assigns











‘not without some divine providence’ (Cic. prov. 34)
(206) I doubt that John didn’t see someone.
Starting from Late Latin (around fourth century ce), however, there first appeared a
negative polarity use of aliquis. During this time of change, both the positive polarity use
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‘If therefore your whole body will be full of light, with no dark part in it, it will be













‘if he cannot, because he is hindered by some necessity or other...’ (Aug. serm. 125)
(Gianollo, 2019, p.85)
This mixture of positive and negative polarity properties still presents itself in many
epistemic indefinites from different languages of today. For example, German irgendein is
found to be resistant to a narrow scope under a clausemate negation. The result, however, is
pure infelicity instead of an obligatory wide scope. If the negation is extra-clausal, irgendein
is grammatical with a narrow scope reading. Curiously though, irgendein functions as a
normal NPI under a DE subject quantifier. Spanish algún, on the other hand, also refrains
from a narrow scope relative to a clausemate negation when preceding a NP41,42. It is only
felicitous if the negation is extra-clausal or the negation is understood as a metalinguistic














Intended: I didn’t read any book. (∗nicht > irgendein, PPI-like)























41PPIs, despite resisting a narrow scope under a clausemate negation, can well scope above the negation.
German irgendein and Spanish algun, while maintaining the resistance under a clausemate negation, lose
their wide scope reading. Why is this the case? I don’t have an answer to this question at hand, and will
have to revisit this question in the future.
42Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010, 2013) make the claim that Spanish algún is ungrammatical
under a clausemate negation. However, they did not provide a supporting example. Here, I give an example
adduced from a native speaker of Colombian Spanish.
43How reversing the order of the indefinite determiner and the NP it modifies determines the polarity be-
havior of the indefinite is beyond this dissertation and must await for another occasion. For more information,
I refer the readers to the original work by Gianollo (2019).
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leihen
borrow
In no case can you borrow any one of those two books.
(X [¬...[CP ...irgendein]], PPI-like)
























Intended: *I didn’t read any book.




























It is not the case that Juan is dating some girl in the Linguistics department.
(X [¬...[CP ...alguna]], PPI-like)











I didn’t see any student. (X no > alguno, NPI-like)
(Gianollo, 2019, p.98)
44In the original example, the authors gave a translation using a sentential negation, one that does not
make explicit the fact that the negation is actually extra-clausal. I have revised the translation here in order
to be more faithful to the original Spanish sentence. The original example is given here for the readers to



























John is not dating any girl in the Linguistics department.
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Except the German irgendein and Spanish algun, we also find some descendants of the
Classical Latin aliquis from different Romance languages that sit at either the NPI pole or
the PPI pole, with Italian alcuno and French aucun mutating into a pure NPI and Catalan
algun staying as a pure PPI.




















Intended: *Some student came.




















Intended: *I have seen some cat.


































Only reading: There is some student whom I didn’t meet.
The polarity space does not seem to be dichotomous where the NPIs and PPIs reside
in completely complementary subspaces. Instead, it is more like a continuum where the
indefinites we have discussed just now can all find its own niche. For example, Italian alcuno
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NPI PPI
Italian alcuno







Figure 10: The spectrum of polarity
has adopted a pure NPI meaning and therefore locates at the left end of the spectrum.
Catalan algun, on the other hand, sustains as a pure PPI and sits at the other end of the
spectrum. Spanish algun and German irgendein exhibit mixed positive and negative polarity
properties and therefore are somewhere in the middle. Aliquis in classical Latin is a pure
PPI and positioned at the right end. In Late Latin, however, aliquis has evolved to adopt
the NPI use, coexisting with its PPI use. Therefore, Late Latin aliquis is put in the middle.
What about Chinese epistemic wh-indefinites? Where do they fit into the cross-linguistic
picture? As for shenme, I have argued in the previous section that when it is kind-denoting,
it behaves like a PPI in that it has an obligatory wide scope relative to a clausemate negation.
I have also pointed out that, however, the kind-reading shenme has long been analyzed as
an NPI and this judgement has been shared by many linguists in the past three decades.
How come the two diametrically opposite judgements can occur simultaneously on one and
the same wh-indefinite? One possible answer, as I have given in the last section, is that
the examples of the so-called NPI use of shenme may actually be sentences of denial. Due
to the fact that in both its normal use and metalinguistic use the negation occupies the
same position in the surface structure and disambiguates for a metalinguistic use only by
the addition of a prosodic accent, those examples are inconclusive as evidence to support
the NPI argument. On the other hand, given what we have learned from Gianollo’s(2019)
historical study of the Latin epistemic indefinite aliquis, a second possibility is that shenme
is undergoing an expansion of its polarity space so as to allow both positive and negative
polarity uses. Native speakers like Dong (2009) and the current author are representatives
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of those who cling strongly to the positive polarity use so as not to adopt the NPI use easily.
The other speakers, on the other hand, may well entertain both uses at the same time. For
example, C. T. Huang (p.c.) agrees that shenme does not necessarily function as an NPI
under a clausemate negation in a negative sentence. It can also have a wide scope epistemic
reading.
What about the other unordered individual-denoting which-indefinites, including the
singular-marked which NPs and the num-marked plural which-phrases? They unambigu-
ously behave like PPIs and never take a narrow scope relative to a clausemate negation
(Cheng & Giannakidou, 2013) unless the negation is metalinguistic or it moves to an extra-
clausal position.
If we are to add the Chinese wh-indefinites to the polarity continuum, the unordered
individual-denoting sg-marked and num-marked ones will go to the PPI end. To the current
author, the kind-denoting shenme ‘what’ as well as shei ‘who’ will find themselves at the
PPI pole. As for those speakers who allow a true NPI use of kind-denoting shenme and shei
as well as the PPI-like epistemic use of them, they will place them in the middle ground.
Here in the figure, I put shenme and shei in the middle. The degree-reading shenme and




alcuno Classical Lat. aliquis
Catalan algun
sg-marked which-phrase
e.g. na ge xuesheng ‘which student’
num-marked plural which-phrase










Figure 11: where the Chinese wh-indefinites fit
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Appendix: Data on Chinese wh-indefinites

































Yet when I was reading till the end, I recalled a word left someone, (I don’t remember
whose word it is though).































She was threatened by someone before, who forbade her from telling what she knew.
(I don’t know who threatened her though).



































Premier Zhou entered last. He talked to someone at the entrance. (I don’t know who
he talked to).





























We had a little slave boy whom we had hired from some one, there in Hannibal.

















My article was deleted by someone. (I don’t know who it is).
(Retrieved 2020/4/10 from http://corpus.leeds.ac.uk/query-zh.html)







































A doctor from the hospital where my intimate friend’s father-in-law works was in-
fected when he attended some conference. He is now a confirmed case. (I don’t know
which conference he attended).
(Retrieved 2020/4/10 from https://oursteps.co/bbs/archiver/?tid-1573934.html&page=
2)































The content is that an office director did not attend some conference due to person
matters. (I don’t know what conference it is though).






















































Generally the wedding went quite well. He also presented himself very well. As for the
lack of consideration of someone’s feelings and other details, it definitely happened.
(We don’t know whose feelings we may have ignored though).
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He said he didn’t bring a certain kind of bolt. (I don’t remember what kind it is.)
(Retrieved 2020/4/10 from http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-develop-562357-1.shtml)

































“Xiaosu, do you have something that you want to say?” “I, I don’t have something
that I want to say.”









































“Oh, Second Lord and Qingwen, which courtyard did you go to?” “We just took a
stroll. We didn’t go to some courtyard.”



















“Where did you go?” “I didn’t go somewhere.”














































Ma Yili: I haven’t experienced anything dangerous in recent years.
(Retrieved 2020/4/15 from http://ling.cuc.edu.cn/RawPub/)
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I didn’t watch many plays recently. I’m losing my hearing. I went to see Faust, and
I could only hear 10 percent of it clearly.































I saw you eat very little just now. It must be that you don’t have a good appetite.





















The price of sesame has increased but that of sesame oil has not increased much.
(Retrieved 2020/4/17 from http://ccl.pku.edu.cn:8080/ccl_corpus)
Chapter 5: Against the even theory of
dou
The previous chapters have established an algebraic theory of Chinese wh-indefinites.
Different readings of wh-indefinites are shown to be tied to different algebraic structures
associated with them. This theory has far-reaching ramifications in other research topics
involving Chinese wh-indefinites. In this chapter, we discuss a particular one among them
— the interaction between Chinese wh-indefinites and dou.
Dou is a lexical item that has drawn immense attention from Chinese linguists. The
diversity of its readings has proven to be a difficult problem. In the past decade or so,
multiple endeavors have been made to give a unified theory of dou to cover its two main
uses. M. Xiang (2008) proposes that dou is a maximality operator. Y. Xiang (2016) asserts
that dou is a pre-exhaustification operator (Fox, 2007; Chierchia, 2013). Liao (2011) argues
that dou has the same contribution as even45, whose idea is later adopted and extended by
M. Liu (2017, to appear). I will not review all these theories in detail. Instead, I will divide
the unifying theories into two types, based on their point of departure and how they go from
there to cover other uses. The first type consists of the distributive theories of dou. Theories
of this kind take the distributive use as the core function of dou that subsumes the even
reading as a special case (Portner, 2002; Pan & Feng, 2016). The second type is the even
45Liao (2011) does not semantically treat dou as even, but claims that the presence of dou always indicates
a covert even operating on the entire sentence.
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theory of dou. Theories of this kind take the even reading as the semantic core of dou and
attributes the distributivity found in dou-sentences to a covert distributive operator.
Despite the influence of the second type of theories, I will argue for a rejuvenation of
the first type of theories by bringing into the picture the insights we have gained from the
algebraic theory of wh-indefinites. After showing the systematic difficulties that the even
theory of dou faces, I will conclude that the first type of theories still do better.
The findings on the interaction between wh-indefinites and dou will extend to the relevant
literature on any in English, casting a doubt on the indiscriminate treatment of any as
even+indefinite in Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995) and a similar theory proposed by Lahiri (1998).
The differences between the separate species of NPIs (Heim, 1984; Krifka, 1995; Zwarts,
1998) will be brought back into the spotlight. Moreover, I will argue that the behavior of
the different species of NPIs can be traced back to the algebraic structure they are associated
with, in the same way I have argued for Chinese wh-indefinites.
1 The even analysis of dou
In recent years, the second type of theories on dou where it is argued to make a se-
mantic contribution analogous to English even has gained more and more momentum. A
prominent resemblance has been found between the wh+dou sequence in Chinese and the
indefinite+even/also sequence46 in Hindi, Japanese, Korean, Bangla and many more lan-
guages. Both exhibit an NPI reading with a clausemate negation and a free choice (FC)
reading where the predicate is generic (Lahiri, 1998; Y.-S. Lee & Horn, 1995, a.o.). I will
present a succinct review of the even analysis given in Lahiri (1998) and Y.-S. Lee and Horn
(1995) and point out its difficulties.
46In Hindi, Japanese or Korean, the same particle performs both even meaning and also meaning. In
Mandarin Chinese, dou has lost its additivity meaning as also. However, in Cantonese, this use has been
preserved till now (Szabolcsi, Whang, & Zu, 2014).
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A second even analysis of dou is found first in Liao (2011) where dou is treated as a
focus operator indicating the presence a covert even. This theory is adopted and extended
by M. Liu (2017, to appear) with some revisions. Y. Xiang (2016, to appear) is also a devel-
opment on Liao (2011) with a different mode of applying the exhaustification framework laid
out in Fox (2007) and Chierchia (2013).47 Their even analysis of dou gives a very different
role to the wh-indefinite, relying on the manipulation of the entailment relationship between
alternatives in order to get the desired reading. However, it is this manipulation that causes
problems elsewhere. I will discuss why.
1.1 An even analysis after Lahiri (1998) and Lee and Horn (1995)
The similarity between wh+dou in Chinese and indefinite+even/also in several other





























47Actually, in the most recent version of her theory, Y. Xiang (to appear) tries to explain the chronological
emergence of the different uses of dou (distributive use comes long before the FCI licenser use and the even
use) by ascribing them to different alternatives (non-excludable alternatives vs. non-innocently-excludable
alternatives vs. scalar alternatives ranking lower than the prejacent) and exhaustification operators (O vs.
just) in the semantic entry of dou. According to her, the alternatives used primarily are the logically weaker
alternatives, and only until later are they weakened to non-innocently-excludable alternatives. This explains
why the distributive use of dou emerges much earlier than the FCI licenser use. In other words, Y. Xiang
takes the distributive use of dou as basic and derives the other uses by manipulating certain parameters in
the semantic entry for dou. In this sense, her theory should not be classified as belonging to the group of even
analysis of dou. Here, I still put her theory into the even group for two reasons. First, I will point out later
that Y. Xiang’s attempt to reduce the different readings to the different alternatives and exhaustification
operators cannot stand. See discussion on example (306). Therefore, her theory actually is not able to
pinpoint the distributive use as the primary and the other two as derived ones. Second, her theory shares a
lot in common with the other two even analyses proposed by Liao (2011) and M. Liu (2017, to appear).

















































































48Astute readers may find that the free choice example here uses -lato instead of the simple -to. This
should not be a problem. According to Choi (2007), both wh+to and wh+lato in Korean have NPI as well
as FCI uses. See the table on page 27 in her dissertation.
49As Yabushiba mentions, some Japanese linguists claim that wh+mo is an NPI, and the free choice use
requires wh+demo, not wh+mo (e.g. Shimoyama, 2006). Yabushiba disagrees though. To him, wh+mo can
well be used in a free choice sentence. Takahashi (2002) also claims wh+mo can be used as FCI, but only
with a special pitch accent. I adopt Yabushiba’s judgement here, as the evidence from other languages where
the same indefinite+even/also sequence has both uses is preponderant.
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He will read any book. (Malayalam, Jayaseelan (2011))
The indefinite used in these sentences is either a wh-indefinite or a plain indefinite like






























Ram also came. (without focus on ‘Ram’)







That witness was also silent.







I also saw Ram (in addition to all the other people I saw).
(Bangla, Ramchand (1997))
(230a) - (235a) show that they all give rise to an NPI reading with a clausemate negation.
(230b)-(235b) show that they generate a free choice reading with a generic predicate.
The same alternation between the two readings is also found in the sequence one+even/also















Zhangsan didn’t invite anyone/even a single person.
























































Mina saves even a penny. (Korean, Yeonju Lee p.c.)
It is also well known that English any has both NPI and FC readings. The only difference
is that any does not have a visible emphatic particle attached to it. Based on data like what
we have seen from other languages, some linguists conclude that any is underlyingly an
indefinite+even (Lahiri, 1998; Y.-S. Lee & Horn, 1995). In so doing, they manage to fit
English any into the pattern of the those languages.
1.1.1 Lahiri (1998)
Lahiri’s (1998) theory consists of two main components. First, indefinites are analyzed
as the cardinality predicate one. For example, someone introduces a variable and imposes
a cardinality requirement on it, semantically translated as one(x) ∧ person(x). Second, the
emphatic particle suffixed to the indefinite/one-phrase is analyzed as even with an additive
implicature and a least likelihood implicature (Karttunen & Peters, 1979; Wilkinson, 1996).50
50Other linguists analyze these two inferences as presuppositions (Bennett, 1982; Kay, 1990). Here, I
present Lahiri’s theory as it is and call them implicatures. Moreover, there has been a debate as to whether
the additive implicature/presupposition is necessary. This issue is orthogonal to the current discussion and
will be ignored here.
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As can be seen in the LF tree in (245), koii bhii is treated as a determiner. The indefinite
phrase first moves from Spec-VP to Spec-IP, leaving an individual variable x. Then, the
determiner itself further moves up, without the NP restriction one dragged along with it51,
leaving a trace of the cardinality predicate it denotes. The individual variable x is closed by









(246) a. 1 = λx.P (x) ∧ came(x)
b. 2 = λP.¬∃x[P (x) ∧ came(x)]
bhii is a focus operator whose focus associate is the indefinite koii. Since koii denotes
the cardinality predicate one, the alternatives to (244) are formed by replacing koii with
other cardinality predicates, shown in (247b).
The additive implicature then says there is an alternative that is different from the
original sentence which is also true, see (247c). This implicature is automatically satisfied
as the assertion made in (244) is stronger than all the other alternatives. If (244) is true, its
51The NP restriction in this case is not very contentful. If we have ‘some student’ instead of ‘someone’,
we will have ‘student’ in place of ‘one’ here.
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alternatives have to be true too. The least likelihood implicature in (247d) is also satisfied.
The more logically stronger a sentence is, the fewer contexts that can make it true, thus the
less likely it is.
(247) a. Assertion: a = ¬∃x[one(x) ∧ came(x)]
b. ALT = {¬∃x[P(x) ∧ came(x)]|P ∈ {two, three, four...}}
c. Additive implicature: ∃q ∈ ALT [q 6= a ∧ q]
d. Least likelihood implicature: ∀q ∈ ALT [q 6= a→ a <likelihood q]
Without the negation, however, the assertion made by the sentence in (248) will be
the logically weakest one among its alternatives. In other words, all the alternatives entail
the assertion. Compare (249a) and (249b) to see this fact. Due to their stronger logical
strength, the alternatives will be less likely, NOT more likely than the assertion. The least









(249) a. Assertion: a = ∃x[one(x) ∧ came(x)]
b. ALT = {∃x[P(x) ∧ came(x)]|P ∈ {two, three, four...}}
c. Additive implicature: ∃q ∈ ALT [q 6= a ∧ q]
d. Least likelihood implicature: ∀q ∈ ALT [q 6= a→ a <likelihood q]
Lahiri (1998) argues that it is this requirement of implicature satisfaction imposed by bhii
that explains why NPIs in Hindi can only occur in downward-entailing (DE) environments.
Only in DE environments can the assertion be logically stronger than the alternatives so as
to make consistent implicatures.
In generic sentences, Lahiri (1998) gives the same semantics for koii bhii. The former
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reasoning for the NPI use of koii bhii carries over to its FC use quite naturally. Take (250)
for example. The genetic operator binds the variable introduced by the indefinite, which
















Any man can lift this table.
The assertion of this sentence is as in (251a), where the indefinite contributes a cardinality
predicate one, in the same way as it does in the NPI sentences. The alternatives, however,
are formed in a slightly different way this time, by replacing one with a contextually relevant
property, which may or may not be a cardinality predicate, as shown in (251b).
(251) a. Assertion: a = Gx([one(x) ∧man(x)]→ x can lift this table)
b. ALT = {Gx([P(x) ∧ man(x)] → x can lift this table)|P ∈ {two, three, weak,
strong...}}
c. Additive implicature: ∃q ∈ ALT [q 6= a ∧ q]
d. Least likelihood implicature: ∀q ∈ ALT [q 6= a→ a <likelihood q]
Lahiri assumes that only the typical cases are considered in FC sentences. This makes
the generic operator function as a true universal quantifier, despite the well-known fact
that exceptions are tolerated in generic contexts. Furthermore, since the restrictor of a
universal quantifier constitutes a DE environment, the assertion is logically stronger than
the alternatives. If it is true, the alternatives have to be true. In other words, it is the least
likely one to be true. Both the additive and least likelihood implicatures are thus satisfied.
1.1.2 Problem with Lahiri’s analysis
Considering the similarity between Chinese wh+dou and the indefinite+even sequence
in other languages, a natural hypothesis is that the two are semantically equivalent. Lahiri’s
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(1998) theory on the latter can be applied to the former. Dou will be analyzed as even and
wh-indefinites will be analyzed as a cardinality predicate one.
Lahiri himself is aware of some of the problems in treating indefinite+even as an ex-
actly the same beast as one NP+even. He cites Zwarts (1998), whose work shows that the
indefinite kind of NPIs do not have the same distribution as the minimizer kind of NPIs.52
However, he claims that all Hindi NPIs as minimizers. In this case, the distinction ends
up irrelevant to his theory. Here, I use some carefully concocted examples with verbs that
target specifically to the difference between an indefinite and the numeral one to show that
the distinction between the two kinds of NPIs is actually a consequential one. Let’s begin
with some NPI sentence examples.
(252) Context: In a primary school math class, the teacher divides the students into two
groups. Then, she asks Zhangsan to count the cardinality of the first group, and Lisi
to count the second. While Lisi obeys the instruction, Zhangsan is just too naughty






























Zhangsan didn’t count even one student.
(253) Context: Zhangsan is a new singer. When his company suggested a list of big cities































Zhangsan didn’t make his debut in any big city. He held it in his hometown.
52In Zwarts’s typology of NPIs, the indefinite NPIs are weak NPIs while the minimizers are strong NPIs.































Zhangsan didn’t make his debut in even one big city. He held it in his hometown.
(252) presents a minimal pair that differs only in the type of NPIs they use. While the
one with wh+dou is ungrammatical, the other with one NP+even is. Note that the verb
‘count’ is collective relative to its object position. The NPI which student+even, however,
obligatorily induces a distributive interpretation. Hence its resistance to the verb. The NPI
one student +even, on the other hand, activates other numeral phrases as alternatives, i.e.
two students, three students, etc., all compatible with the collective requirement of ‘count’.
Furthermore, the object of ‘count’ is cumulative in terms of its cardinality. If John counts
two students, he must count one and then one more. In other words, without the negation,
all the alternatives entail the assertion of the original sentence. With the negation, the
entailment relationship reverses. We end up with a familiar case as we have already seen in
(244). The same composition applies and the grammaticality of (252b) is explained.
(253) presents another minimal pair. This time, however, wh+even is grammatical, but
one NP+even is not. The predicate ‘make a debut’ is special in that a debut can only occur
once. It’s impossible to have a debut in two or more places. If we use one NP+even, the
sentence will say something to the effect that ‘Zhangsan didn’t make his debut in one city, not
to say in two or more cities’, the latter half of which seems to suggest that a debut could have
been held in two or more cities, but this suggestion contradicts the conventional implicature
conveyed by the word ‘debut’. This is why (253b) does not tolerate one NP+even. The
other NPI wh+even does not have the problem that one NP+even has in this case, because
it induces an obligatory distributive interpretation. The undesirable implicature that one
NP+even generates is preempted by the distributive interpretation of wh+even from the
very beginning.
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The above minimal pairs show that wh+even and one NP+even are very different in their
behavior despite that both function as NPIs in the respective sentences. We see a sentence
ends up with a completely different grammaticality status depending only on which NPI is
chosen. There are cases where wh+even leads to grammaticality while one NP+even leads
to ungrammaticality. There are also cases where the opposite happens. This discrepancy
reveals that the two are independent from each other.
The same contrast carries over to English, as we can see in (254) and (255). In (254),
the predicate ‘be born’ is deliberately selected. It is common knowledge that a person’s
birth can only happen once. (254b) states that ‘John wasn’t born in one city’, with an
implicature that ‘John wasn’t born in two or more cities’. The implicature suggests that it is
possible for a person to be born in two or more cities, a possibility not tolerable by the world
knowledge. Thus (254b) fails. (254a), however, has no such problem due to the distributive
interpretation of any.53
(254) a. John wasn’t born in any city. He was born in a small village.
b. *John wasn’t born in even one city. He was born in a small village.
In (255), the verb ‘gather’ is collective relative to its object position. The distributive
interpretation of any student counters this lexical requirement of ‘gather’. The implicature
of one NP+even, nevertheless, is compatible with this collective requirement. This explains
the ungrammaticality of the former and the grammaticality of the latter in the same sentence
frame as in (255).
(255) a. *John didn’t gather any student.
b. John didn’t gather even one student.54
53Note that all my examples use any+singular NP. Any+plural NP is more complicated and will not be
discussed here.
54Sam Alxatib (p.c.) questions the grammaticality of sentence (255b). I have asked five different native
speakers. Three of them confirmed the grammaticality and two didn’t like it. I also asked their judgement
using the following sentence. Four said yes and one said no. Both ‘gather’ and ‘count’ are collective predicates
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The prior examples, through a careful selection of verbal predicates, reveal the under-
lying differences between the NPI wh/any+even and NPI one NP+even. Lahiri (1998) did
not detect the difference mainly because he only uses verbs that are distributive relative to





















‘Come’ is distributive relative to its subject, i.e. ‘John and Mary came’ entails that
‘John came and Mary came’. This is why it’s compatible with the indefinite in (256a).
Moreover, (256b) without negation activates a set of alternatives, each of which is stronger
than the assertion made by itself. With the negation, the entailment relationship reverses
and both additive and least likelihood implicatures are satisfied. What’s crucial is that the
implicatures generated by (256b) do not contradict the distributive requirement imposed by
the verb ‘come’. As a result, the two sentences turn out to be semantically equivalent with
the difference between the two NPIs concealed by the inadvertent choice of a distributive
predicate. Once we replace the predicate, however, we will immediately elicit a difference,
as we have seen in (252) to (255).
I hope I have driven home the point that the indefinite+even and one NP+even are
NOT the same in terms of their NPI use. Therefore, Lahiri’s (1998) proposal that reduces
relative to their object position. I don’t know why my informants like the following example with ‘count’
better than the one with ‘gather’. The intra-speaker variation in judgement is also a puzzle to me. Here, I
will go with the judgement that both (255b) and (i) are grammatical and leave the variation puzzle in future
study.
Context: The teacher asked John to count how many students there were in the next room. John was so lazy
that he totally forgot this task.
i John didn’t count even one student.
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the former to the latter is problematic. Now, let’s turn to the generic use of the two se-
quences. I will show that they are essentially different in this use too.
Recall that Lahiri (1998) claims an indefinite in indefinite+even still denotes the cardi-
















Any man can lift this table.
Applying Lahiri’s theory to the wh+dou sequence in Chinese, however, cannot explain the
contrast in (258) and (259).
(258) Context: Zhangsan goes to a driving school to learn driving. There is a car available
to all the students who want to practice driving. No need to ask for permission. The


































Even one person can drive this car.
(259) Context: In a physics class, the teacher asks the students to lift a table collectively.
Zhangsan, however, thinks the table is so light that there is no need to have two or


































Even one person is sufficient to lift this table.
The trick I use here, again, is a calculated choice of verbal predicates. In (258), ‘drive
this car’ has a conventional implicature that there can be only one driver. The distributive
CHAPTER 5: AGAINST DOU AS EVEN 125
interpretation induced by the indefinite shei is congruous with the this implicature. When
it comes to one NP+dou, however, we get a problematic implicature. (258b) states that
‘one person can drive this car, needless to say two or more people’, the latter half of which
immediately contradicts the uniqueness of driver implicature brought by the predicate. The
(in)congruence with the verbal predicate determines that wh+dou is grammatical, but one
NP+dou is ungrammatical.
In (259), the predicate ‘sufficient to lift this table’ exhibits incompatibility/compatibility
respectively with the two FCIs in the opposite way as we just see in (258). ‘Sufficient’ implies
existence of a scale. If a certain amount a is sufficient to do something, any amount that
exceeds a on the scale is also sufficient to do the same thing. The distributive interpretation
of the wh-indefinite in the FCI wh+dou does not fit with this conventional implicature of
‘sufficient’, as it does not induce a cumulation of number. Hence the ungrammaticality of
(259a). (259b) is different in this regard. If ‘one person is sufficient to lift this table, then any
larger number of people is also sufficient to lift this table’. The implicatures generated by one
NP+dou is consistent with the requirement of ‘sufficient’. Therefore, (259b) is grammatical.
The same contrast is found in English, shown in (260) and (261). I omit the explanation
here. I trust the readers can do the same reasoning as I did for the Chinese examples.
(260) a. Anyone can drive this car.
b. *Even one person can drive this car.
(261) a. *Anyone is sufficient to lift this table.
b. Even one person is sufficient to lift this table.
We see cases where the FCI wh+dou is grammatical, but the FCI one NP+dou is not.
We also see cases where the latter is grammatical, but the former is not. It is clear that they
are fundamentally different in terms of their FCI usage. Coupled with the previous findings
on their different behavior when functioning as NPIs, we can conclude that wh+dou and
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one NP+dou are two different creatures. Simply applying Lahiri’s (1998) theory to Chinese
wh+dou is bound to have problems. I will discuss the implications of these findings on the
semantics of dou, but before I get there, I’ll briefly present the problems with Y.-S. Lee and
Horn’s (1995) theory, which is very similar to that of Lahiri.
1.1.3 Lee and Horn (1995) and its problems
Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995) focus on the lexical item any in English. They argue that
any is underlyingly composed of two ingredients, an indefinite and a focus operator even,
the same as the overt indefinite+even sequence we have been cross-linguistically from Hindi
to Malayalam.
When any is used as an NPI, they pattern it with one NP+even. According to them, the
indefinite in indefinite+even activates a quantity scale in negative sentences. The indefinite
then denotes the least quantity on the scale. Normally, the least quantity is one,55 and so the
indefinite denotes the cardinality predicate one. This proposal of NPI uses of indefinite+even
is exactly the same as that of Lahiri’s. Both treat indefinite+even as one NP+even. The
problems with Lahiri’s (1998) theory, therefore, all carry over to Y.-S. Lee and Horn’s (1995)’s
analysis. I believe there is no need to repeat the examples and detailed explanations once
again here.
As for the generic use of indefinite+even, Y.-S. Lee and Horn assume that indefinites
activate a quality scale and the indefinite denotes an extreme value thereon that makes
the assertion stronger than all the other alternatives. This is where their analysis is slightly
different from Lahiri’s. The latter assumes that indefinite+even invariably denotes one+even,
55I say normally because there are sentences in which the least number on a quantity scale is one half, not













Zhangsan didn’t spend even half a cent.
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either in NPI or FC sentences. The counterexamples against Lahiri’s (1998) theory on the
FCI indefinite+even, therefore, cannot be directly used to argue against Y.-S. Lee and Horn.
However, I will show that Y.-S. Lee and Horn’s analysis of the FCI indefinite+even has it
own insufficiencies.
The idea that a generic sentence involves an extreme value on a quality scale is not new.
Fauconnier (1975) finds that the following two sentences have the same semantic meaning.
(262) Alfred will eat any food.
(263) Alfred will eat the most awful food.
A natural explanation of this semantic equivalence is that any refers to the low end of the
scale measuring the food quality. Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995) agree with Fauconnier on this
point and adopt it in their theory. It’s worth emphasizing that this theoretical choice comes
with an accompanying assumption that the FCI any always activates a quality scale. In
other words, the alternatives should always stand in a scalar relationship with each other. It
is this assumption that I am about to challenge. Take a look at (264) and (265), where two
mathematical axioms are presented. In set theory, it is established that any set is a subset of
itself. This axiom applies to all sets indiscriminately. What’s more, the sets are not ordered
in any kind of scalar relationship so that one set will satisfy this axiom to a bigger degree
than the set lower than it on the scale. Actually, an attempt to impose such a scale will make
the sentence ungrammatical, as shown in (264b). In (265), the same contrast is replicated.
The fact that a triangle has a sum of 180◦ of its internal angles is only due to its identity as
a triangle. It has nothing to do with any other additional quality it has. This explains the
ungrammaticality of (265b).
(264) a. Any set is a subset of itself.
b. *Even the largest set is a subset of itself.
(265) a. Any triangle has a sum of 180◦ of its internal angles.
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b. *Even the smallest triangle has a sum of 180◦ of its internal angles.
The contrast demonstrated in the previous sentences makes it crystal clear that any does
not activate a quality scale as a superlative qualitative adjective does in generic sentences.
The assumed semantic equivalence between the two upon which Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995)
base their theory is overthrown by examples like (264) and (265). Their idea of reducing any
to superlative+even is unwarranted.
In Chinese, we find wh+dou behaves in the same way as English any in generic contexts.
(266) Context: In a writing class, the teacher wants the students to write an essay about
the unconditional love a mother has for her children. She makes an opening line that










































Even the loneliest person has a mother, who gives birth to her.
It is common knowledge that anyone has a biological mother. This fact only has to do with
the quality denoted by the NP restriction of shei, i.e. the quality of being a human. Inserting
a qualitative superlative like ‘loneliest’, like what is done in (266), will imply that whether
a person has a mother is correlated with the degree of loneliness that person has. This
correlation is not allowed by our world knowledge. No surprise that (266b) is ungrammatical.
I have given a brief review of Lahiri’s (1998) and Y.-S. Lee and Horn’s (1995) theories.
The former relegates indefinite+even to one NP+even in both the NPI and FC sentences.
The latter reduces indefinite+even to one NP+even in its NPI use, and to superlative+even
in its FCI use. This simple idea of analyzing indefinite+even as underlyingly equivalent to
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one NP+even or superlative+even turns out to be problematic. In the next section, I will
discuss the implications of the counterexamples to these two theories on the semantics of
dou.
1.1.4 Implications to dou
The examples against Lahiri (1998) and Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995) may seem random,
but they are not. They are devised specifically targeting the difference between an indefinite
and a scalar phrase. As we have argued in Chapter 2, the individual reading of Chinese wh-
indefinites assigns them a denotation of a set of unordered alternatives. This lack of internal
ordering will make them at odds with the focus operator even, whose likelihood implicature
explicitly requires a scalar ordering among the alternatives.
Heim (1984) observes that minimizers like ‘a single dime’ are not licensed in a typical
NPI environment if it does not facilitate the satisfaction of the scalar implicature carried by
the minimizer. Compare (267a) and (267b). From (267a), we understand that the speaker
thinks iceberg lettuce is something that should be provided to the customers for free by
every restaurant. Even if a restaurant charges as little as a dime for it, it ought to be closed
down. Needless to say those which charge more than a dime. The scalar implicature of ‘so
much as a dime’ is satisfied in this sentence. In (267b), however, the property denoted by
the predicate ‘actually has four stars in the handbook’ is an accidental property that does
not have the remotest connection with how much a restaurant charges for iceberg lettuce.
The scalar implicature is extremely hard to accommodate in this case. This is why (267b)
sounds very odd. The NPI any, on the other hand, does not have a scalar requirement, and
so it is grammatical in the same sentence frame, shown in (268).
(267) a. Every restaurant that charges so much as a dime for iceberg lettuce ought to be
closed down.
b. ??Every restaurant that charges so much as a dime for iceberg lettuce actually
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has four stars in the handbook.
(268) Every restaurant that advertises in any of these papers happens to have four stars in
the handbook.
Both our counterexamples to Lahiri (1998)/Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995) and Heim’s
(1984) observations point to one conclusion: indefinites, the individual-reading Chinese wh-
indefinites or English any56, do not impose a scalar ordering onto its alternatives. This
conclusion also further corroborates the one we made in Chapter 2.
Heim (1984) classfies NPIs into ones with an inherent even and ones without. Minimizers
belong to the former type, and any/ever belong to the latter. If any as an indefinite does
not take even along with it, a pertinent question to ask for wh+dou in Chinese is, do we
still want to analyze dou as even? I argue the answer is no. The unordered structure of the
indefinites is part of their semantic nature, one that clashes with the ordering requirement
imposed by even. The counterexamples I give in previous sections are all traced back to this
basic semantic clash. After all, how can two semantic objects that carry conflicting semantic
requirement get along with each other?
1.1.5 A template for the counterexamples
In this section, I would like to provide a template for the counterexamples we have seen
in previous section. On the one hand, this template reiterates that the difference between
wh+dou and one NP/superlative+dou is semantically founded. On the other hand, the read-
ers can refer to this template to make their own examples.
• NPI wh+dou and one NP+dou
56Recall that I have mentioned before the discussion on any in this dissertation is confined to any followed
by a singular noun.
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wh+dou neg one+dou neg
Predicates that
denote one-time-only event relative to the NPI
E.g. make his debut in 11111 city
X ×
Predicates that are collective relative to the NPI
E.g. count 11111 × X
Predicates that
denote an accidental property relative to the NPI
E.g. 11111 has a four star
X ×
• FCI wh+dou and one NP/superlative+dou
wh+dou one+dou
Predicates that
require a unique singular argument in the FCI position
E.g. 11111 can drive this car
X ×
Predicates that
are collective relative to the FCI




denote a property that only has to do
with the NP restriction of the FCI
E.g. 11111 set is a subset of itself
X ×
1.1.6 Interim conclusion
I have shown that an even analysis of dou along the lines of Lahiri (1998) and Y.-S. Lee
and Horn (1995) cannot stand up to scrutiny. The counterexamples to these two theories
come as no surprise if we take into account the conclusion we have drawn in Chapter 2,
namely, individual-reading Chinese wh-indefinites are associated with an unordered alge-
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braic structure imposed on its domain of alternatives. Since even has a built-in ordering
requirement instead, the combination of individual-reading Chinese wh-indefinites and even
results in a semantic clash. This internal conflict may sometimes be obscured by certain
predicates, as the examples in Lahiri (1998) and Y.-S. Lee and Horn (1995) demonstrate.
Only by using those predicates that can elicit a consequential result from the ordering dif-
ference can we evoke the conflict, shown in our counterexamples.
One thing to note is that the even analysis laid out in the previous sections has a very
narrow focus. It only discusses the wh+dou sequence, without paying attention to other
linguistic contexts in which dou occurs. In the next section, another even analysis of dou
is introduced, whose main goal is to unify the distributive and even uses of dou. I still call
it an even analysis because it takes the even usage as the semantic core of dou and tries to
integrate the distributive use into the even use. Evidence will be given to argue against this
line of even analysis of dou as well.
1.2 A second even analysis after Liu (2017, to appear) and Xiang
(2016, to appear)
When asked what dou means, the first use that comes to mind for most native Chinese
speakers may be its distributive use, see (269). Actually, the initial literature on the semantics
of doumostly confines their discussion to this use only (T. H.-T. Lee, 1986; Y. Li, 1993; X. Li,















They each bought a car.
In recent years, linguists make great efforts in unifying the various uses of dou (Portner,
57The distribution is not necessarily down to atoms. I use ‘each’ here for simplicity. As has been argued in
J.-W. Lin (1996, 1998b), dou can distribute down to the members in a cover that is contextually determined.
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2002; Giannakidou & Cheng, 2006; M. Xiang, 2008; Liao, 2011; Y. Xiang, 2016, to appear;
M. Liu, 2017, to appear). Here, I focus on the unification of the two uses that have drawn
the most attention — distributive use and even use of dou. Specifically, I choose Y. Xi-
ang (2016, to appear) and M. Liu (2017, to appear), the most recent two theories, as the
representative analyses with this particular unification goal. M. Liu’s analysis claims that
dou is semantically a counterpart of English even. Y. Xiang’s theory does not make this
claim, but has a lot in common with the theory put forward in Liao (2011), a precursor of
M. Liu’s theory. Therefore, I still put her theory into the group of the even analysis of dou.
I will give just enough details from these two theories for the sake of understanding, only to
prepare for the later discussion on the problems against them. The even analysis along the
lines delineated in Y. Xiang (2016, to appear) and M. Liu (2017, to appear) will be shown
to be unable to maintain theory-internal consistency. This negative outcome, coupled with
the arguments against the even analysis of dou as put forth in Lahiri (1998) and Y.-S. Lee
and Horn (1995) that we have seen before, brings the whole second type of theories on dou
further into question.
1.2.1 Liu (2017, to appear)
M. Liu (2017) starts with a sentence like (270), where a definite plural serves as the
subject. Following Schwarzschild’s (1996) judgement on the counterpart English sentence
(271), he claims that (270) is ambiguous between a collective and distributive interpretation.
When a covert dist operator as proposed in Schwarzschild (1996) is present in the logical
form, the sentence ends up with a distributive interpretation. When it is absent, the sentence













They collectively bought a car. /They each bought a car.
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(271) They bought a car.
M. Liu takes (270) as evidence that the distributive interpretation in Chinese does not require
an overt distributive operator. According to him, the idea that dou is an overt counterpart
of the dist operator in the sense of Schwarzschild (1996) (J.-W. Lin, 1996, 1998b) is a hasty
conclusion. In a distributive sentence with dou like (269), it may well be the case that a
covert dist is present without dou functioning as the distributor itself.
Another observation made in M. Liu (2017) is that a collective interpretation of the
predicate in a dou-sentence forces an even reading.58 The sentence (269) we have seen before















They each bought a car.
Even they bought a car. (with ‘they’ focused)
How to explain the ambiguity of (272) while maintaining a unified semantics of dou? This
is the main question that M. Liu (2017) tries to answer in his theory. To achieve this goal,
he has the following assumptions. First, definite plurals are interpreted either as a sum or a
group (I will explain shortly), depending on what kind of predicates it is that take them as an
argument. Distributive predicates choose the sum denotation and collective predicates opt
for the group interpretation. The latter is formed by applying an uparrow operator ↑ to the
corresponding sum (Landman, 2000). For example, if there are three contextually relevant
58Note that in a typical even sentence, the focus associate is put in between lian, a preposition literally

















Even they bought a car.
The lian-sentence and lian-less sentence have exactly the same meaning as long as we stress the focus associate
in the lian-less version. In light of these facts, many linguists assume that lian is always present in an even
sentence, overtly or covertly (Paris, 1979, 1998; M. Xiang, 2008, a.m.o.). More discussion on this point will
come in §2.2. In M. Liu’s theory, he completely ignores the semantic contribution of lian. However, in my
theory, lian will play a substantial role in the semantics.
CHAPTER 5: AGAINST DOU AS EVEN 135
people a, b and c, then ‘they’ has a sum interpretation a⊕ b⊕ c and a group interpretation
↑ a⊕ b⊕ c. When a definite plural is interpreted as a group, the atomic parts inside it are
no longer accessible for semantic operation. Second, dou functions as a focus operator. If
the focus associate is a sum, then alternatives are formed by replacing the associate with a
sum formed by its subparts. If the focus associate is a group, then alternatives are formed
by replacing the associate with a group formed by its subparts.
With these two assumptions, M. Liu (2017) argues that dou can be unambiguously
treated as even with both interpretations of sentence (272) captured correctly. M. Liu (2017)
follows Karttunen and Peters’s (1979) theory on English even and gives the semantics as in
(273) to dou. In words, dou takes a proposition p as its prejacent and checks whether p is
less likely than all of its alternatives (excluding p itself). If it is, dou returns p as it is. If
not, a presupposition failure results.
(273) JdouK = λp : ∀q ∈ ALT (p)[q 6= p→ p <likelihood q].p
In the distributive interpretation of (272), M. Liu (2017) assumes that there is a covert
dist operator in the logical form. The prejacent of dou, as a result, stands in a logical entail-
ment relationship with the other alternatives. If the proposition that a⊕ b⊕ c distributively
bought a car is true, then the proposition that a⊕ b distributively bought a car is true, and
the proposition that b⊕ c distributively bought a car is true, and so on. Figure 12 illustrates
the entailment relationship between the alternatives with the arrows marking the entailment
direction.
Since the logical strength of a proposition is tied to its likelihood, i.e. the stronger a
proposition is logically, the less likely it is (Krifka, 1995; Lahiri, 1998; Crnič, 2011), the
prejacent of dou turns out to be the least likely one among its alternatives, making the least
likelihood presupposition of dou automatically satisfied. This automatic satisfaction of the
presupposition, according to M. Liu, leads to a semantic vacuity effect in that the even flavor
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a⊕ b⊕ c dist bought a car
a⊕ b dist bought a car a⊕ c dist bought a car b⊕ c dist bought a car
a bought a car b bought a car c bought a car
Figure 12: Distributive interpretation of (272)
of dou becomes imperceptible. M. Liu (2017) argues that this is exactly why native speakers
of Chinese do not detect the presence of an even meaning in plain distributive sentences with
dou. The even flavor of dou is obscured by the internal entailment relationship between the
prejacent of dou and its alternatives.
In the collective interpretation of (272), however, the covert dist operator is absent. As
mentioned before, the definite plural subject is interpreted as a group in this case. Most
importantly, the logical entailment relationship between the alternatives we have seen in the
distributive interpretation now disappears. The existence of an event of ↑ a ⊕ b ⊕ c collec-
tively buying a car does not entail the existence of an event of ↑ a⊕ b collectively buying a
car or ↑ a⊕ c collectively buying a car or any of the alternatives. Figure 13 shows that the
alternatives are logically independent of each other without entailment arrows connecting
them. The prejacent of dou is no longer the logically strongest one. The least likelihood
presupposition carried by dou is not automatically satisfied. In order for it to be satisfied,
we need a facilitating context in which the prejacent is contextually the least likely one. To
M. Liu, this is why the even flavor of dou emerges in collective sentences.
In his (M. Liu, to appear), M. Liu extends his even theory to explain the FCI use of
wh+dou by integrating some ingredients from Liao’s (2011) and Y. Xiang’s (2016, to appear)
exhaustification theory. I will postpone the discussion of the exhaustification part of M. Liu’s
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↑ a⊕ b⊕ c bought a car
↑ a⊕ b bought a car ↑ a⊕ c bought a car ↑ b⊕ c bought a car
↑ a bought a car ↑ b bought a car ↑ c bought a car
Figure 13: Collective interpretation of (272)
theory to the section 1.2.3 on Y. Xiang’s analysis.
An advantage of the even theory laid out in M. Liu (2017) is that a unified semantics of
dou can be achieved in two typical linguistic contexts dou occurs in. The major innovation
is to shift the burden of distributivity from dou to a covert dist operator, as a result of
which dou can unambiguously contribute an even meaning to the sentence. This advantage
comes with a price, though. A correlation is established between the entailment relation-
ship between the alternatives and the presence/absence of the even flavor of dou. When
the prejacent of dou logically entails the other alternatives, the even flavor is predicted to
be undetectable. When it does not, the even flavor will show up. I will argue below that
this prediction is problematic. In the next section, I will first point out a problem that has
an easy fix, which results in an obligatory enrichment of M. Liu’s alternatives-generating
mechanism. Unfortunately, even with the enrichment, the prediction that the even flavor of
dou will be suppressed when the prejacent is the least likely one is still a wrong one.
1.2.2 Problems with Liu’s (2017) analysis
The first problem with M. Liu’s even theory of dou lies in its alternatives-generating
mechanism. Recall that M. Liu grammaticalizes the mechanism, generating alternatives to
a definite plural NP solely with the atomic subparts constituting the plurality denoted by
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the NP (I call them the internal alternatives henceforth). The atomicities and pluralities
that do not overlap with the subparts of the NP are ignored altogether (I call these alterna-
tives external alternatives henceforth). However, it has been well known since Rooth (1985,
1992) that context plays an important role in deciding which alternatives to activate. Only
those contextually relevant alternatives will be taken into account when computing sentence
meanings. The two different ways of activating alternatives make very different predictions
when it comes to sentence (274).
(274) Context: In a math class on the concept of weight, A group of students is divided into
teams. The team formed by a, b and c is the weakest team since these students are the
least muscular in the class. Different teams take turns to lift a big table. Zhangsan















Even they can lift this table.
This statement of Zhangsan makes perfect sense in this context. If the weakest team
can lift the table, the other teams formed with stronger students can definitely lift it too.
Intuitively, the comparison is made between the team of a, b and c and the other teams
that do not overlap with it. If we follow M. Liu’s grammaticalized alternatives-generating
mechanism, however, we would activate alternatives that are internal, not external to the
plurality denoted by the subject. Let’s assume that the subject denotes the group ↑ a⊕b⊕c,
for the predicate is interpreted collectively. A logical entailment relationship now emerges
between the alternatives, shown in Figure 14. If a alone can lift the table, a together with b
can definitely lift the table, and so on. The prejacent of dou turns out to be the most likely,
NOT the least likely among the alternatives.
Following M. Liu’s logic, the least likelihood presupposition of dou can never be satisfied in
(274), making the sentence a presupposition failure, contrary to fact.
CHAPTER 5: AGAINST DOU AS EVEN 139
↑ a⊕ b⊕ c can lift this table
↑ a⊕ b can lift this table ↑ a⊕ c can lift this table ↑ b⊕ c can lift this table
↑ a can lift this table ↑ b can lift this table ↑ c can lift this table
Figure 14: Problem with grammaticalized alternatives-generating mechanism
The problem posed by (274) may seem to be an easy one. An effective solution would
be to cancel the grammaticalized alternatives-generating mechanism in M. Liu (2017) and
replace it with a context-informed one. But even with this revision some questions still
remain to be answered. In M. Liu’s theory, the explanation of a plain distributive sentence
containing dou crucially relies on the activation of the internal alternatives only. In order
to maintain the existing account, he has to come up with a rationale as to why the plain
distributive sentences always activate the internal alternatives. After all, the distributive
interpretation of dou sentences does not need any contextual support. In contrast, the other
readings always come with a felicitating prosodic cue. For example, the even reading of dou
is accompanied with a prosodic stress on the so-called focus-associate of dou. In view of
the necessity of the context-independent internal alternatives in capturing the distributive
reading and the external alternatives in capturing sentence (274), one possible rationalization
M. Liu could give is that both the internal alternatives and the external alternatives are
activated for every sentence containing dou. After that, a filtering procedure is implemented
to prevent the ungrammatical readings from arising and let pass the grammatical ones. This
architecture of generating semantic meanings for sentences containing dou makes available
four logical possibilities, presented in Table 5.
‘Internal’/‘External’ in the header means what kind of alternatives are being activated.
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Internal External Predicted result
Most likely Most likely Presupposition failure
Likelihood Least likely Least likely Grammatical
Most likely Least likely Grammatical
Least likely Most likely Grammatical
Table 5: Four logical possibilities of activating both kinds of alternatives
‘Result’ gives the grammaticality status of the resulting sentence. ‘Likelihood’ refers to the
likelihood of the prejacent of dou. Let’s examine these four possibilities in order.
Most likely and most likely Imagine we are in a math class on the concept of weight.
The teacher divides the students into several teams, among which the team of John, Mary
and Bill, the three most muscular students in the class, is the physically strongest. The















Even they can lift this table.
Neither the internal alternatives nor the external alternatives could produce a sensible mean-
ing. Compared with the other teams, the team of John, Mary and Bill is the most likely one
to be able to lift this table, contradicting the presupposition imposed by dou. Compared
with the internal alternatives, the team of John, Mary and Bill is still the most likely to be
able to lift this table. If John and Bill by themselves can lift this table, they can definitely
lift it with Mary joined in the team. This sentence is predicted to be unacceptable correctly.
Least likely and least likely For this logical possibility, I consider sentences with both
distributive and collective predicates. In (269), we already see that the prejacent of dou is
the least likely one compared to its internal alternatives. A grammatical distributive inter-
pretation results with even flavor of dou quenched by the automatic satisfaction of its least
likelihood presupposition. What happens if the external alternatives are activated? In the
context given in (276), since John, Bill and Mary are the most reserved students, the fact
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that they all laughed is contextually less likely than any other student/students laughing.The
prejacent of dou is less likely than the external alternatives. An even reading is generated.
(276) Context: John, Bill and Mary are the three students most difficult to amuse. Today










The fact that examples like (276) do exist lends support to the suggestion that both kinds
of alternatives are needed in order to paint a complete picture of dou. M. Liu’s initial
alternatives-generating mechanism, therefore, is proved once again to be inadequate.
In a collective sentence, we find both an even reading of dou against its internal alter-
natives and an even reading of dou against its external alternatives.
(277) Context: There is a flag hanging up high. Students are organized into teams of three
to reach it. They are supposed to form a human stack in order to achieve this goal.
John, Mary and Bill are the three tallest students in the class and they are in a team.


































































Even they three cannot reach the flag. Let alone the other teams.
Both statements are meant to convey how high the flag is, so high that the three tallest
students in a human stack still cannot reach it. Compared with the internal alternatives,
the prejacent of dou is the least likely one. If John, Mary and Bill together cannot reach
the flag, John and Mary alone together cannot reach it either. Compared with the external
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alternatives, the prejacent of dou is still the least likely one. If John, Mary and Bill together
cannot reach the flag, the other teams with shorter students cannot reach it either. In both
cases, an entailment relationship is established between the alternatives. The former bears
a logical entailment relationship while the latter bears a contextual entailment relationship.
What’s worth pointing out is that the even flavor is not suppressed in either case, against
the prediction made in M. Liu (2017).
Most likely and least likelyWe have already seen an example of this possibility. In (274),
the prejacent of dou is the most likely one relative to the internal alternatives, but the least
likely one relative to the external alternatives. Computing the sentence meaning using the
internal alternatives leads to a presupposition failure, but with the external alternatives, the
sentence still has a grammatical meaning.
Least likely and most likely The prejacent of dou in a distributive sentence is always less
likely relative to the internal alternatives. An example that exemplifies this last possibility,
therefore, has to take a collective predicate.
(278) Context: In a math class on the concept of volume, the teacher divides the students
into teams of three. She asks each team to squeeze into a box by twisting their bodies.
John, Mary and Bill are the three thinnest students in the class and they are in the
same team. Max asks you whether you think Mary and Bill alone together can fit





































Even they three can squeeze into the box. Let alone the two of Mary and Bill.
The answer compares the prejacent of dou with the internal alternatives. With the volume
of the box fixed, if John, Mary and Bill together can fit into it, Mary and Bill alone together
can fit into it too. On the other hand, the prejacent is the most likely one to be true when
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the external alternatives are activated. A presupposition failure is predicted to be the result.
As expected, the only chance for (278) to attain a felicitous reading is to compute with the
internal alternatives.
The discussion so far makes it clear that both internal alternatives and external alter-
natives are necessary in the account of dou sentences. We find contexts for dou-sentences
that capitalize on the internal alternatives and also contexts for dou-sentences that make
use of the external alternatives. One thing for sure is that M. Liu’s alternatives-generating
mechanism needs to be enriched in order to incorporate the external alternatives. After the
enrichment, however, are we back to square one? Can M. Liu’s even theory of dou be main-
tained intact? I argue that even with the enrichment, his theory still suffers insufficiencies.
Recall that M. Liu (2017) makes a correlation between the logical entailment relation-
ship between the prejacent of dou and the alternatives, and the presence/absence of an even
reading of dou. When the prejacent logically entails the other alternatives, the presupposi-
tion of dou is trivialized, and no even reading is detected. It is this correlation that I raise
a challenge to. First, as already mentioned in (277), where the prejacent of dou is both
logically strongest relative to its internal alternatives and contextually strongest relative to
its external alternatives, the even flavor is NOT suppressed, as can be seen in the respective
follow-up sentence in the two examples. Second, if the even flavor is suppressed as M. Liu ar-
gues, we cannot explain the felicity of a dou sentence and the infelicity of a dou-less sentence
in a context where the even flavor is demanded, as shown in (279).
(279) Context: Mr. Smith is organizing students to play a human stack game. The purpose
is to reach a flag hanging higher up on a rope. John, Bill and Alex are the tallest





















A: Even John, Bill and Alex together cannot make the height.



















B: *John, Bill and Alex together cannot make the height.
Note that the prompt question makes the internal alternatives the contextually relevant ones.
The prejacent of dou is the logically strongest one among the alternatives. If John, Bill and
Alex in a stack cannot reach the flag, then John and Bill alone in a stack cannot reach it
either, and John by himself cannot reach it either, and so on. With dou, Sue’s answer is
a ridicule to the question. Her answer says something to the effect that ‘even the three
tallest students in a stack cannot make the height, how can the two of just John and Bill
make it?’ Without dou, however, Sue’s answer violates the congruity between questions and
answers by an impromptu introduction of a third irrelevant person. Hence the infelicity. The
contrast between this minimal pair shows that dou’s even flavor emerges intact even when
the prejacent is the logically strongest one. If dou’s even flavor is suppressed, as M. Liu
argues will happen in this case, the clear contrast would not be accounted for. Both answers
are predicted to have the same grammaticality status.
Turning back to the plain distributive sentences containing dou, we find M. Liu is in
a dilemma. He relies on the logical entailment relationship between the prejacent and the
internal alternatives in order to explain why dou does not generate an even flavor in a
distributive sentence. However, extending his logic to sentences with collective predicates
where the same logical entailment relationship holds makes the wrong prediction in example
(279). M. Liu needs to stipulate that the suppression is only effected when the predicate is
distributive, but is somehow obviated when the predicate is collective. But such a stipulative
move would take away the explanatory power of the proposal, and therefore is undesirable.
In conclusion, M. Liu’s main innovation is to shift the burden of distributivity from dou to
a covert dist operator, but the alleviation of the labor for dou leads to problems elsewhere,
making it hard to maintain the logical self-consistency within the theory.
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The last problem has to do with M. Liu’s explanation of the maximality effect brought
about by dou. According to him, the presence of dou in a plain distributive sentence may
seem to have no effect at all, but in fact it achieves a maximality effect (M. Xiang, 2008;
Giannakidou & Cheng, 2006). Take (269) for example again. If the prejacent of dou takes
a non-maximal plurality like a ⊕ b as the subject, the least likelihood presupposition will
fail because we can always find an alternative ‘a ⊕ b ⊕ c dist bought a car’ that is more
unlikely than the prejacent. In order to satisfy the least likelihood presupposition, dou has
to be associated with the maximal plurality in the context. The prediction is incorrect,
unfortunately. In the following context, John’s question makes all the people who went to
the park contextually salient. As predicted by M. Liu, dou should be associated with the
maximal plurality, i.e. the plurality with all the people who went to the park as atomic parts
in it. The answer Bill gives, therefore, should be impossible, but it is perfectly fine in this
context.
(280) Context: John is noting down the number of people who went to the park yesterday.





















B: The teachers all went, and the students all went too.
I have pointed out three problems with the even theory of dou put forward in M. Liu
(2017, to appear). In the next section, I will present Y. Xiang’s (2016, to appear) theory
that shares a lot of similarities with M. Liu (2017), followed by a discussion of the problems
in her theory.
1.2.3 Xiang (2016, to appear)
Y. Xiang (2016, to appear) proposes a theory intended to unify the distributive, free
choice and even use of dou. I summarize her theory into two ingredients here with details
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to be spelled out later. First, dou has an existential presupposition that its prejacent has
at least one sub-alternative. Second, when the presupposition is satisfied, dou affirms its
prejacent and negates all the exhaustified sub-alternatives. The semantics of dou and the
definition of sub-alternatives are given in (282) and (283).59 I leave out the intensional
parts of her definition for expository simplicity. Also, I ignore the contextually determined
pronoun C whose intersection with the focus alternative set yields the contextually relevant
alternatives. In my presentation, the readers can just take Alt(p) as the contextually relevant
alternatives to p.
(282) JdouK(p) = 1 iff ∃q ∈ Sub(p).[p ∧ ∀q ∈ Sub(p)[¬O(q)]]
(283) Sub(p) = (Alt(p)− IExcl(p))− {p}
Some additional definitions need to be understood before we can appreciate (282) and (283).
Excludable alternatives of p, or Excl(p), is the set of alternatives q that are not entailed
by p, shown in (284). Building on this definition, innocently excludable alternatives of p, or
IExcl(p), are defined as the intersection of the maximal sets of the alternatives to p such
that excluding each of the maximal set is consistent with the prejacent. With the definition
of IExcl(p), Y. Xiang defines sub-alternatives of p, Sub(p), as the set of alternatives of
p excluding its innocently excludable alternatives and p itself. Last, the exhaustification
59There is a difference between the theories presented in Y. Xiang (2016) and Y. Xiang (to appear). In the
previous version, Y. Xiang gives a unified definition of sub-alternatives as the one in (283) for the distributive
use and FCI licenser use of dou. In the updated version, however, she gives (i) as the definition of the sub-
alternatives used in the distributive use of dou and (ii) as the definition of the sub-alternatives used in the
FCI licenser use of dou.
(i) Sub(p) = (Alt(p)− Excl(p))− {p}
(ii) Sub(p) = (Alt(p)− IExcl(p))− {p}
The two definitions of sub-alternatives do not make a difference in the calculation of semantic meanings of
distributive sentences containing dou, but opting for the latter will make both the distributive use and FCI
use primary. Y. Xiang argues this is not the optimal choice, considering the historical evidence that the
distributive use emerges long before its FCI licenser use. According to her, taking (i) as primary and (ii) as
a weakening version of (i) will explain the chronological order of the two uses. Here in the text I only give
the second definition with sub-alternatives as the non-innocently excludable alternatives that are distinct
from the prejacent. I ignore Y. Xiang’s classification of the two versions because the motivation behind this
classification is orthogonal to my concerns on her theory.
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operator O applying to a proposition p will affirm the truth of p and negate all the excludable
alternatives of p.
(284) Excl(p) = {q : q ∈ Alt(p) ∧ p 6⊆ q}
(285) IExcl(p,Alt(p)) = ∩{A : A is a maximal subset of Alt(p) s.t. A¬∪{p} is consistent},
where A¬ = {¬q|q ∈ A} (Fox, 2007)
(286) O(p) = 1 iff p ∧ ∀q ∈ Excl(p)[¬q]
Let’s take a look at how Y. Xiang implements the definition of dou in distributive
sentences and collective sentences. In a distributive sentence like (269), repeated here in
(287), she takes on the same assumption as M. Liu that a covert dist is present in the logical
form. Dou as a focus operator is associated with the definite plural subject. Alternatives
are formed by replacing the plural subject with the subparts of it. Suppose ‘they’ refers to















They each bought a car.
(288) LF: Dou(a⊕ b⊕ c dist bgt a car)
(289) ALT = {a⊕b⊕c dist bgt a car, a⊕b dist bgt a car, a⊕c dist bgt a car, b⊕c dist bgt
a car, a bgt a car, b bgt a car, c bgt a car}
The prejacent of dou logically entails all the other alternatives and the readers can verify
for themselves that none of the alternatives is innocently-excludable. This makes the set of
sub-alternatives a set containing the logically weaker alternatives than the prejacent. Dou
then affirms the prejacent and negates the exhaustification of each sub-alternative. The
truth condition we finally obtain in words is ‘a⊕ b⊕ c each bought a car, and not only a⊕ b
each bought a car, and not only a ⊕ c each bought a car, and not only b ⊕ c each bought
a car, and not only a bought a car, and not only b bought a car, and not only c bought a
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car’. The negation of the exhaustification of each weaker alternative does not strengthen
the prejacent at all, because they are already logically entailed to be true by the prejacent
of dou.
In a collective sentence like (290), there is no logical entailment relationship between
the prejacent and the alternatives different from it. In other words, the other alternatives are
all innocently excludable. As a result, the set of sub-alternatives is empty, and the existential
presupposition of dou cannot be satisfied. The incompatibility of dou and a strictly collective

















Intended: They lifted this table together.
(291) LF: Dou(a⊕ b⊕ c lft the table tgt)
(292) ALT = {a ⊕ b ⊕ c lft the table tgt, a ⊕ b lft the table tgt, a ⊕ c lft the table tgt, a
lft the table, b lft the table, c lft the table}
The second use of dou that Y. Xiang (to appear) discusses is its function as an FCI
licenser in wh+dou constructions, exemplified in (293). This sentence is semantically a coun-
terpart of a typical free choice sentence with any, as the translation indicates. Here, Y. Xiang
adopts the common assumption that wh-words like who are an existential quantifier and the
modal has a scope over the entire sentence. Suppose shei has a quantificational domain











Anyone/Everyone can teach Chinese.
(294) LF: Dou(♦(a ∨ b teach Chinese))
61By ‘strictly collective’, I mean collective predicates without the so-called sub-distributive entailment
(Dowty, 1987).
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(295) ALT = {♦(a ∨ b teach Chinese), ♦(a teach Chinese), ♦(b teach Chinese), ♦(a ∧ b)
teach Chinese}
Among the alternatives, the two disjuncts of the original sentence are sub-alternatives. The
presupposition of dou is thus satisfied. Moreover, negating the exhaustification of these two
alternatives strengthens the original disjunctive sentence into a conjunctive one, as can be
seen in (296). A free choice reading is derived accordingly.
(296) Dou(♦(a ∨ b teach Chinese))
= ♦(a ∨ b teach Chinese) ∧ ¬(♦a teach Chinese ∧¬♦b teach Chinese)∧¬(♦b teach
Chinese∧¬♦a teach Chinese)
= ♦(a ∨ b teach Chinese) ∧ (♦a teach Chinese→ ♦b teach Chinese) ∧ (♦b teach
Chinese→ ♦a teach Chinese)
= ♦a teach Chinese ∧♦b teach Chinese
Last, the even use of dou is always associated with a scalar term. Accordingly, Y. Xiang
adjusts the definition of the exhaustifier and sub-alternatives. The new exhaustifier just
affirms its input proposition p and asserts that there is no contextually relevant true propo-
sition that ranks higher than p relative to the contextually determined scale µ, see (297).
The sub-alternatives are defined as those which rank lower on the scale than the prejacent,
see (298). The definition of dou with these two new components is given in (299).
(297) just(p) = p ∧ ∀q ∈ AltC [q → q ≤µ p]
(298) Sub(p) = {q : q ∈ AltC ∧ q µ p}
(299) Dou(p) = 1 iff ∃q ∈ Sub(p).p ∧ ∀q ∈ Sub(p)[¬just(p)]
The readers can verify themselves that the second conjunct in the truth condition of dou is
entailed by the truth of the first. Therefore, the definition of dou can be further simplified
as (300). In words, dou takes a proposition p and checks whether there is a contextually
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relevant alternative that ranks lower than p on the contextually determined scale. If there
is, then dou returns p as it is. For example, in sentence (301), the prejacent of dou activates
other points of time, among which there does exist ones that rank lower than the prejacent
relative to time scale. The presupposition of dou is satisfied. The prejacent is returned and
it asserts that it is 5 o’clock.









It’s already 5 o’clock.
1.2.4 Problems with Xiang’s (2016, to appear) theory
An interesting ingredient of Y. Xiang’s theory is that she assumes the same alternatives-
generating mechanism as M. Liu (2017) for distributive sentences and strictly collective
sentences. A consequence following this assumption is that the problem we have pointed out
in (274) against M. Liu (2017) carries over to Y. Xiang (2016, to appear). The enrichment of
M. Liu’s alternatives-generating mechanism, therefore, has to be added to Y. Xiang’s theory
too.
A second question arising from her theory is why we need dou to be present in a
distributive sentence if it does not change the semantic meaning at all. Y. Xiang is aware
of this potential question and argues that this kind of redundancy also exists in English. In
(303), ‘both’ does not change the semantic meaning we get from the both-less version (302),
yet its presence is still allowed.
(302) John and Mary smiled.
(303) John and Mary both smiled.
Another possible answer given by Y. Xiang is that dou as well as both explicitly contrasts
with non-maximality operators like ‘only a part of/only one of’. She then gives the following
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conversation as evidence. In (304), she claims that the answer with dou is infelicitous. Dou
requires the question under discussion to be ‘is it the case that John and Mary both arrived
or only one of them arrived?’, whose denotation should have an alternative ‘only John arrived
or only Mary arrived’. This alternative, however, is not in the Hamblin set denotation of
the question below, {p : x arrived|person(x)}. The incongruence between the question and
the answer, according to her, results in the infelicity.
(304) a. Q: Who arrived?
b. A: John and Mary #(both/dou) arrived.
I don’t agree with her on this point. First of all, the previous conversation is felicitous
as long as dou does not bear a prosodic focus. Only when it is focused does the infelicity
emerge. In that case, the prosodic accent signals a contrastive focus on dou, making the
so-called non-maximality operators salient.62 Second, if dou always contrasts with the non-
maximality operators, the contrast between the two answers we have seen in (279), repeated
here in (305) will disappear.
(305) Context: Mr. Smith is organizing students to play a human stack game. The purpose
is to reach a flag hanging higher up on a rope. John, Bill and Alex are the tallest








































B: *John, Bill and Alex together cannot make the height.
The denotation of the question is the set {John and Bill together can reach it, John and Bill
together cannot reach it}, yet the denotation of the answer with dou, according to Y. Xiang
62Y. Xiang (to appear) also mentions that the maximality reading is associated with a prosodic focus on
dou. See footnote 13 in her paper.
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is {John and Bill and Alex together cannot reach it, only one of them cannot reach it or only
two of them together cannot reach it}. An incongruity between the question and the answer
results. The dou-less answer is incongruent with the question as well, and is predicted to be
infelicitous. However, as has mentioned, only the latter but not the former answer actually
fails. This contrast is not accounted for if Y. Xiang’s theory is taken to be correct.
Still another problem with Y. Xiang’s theory is the implicit association she has estab-
lished between the different kinds of alternatives participating in the semantic calculation of
dou and the different uses of dou. Namely, the alternatives formed by the sub-parts of dou’s
associate which are logically weaker than the prejacent will yield the distributive use; the
domain alternatives of dou’s associate will yield the FCI use; and the alternatives along the
same contextually determined scale with dou’s associate will yield the even use. This strict
mapping relationship between the types of alternatives and the final reading we get for a
dou-sentence breaks down in example (306).
(306) Context: In a math class on the concept of volume, the teacher divides the students
into teams of three. She asks each team to squeeze into a box by twisting their bodies.
John, Mary and Bill are the three thinnest students in the class and they are in the
same team. Max asks you whether you think Mary and Bill alone together can fit





































Even they three can squeeze into the box. Let alone the two of Mary and Bill.
Here in the given context the question under discussion is Max’s question about whether
Mary and Bill together can fit into the box, a question about the sub-parts of the focus
associate of dou in this case. Accordingly, we activate focus alternatives to the prejacent by
replacing the focus associate with its parts, as in (308). The prejacent of dou turns out to
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be the logically strongest one among the alternatives. The existential presupposition of dou
is automatically satisfied, in the same way as we have seen in the distributive dou-sentences.
Moreover, the exhaustification of the pre-exhaustified sub-alternatives adds nothing to the
truth condition, as they are already entailed by the prejacent.
(307) Prejacent: j ⊕m⊕ b can squeeze into the box.
(308) Alt = {j ⊕m⊕ b csb, j ⊕ b csb, j ⊕m csb, j csb, m csb, b csb}
(309) JDouK = λp : ∃q ∈ Sub(p).p ∧ ∀q ∈ Sub(p)[¬O(q)]
Readers can see that we activate exactly the same types of alternatives (alternatives formed
using the sub-parts of dou’s associate) and apply the same entry of dou (using the exhaustifi-
cation operator O in the pre-exhaustification step) as in the distributive sentences. However,
we still get an even reading for the sentence. Therefore, reducing the different readings to
the types of alternatives (sub-parts vs. domain alternatives vs. scalar alternatives) and the
types of exhaustification operators (O vs. just) does not seem to be correct in this case.
Of course we may say that the alternatives are actually ordered along a likelihood scale.
Sub-alternatives are not the logically weaker ones, but the more likely ones than the preja-
cent. Since logical strength is stronger than likelihood(Lahiri, 1998; Crnič, 2011), i.e. the
logically stronger a proposition is, the less likely it is, the set of logically weaker alternatives
and the set of the more likely alternatives are conflated into the same set. Last, instead of
the exhaustifier O, we use just, the one reserved for the scalar sentences, as in (310). If we
make these changes, we will interpret sentence (306) as a scalar example containing dou that
gives rise to an even reading, which seems to be exactly what we want. The problem, how-
ever, is that we have to explain why in the plain distributive sentences, we never calculate
an interpretation in this way. After all, in a distributive dou-sentence, the prejacent is the
logically strongest one. The logically weaker alternatives and the more likely alternatives
will also conflate into the same set. It should be possible to apply the entry of dou with
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just as the exhaustifier to get an even reading. Yet this possibility never arises. We never
get an even reading in a plain a distributive dou-sentence (unless we activate the external
alternatives).
(310) JDouK = λp : ∃q ∈ Sub(p).p ∧ ∀q ∈ Sub(p)[¬just(q)]
Moreover, we have the same question as to why dou needs to be present when it is semanti-
cally vacuous in (306). Y. Xiang’s answer is that dou still contributes a maximality effect by
contrasting with the non-maximality operators when it is semantically vacuous. We already
point out the problem with this explanation in (305).
One last problem with Y. Xiang’s theory is her explanation of the FCI use of the wh+dou
sequence. It has been noticed that the universal reading of wh+dou is only possible with
a generic predicate. With a past tense episodic predicate, the sentence will fail, as shown
in (311). To explain the ungrammaticality of (311), Y. Xiang (2016) argues that we first
calculate the scalar implicature of the prejacent of dou. Suppose again that the domain of
quantification of who is {a, b}. The scalar alternative to the prejacent will be ‘a and b came’.
The assertion of the prejacent together with the negation of this scalar alternative will lead
to a strengthening meaning that ‘a or b came but it is not the case that they both came’.
Simply put, we get an exclusive inference that only one of the two people came. But this
scalar implicature immediately contradicts the universal reading dou generates. According
to Y. Xiang, the sentence fails because of the clash between the scalar implicature and the










Following her treatment of sentences like (311), one prediction made by Y. Xiang is
that whenever the prejacent of dou has an exclusive inference, inserting dou will result in a
semantic failure. This prediction is not borne out. In (312), a simple declarative sentence
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with what has an exclusive inference that Zhangsan did one bad thing, but not all the bad
things. However, inserting dou to operate on the wh-phrase still leads to a grammatical
universal reading, namely, Zhangsan has done every bad thing. If Y. Xiang’s explanation of
(311) is to be defended, she has to come up with a story as to why we need to compute the
scalar implicature in (311), but not in (313). I don’t see an easy way of accounting for this
























Zhangsan has done any bad thing/every bad thing.
Y. Xiang (to appear) presents another possible solution to the ungrammaticality of
(311). She proposes the following Logical Form for the sentence, assuming the domain of the
wh-word is {a, b}, and posits a standard exhaustifier O in the structure. The alternatives to
the prejacent are in (315). The result of the calculation leads to a contradictory conjunctive
inference, as in (316). This new solution still suffers from empirical insufficiency in sentence
(313). Everything being equal, Y. Xiang has to explain why the derivation of a contradictory
inference only exists for (311), but not (313). Again, I don’t see an easy way of accounting
for this selectivity and regard it as an indication that Y. Xiang’s theory is problematic.
(314) LF: Dou(a ∨ b λx. O xF came)
(315) Alt = {O(a came) ∨O(b came), O(a came), O(b came)}
(316) JDou(a ∨ b λx. O xF came)K = O(a came) ∧O(b came) =⊥
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1.2.5 Interim summary
I have argued against the second even theory of dou, represented by M. Liu (2017, to
appear) and Y. Xiang (2016, to appear). The first problem with their theory is the gram-
maticalized alternatives-generating mechanism they propose for distributive and collective
sentences containing dou, which only considers the internal alternatives. An easy solution
seems to be at hand by including the external alternatives. I admit this solution will solve
some of the problems, but point out that it is not the final answer. M. Liu establishes a
correlation between the logical entailment relationship between the prejacent of dou and
its alternatives and the presence/absence of an even flavor of dou in plain distributive sen-
tences. However, example (279) with a collective predicate which bears the same entailment
relationship exhibits an obligatory even flavor. His theory, therefore, cannot maintain an
internal consistency.
As for Y. Xiang, she also needs to explain why dou is present in a distributive sentence
when it does not change the semantic meaning. Her answer emphasizes the maximality effect
that dou brings about, but the achievement of this effect by evoking the non-maximality op-
erators only happens when a prosodic accent is put on dou. Without the prosodic accent, her
evidence to illustrate the presence of the maximality effect as presented in (304) is invalid.
Moreover, Y. Xiang’s theory also fails to explain the even reading of (306). Her theory
analyzes different readings of dou-sentences as a result of the different setting of two pa-
rameters — the types of sub-alternatives (non-excludable vs. innocently-non-excludable vs.
scalar alternatives that rank lower than the prejacent) and the type of the exhaustification
operators (O vs. just) used to pre-exhaustify the sub-alternatives. Sentence (306) with the
same setting as a plain distributive dou-sentence is not predicted to have an even-reading,
contra fact. If she chooses the same setting of parameters for (306) as the one used in even
dou-sentences, she will then encounters the question why we never get an even reading in a
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simple distributive dou-sentence. Last, Y. Xiang’s explanation of why wh+dou in an episodic
sentence is ungrammatical does not account for the difference between (311) and (313). Her
theory predicts both sentences to be ungrammatical, contra fact.
2 Rejuvenation of the distributor theory
Having pointed out the problems with the even analyses of dou, I now turn to my
argument that the distributor theory of dou still fares better theoretically and empirically.
In the following, I will present a theory of dou where it functions as and only as a distributor.
My theory consists of three ingredients. First, the semantics of dou is kept as simple as the
one given in (317). Second, what dou distributes over is a topic set. The topic set may or
may not be overt in the sentence (Portner, 2002). Third, in distributive sentences, there is
no focus association. In scalar sentences, focus alternatives are used up by a focus operator
lian, which again, may or may not be overt in the sentence (Paris, 1979, 1998; M. Xiang,
2008, a.m.o.).
(317) JdouK = λPτtλXτt.∀y[y ∈ X → P (y)]
2.1 The distributive use
Mandarin Chinese is a well-known topic-prominent language (C. Li & Thompson, 1981,
a.o.). In terms of the information structure, the topic position is a locus of the back-
ground/old information, requiring its occupant to be definite. Subjects in Chinese sentences
are moved to the topic position by default unless a prosodic focus explicitly marks it as the
new information. This explains why an indefinite interpreted non-specifically cannot func-
tion as the subject, but when interpreted as a kind, it can. The contrast between (318) and
(319) illustrates this point.


































A student should study hard and make progress every day.
With the preceding facts on Mandarin in mind, I assume that in a plain distributive
sentence with dou like (269), repeated here in (320), the definite plural ‘they’ is in the topic
position, rather than the subject position. This assumption is supported by the fact that we
































They each bought a car.
The even analyses we discuss previously all treat dou as a focus operator. In their account
of (320), the ‘subject’ is taken to be the focus associate of dou (M. Liu, 2017, to appear;
Y. Xiang, 2016, to appear). If that is the case, we need to answer the question why the
‘subject’ in a distributive dou-sentence never gets prosodically focused. Y. Xiang (to appear)
mentions that the prosodic focus can only be assigned to dou, rather than the ‘subject’. She
takes this fact as evidence that dou in distributive sentences always contrasts with non-
maximality operators to contribute a maximality effect. I already point out some problems
with this argument in §1.2.4. M. Liu (2017) is also aware of the displacement of prosodic
focus in distributive dou-sentences but does not regard it as a serious problem. He says in a
footnote that there are second occurrence focus (Partee, 1999) that never receives the main
stress but triggers alternatives, and stressed additive particles (Krifka, 1998) that themselves
receive stress but are associated with alternative-triggering items. In light of these findings,
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he thinks that the displacement of prosodic focus does not necessarily mean that dou is not a
focus operator or the ‘subject’ is not an alternative-triggering item in distributive sentences.
Here, I depart from Y. Xiang and M. Liu, taking the positioning of a prosodic focus as a
reliable indication of the locus of a semantic focus. Therefore, the absence of prosodic focus
on the ‘subject’ does suggest that it is not an alternative-triggering item in the sentence.
With the above assumptions, I now proceed to the composition of a simple distributive
dou-sentence (320). ‘They’ is a topic set that has its atomic parts as members. Suppose it
stands for the set {j, b, s} here. Dou then takes the VP and applies it to each member in the
set. If the VP holds of every member, the sentence is true. Otherwise it is false.63





J 3 K = λx.∃z[car(z) ∧ bought(z)(x)]
J 2 K = λx.∀y[y ∈ x→ ∃z[car(z) ∧ bought(z)(y)]]
J 1 K = 1 iff ∀y[y ∈ {j, b, s} → ∃z[car(z) ∧ bought(z)(y)]]
One thing worth pointing out is that the topic set can occur covertly when it is contex-
tually salient. In the following context, the quantificational domain of dou is the students
who are supposed to come for the dancing rehearsal. It’s contextually salient so that John
63Again, I simplify the matters here. As J.-W. Lin (1996, 1998b) argues, dou does not necessarily distribute
down to atoms. To accurately capture the semantics of the sentence, we should borrow the concept of cover
from Schwarzschild (1996) and gives the following semantics to dou. As can be seen, dou distributes down
to each member in the cover of the subject.
i. JDouK = λCλPλx.∀y[(y ∈ C(x))→ P (y)]
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does not need to mention it overtly. In the logical form, we posit a pronoun-like topic set
whose value is determined by the context-sensitive assignment function. The compositional
process proceeds in the standard way.
(323) Context: You are a dancing teacher, waiting for the students to come for a rehearsal.








The students have all come.
1
C1 dou came
J 1 Kg = Jdou cameKg(JC1Kg)
= λx.∀y[y ∈ x→ came(y)](g(1))
=1 iff ∀y[y ∈ g(1)→ came(y)]
2.2 The scalar use
Sentence (324) is an example of the so-called scalar use of dou. The focus associate
Zhangsan is put in between lian—a preposition whose literal meaning is ‘including’—and
dou. An interesting discrepancy in the literature on the scalar use of dou is that some
linguists attribute the even meaning to lian while maintaining dou as a universal quantifier
while others attribute the even meaning directly to dou while ignoring lian. The latter choice
is due to the fact that lian can be dropped with the even reading of the sentence unchanged
as long as the focus associate is stressed64, see (325).
64Badan and Del Gobbo (2015) claim that there is a difference between the lian-sentence and lian-less
sentence in that the former does not necessarily require a prosodic focus on the focus associate but the latter
does. Personally, I prefer to have a prosodic accent in both cases.




















Even Zhangsan likes Lisi.
The two different takes on the source of even present themselves in the glosses that different
linguists give to their examples. While F.-H. Liu (1997) glosses lian as even (see also Paris
(1979), Portner (2002), Badan and Del Gobbo (2015), a.m.o.), Y. Zhang (2017) glosses dou






































Even a pupil knows who is the inventor of the movable type printing.
(Y. Zhang, 2017)
I assume with Paris (1979, 1998), M. Xiang (2008) and many others that lian is always
present, overtly or covertly in a scalar dou-sentence. On top of the overt/covert lian, we also
have an overt/covert topic set in the sentence (Portner, 2002), in the same way as we have
seen in a distributive dou-sentence. As a result, the following four sentences all have the
same meaning in the given context. The only difference between them is whether lian and
the topic set is overt or covert.
(328) Context: Zhangsan and Lisi are discussing how popular John is in his class. Knowing















Among their class, even Bill likes John.

































(Among their class), even Bill likes John.
Before we get down to the composition, we have to answer a few questions. First, what is the
semantics of lian? From the literal meaning of it, a natural hypothesis is that lian contributes
a membership condition on its focus associate. ‘Bill’ in (328a) has to be a member of the
topic set ‘their class’. Moreover, the focus associate satisfies the property denoted by the
VP. I call it a property condition. Last, the focus associate is the least likely one in the topic
set to satisfy the property denoted by the VP, i.e. Bill is the least likely one in ‘their class’
to like John. I call this a likelihood condition. The following entry for lian is proposed to




x ∈ (Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
membership condition
∧ P (Y )︸ ︷︷ ︸
property condition
∧




Despite the complexity, each component of the semantics of lian is actually quite intuitive
based on the meaning we get from the scalar sentences. Let’s take (328a), repeated in (330)
for example. Suppose there are three students in John’s class, Bill and Sue and himself. The















Among their class, even Bill likes John.








a. J 3 K = λY.∀x[x ∈ Y → like(j)(x)]
b. J 2 K
= λP.[ b ∈ {j, b, s}︸ ︷︷ ︸
membership condition
∧ P ({j, b, s})︸ ︷︷ ︸
property condition
∧
∀z[z ∈ F -Alt(b) ∩ {j, b, s} ∧ z 6= b→ P ({j, b, s}\{b}) >likely P ({j, b, s}\{z})︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood condition
]]
c. J 1 K
= 1 iff b ∈ {j, b, s}︸ ︷︷ ︸
membership condition
∧∀x(x ∈ {j, b, s} → like(j)(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
property condition
∧
∀z[z ∈ {j, s} → [∀y ∈ {j, s}(like(j)(y))] >likely [∀y ∈ {j, b, s}\{z}(like(j)(y))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood condition
]
The membership condition asserts that Bill is a member of the topic set. The property
condition asserts that the property denoted by dou-VP holds of the topic set. Since Bill
belongs to the topic set, we can derive from the membership condition and the property
condition that Bill likes John. Last, the likelihood condition comes in. Following Rooth
(1985), I assume that the prosodic focus placed on the focus associate α triggers a focus
(F-)alternative set containing all the expressions of the same type as α, as in (332).
(332) F-Alt(α)=Dtype(JαK) if α is focused
The topic set then restricts our attention to the members in it only. For each element x in
the topic set that is distinct from the focus associate Bill, the likelihood that dou-VP holds
of the topic set with Bill subtracted from it is higher than the likelihood that dou-VP holds
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of the topic set with the x subtracted from it. In the small model we assume, the likelihood
condition is as shown in (333).
(333) Likelihood condition:
∀z[z ∈ {j, s} → [∀y ∈ {j, s}(like(j)(y))] >likely [∀y ∈ {j, b, s}\{z}(like(j)(y))]]
Let’s break down this likelihood condition to see what it says. If we choose Sue as the value
of z in the formula, then we get ‘the likelihood that both j and s like j is greater than the
likelihood that both j and b like j’, as in (334).
(334) [∀y(y ∈ {j, s} → like(j)(y))] >likely [∀y(y ∈ {j, b} → like(j)(y))]
= j&s like j >likely j&b like j
If the likelihood of John, Sue, and Bill liking John are represented as pj, ps and pb respectively,
(334) can be further simplified into (335), from which we derive that the likelihood of Sue
liking John is greater as the likelihood of Bill liking John, in (336).
(335) pj × ps >likely pj × pb
(336) ps >likely pb
Iterating through the other members distinct from the focus associate Bill will lead to the
result that the likelihood of Bill liking John is at least as small as the likelihood of each of
the other members liking John. This is exactly the likelihood inference we get from sentence
(330), i.e. Bill is the least likely person to like John.
There is one last point I need to mention here. In the huge literature on even, the
semantic status of the likelihood condition has not been agreed in consensus. Some linguists
assign it a presuppositional status (Bennett, 1982; Kay, 1990; Karttunen & Peters, 1979, a.o.)
while others treat it as an implicature (Rooth, 1985; Lahiri, 1998; Portner, 2002, a.o.). Lahiri
(1998) and Portner (2002) do not explicitly say whether they mean conversational implicature
or conventional implicature, while Rooth (1985) states explicitly that the likelihood condition
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is a conventional implicature. Here in our theory, the likelihood condition is written as part
of the assertion. Therefore, our theory is more in line with Rooth’s stand on this issue.
In another scalar use where the focus associate is an inherently scalar item, shown in
(337), the same set of assumptions as to the presence of lian and a topic set, coupled with







It’s already five o’clock.
In this sentence, the time expression wudian is turned into a predicate. The complete original
sentence is something like (338). Without lian, the time expression prefers to stay in the
predicate position. As mentioned before, both the topic set and lian can be covert. Therefore,

































It’s already five o’clock.
Even though the time expression wudian prefers not to move to adjoin lian when lian is
covert, at the logical form, however, we still assume that it undergoes focus movement to a
position adjacent to the covert lian. The topic time, i.e. the utterance time u in this case,
denotes a set of time points ending with the moment when the utterance is made. Moreover,
I assume that when the time has reached a certain moment, it is true to say that the time
has reached every moment that is at least as early as that moment. For example, if it is
5 o’clock now, then it is true that the time has reached 1 o’clock, 2 o’clock, 3 o’clock, 4
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o’clock and 5 o’clock. The likelihood that a later moment has arrived is then smaller than
the likelihood that an earlier moment has arrived. With these assumptions in place, we are







a. J 3 Kg = λY.∀x[x ∈ Y → arrived(x)]
b. J 2 Kg
= λP.[ 5 ∈ {..., g(u)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
membership condition
∧ P ({..., g(u)})︸ ︷︷ ︸
property condition
∧
∀z[z ∈ F -Alt(5) ∩ {..., g(u)} ∧ z 6= 5→ P ({..., g(u)}\{5}) >likely P ({..., g(u)}\{z})︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood condition
]]
c. J 1 Kg
=1 iff[
5 ∈ (−∞, g(u)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
membership condition
∧∀y ∈ (−∞, g(u)][arrived(y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
property condition
∧
∀z[z ∈ (−∞, g(u)] ∧ z 6= 5→




In the truth condition, the membership condition says 5 o’clock is at least as early as the
utterance time. The property condition then says for each moment before or at the utterance
time, it has arrived. As we mentioned before, if a certain moment in time has arrived, then it
is true that every moment that is at least as early as that moment has arrived. The property
condition, therefore, can be simplified as saying that the utterance time has arrived. Since
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5 o’clock is at least as early as the utterance time, it also has arrived. Last, the likelihood
condition says the likelihood that the latest moment in the topic set with 5 subtracted has
arrived is greater than the likelihood that the latest moment in the topic set with any other
moment in the topic set distinct from 5 being subtracted. How can this condition be true?
Suppose 5 o’clock is a moment before the utterance time, the latest moment in the topic
set with 5 subtracted will then be the utterance time itself. In this case, we can always find
another moment distinct from 5 that precedes the utterance time, e.g. 4 o’clock. The latest
moment in the topic set with 4 subtracted will still be the utterance time itself. As a result,
the likelihood condition is contradictory and cannot be satisfied, shown in (342).
(342) When 5 o’clock is a moment preceding the utterance time, the likelihood condition is
contradictory[






When 5 o’clock itself is the utterance time, with any other moment distinct from it subtracted
from the topic set, the latest moment in the set will always be 5 o’clock. Since the likelihood
that 5 o’clock is the smallest relative to the likelihood that any other moment preceding it
has arrived, the likelihood condition can now be satisfied, shown in (343).
(343) When 5 o’clock is the utterance time, the likelihood condition is satisfied[




∀y(y ∈ (−∞, 5]\[5]→ arrived(y))] >likely [arrived(5)]
]
In conclusion, sentence (338) means something to the effect that ‘5 o’clock has arrived and
compare to the moments before it, 5 o’clock is the least likely one to have arrived’. The
speaker basically thinks it is more likely for the utterance time to be some moment earlier
than 5. This is how we get the inference that the speaker thinks 5 o’clock is unexpectedly
late to him/her.
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The topic time is not always the utterance time. When the topic time is not overt in
the sentence, we set it to the utterance time by default, as in (337), but an overt topic time











At that time, it was already five o’clock.
I don’t do the composition again here. The readers can verify for themselves that the sentence
is true if and only if 5 o’clock is the topic time that arrived. Moreover, compare to the other
moments preceding the topic time, 5 o’clock is the least likely one to have arrived at the
topic moment. Thus we get the inference that the speaker thinks at the topic moment, 5
o’clock is unexpectedly late to him/her. Whether the topic time is set to the utterance time
or some other contextually determined time, the focus associate always has to be the latest
moment in the topic set for the least likelihood condition to be true.
When the predicate contains a negation, as in (345), the topic time is no longer the
moments that have arrived, but those that have not. Intuitively, the sentence conveys the














It is not even 5’clock.
With the topic time as (g(u),∞), and the focus alternatives as {(5,∞), (6,∞), (7,∞)...},
we get a truth condition as in (346). The membership condition and the property condition
together identify 5’clock as a moment that has not arrived. For a moment to not arrive
means for itself and for any moment later than it to not arrive. Therefore, in order to satisfy
the likelihood condition, 5’clock has to be the earliest moment among the all the moments
that have not arrived yet. In other words, compare to the other moments later than it, 5
o’clock is the least likely one to not have arrived at the utterance time. This is how we get
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the inference that the speaker thinks the utterance time is unexpectedly early to him/her.
(346) J345Kg
=1 iff[
5 ∈ (g(u),∞)︸ ︷︷ ︸
membership condition
∧∀y ∈ (g(u),∞)[¬arrived(y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
property condition
∧
∀z[z ∈ (g(u),∞) ∧ z 6= 5→





In this dissertation, I have investigated the non-uniformity of Chinese wh-indefinites through
the lens of the algebraic structure. It is shown that what kind of readings a wh-indefinite can
generate is closely tied to what kind of algebraic structure it is associated with. Specifically,
the individual-denoting wh-indefinites that are associated with an unordered structure, in-
cluding the sg-marked ones (e.g. na ge xuesheng ‘which student’), the num-modified ones
(e.g. na liang ge xuesheng ‘which two students’), and the bare wh-phrase shei ‘who’ can
give rise to an epistemic reading in both positive and negative sentences. In contrast, the
non-num-modified plural which-phrases (e.g. na xie xuesheng ‘which students’) that are
associated with a structure of partial ordering, however, can never generate an epistemic
reading. Two different theories of the epistemic indefinites are shown to be insufficient in
that they incorrectly predict the non-num-modified plural which-phrases to also have an
epistemic reading.
On the other hand, the degree-denoting wh-phrases (e.g. ji ben shu ‘how many books’)
that are associated with a structure of total ordering behave similarly to gradable adjectives.
They have an existential reading in positive sentences and give rise to an insignificance
reading under a clausemate negation. The epistemic reading which is argued to be confined
to those wh-indefinites associated with an unordered structure is impossible for them.
Shenme ‘what’ sticks out among the Chinese wh-indefinites because it straddles both
types of wh-indefinites. When it is kind-denoting, it is associated with an unordered structure
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and has an epistemic reading. When it is degree-denoting, it is associated with a structure of
total ordering and has an insignificance reading under a clausemate negation. The adverb-
denoting zenme ‘how’ exhibits the same ambiguity as shenme does. When it denotes a
certain manner, it has an epistemic reading. Yet when it denotes a gradable adverb like
‘frequently’, however, it has an insignificance reading under a clausemate negation.
The algebraic theory of Chinese wh-indefinites also helps assessing the different analyses
on the particle dou that interacts with the wh-indefinites. Based on the findings on the
non-uniformity of Chinese wh-indefinites, I show that the recent even theory of dou is on the
wrong track.
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